Tierney v. Davidson

• Decision Date: 07 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 324,D,324
• Citation: 133 F.3d 189
• Parties: Maureen TIERNEY, for herself and as mother of Philip T. Newton, Plaintiffs-Appellees, Patrick J. Newton, Plaintiff, v. Joel R. DAVIDSON; Thomas E. Williams, Defendants-Appellants, State of Vermont, Defendant. ocket 97-7172.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 189

133 F.3d 189

Maureen TIERNEY, for herself and as mother of Philip T Newton, Plaintiffs-Appellees Patrick J. Newton, Plaintiff, v. Joel R. DAVIDSON; Thomas E. Williams, Defendants-Appellants State of Vermont, Defendant.

No. 324, Docket 97-7172.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Oct. 15, 1997.

Decided Jan. 7, 1998.

Timothy B. Tomasi, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, VT (William E. Griffin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellants.

Alicia Aiken, Rutland, VT (Herbert G. Ogden, Jr., Liccardi Crawford & Ogden, P.C., on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Before: JACOBS and LEVAL, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge ^*.

JACOBS, Circuit Judge:

Officers Joel Davidson and Thomas Williams of the Vermont State Police (the "Officers") responded separately to a report of a raucous domestic dispute at Maureen Tierney's home. Tierney, suing on behalf of herself and her son, Philip Newton, claims that the Officers conducted an unlawful search of her premises and used excessive force against her and her son on that occasion. The Officers now appeal the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Murtha, Ch. J.), denying their motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. We vacate the district court's order and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Officers on plaintiffs' federal claims because: (i) the district court erred in concluding that a genuine dispute existed as to material facts; (ii) the district court erred in according preclusive effect to a state court's suppression ruling; and (iii) it was objectively reasonable for the Officers to believe that their actions did not violate clearly established law. In addition, having dismissed the federal claims, we dismiss the state claims for lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

The facts, viewed on this motion for summary judgment in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, are as follows:

On September 21, 1992, Officer Davidson was dispatched to a residence on Little Rutland Road in Castleton, Vermont. The dispatcher told Davidson that she had received a call from an unnamed woman who reported that a "bad" domestic dispute was in progress, that there had been previous domestic disturbances at the same house, and that this episode was the worst yet. As Davidson drove down Little Rutland Road, he saw two men on the road, and approached them. One of them said that his wife had called the police. They pointed to a residence and told Davidson that it had been the scene of prior domestic altercations, that this was the worst yet, and that they had heard screaming and banging up until Davidson's approach. ¹ Tierney's residence was quiet as Davidson walked up to it. According to Davidson, the silence suggested to him that someone in the house might be injured, and the fact that the dispute had just ended suggested to him that both parties to the fight were still present.

Behind a screen door, the door to Tierney's residence was closed and locked, with a broken glass pane through which a hand could reach. The door led onto a landing from which a stairway descended.

Davidson opened the door through the broken pane, and entered the house without knocking or identifying himself. ² Tierney then appeared at the bottom of the stairs with her two children. Davidson told her he had received a noise complaint and asked her about the dispute. Tierney said nothing had happened, there was no problem, and asked him to leave. Tierney's face was red and she seemed upset and shaken. Davidson headed down the stairs. Tierney then told him to "get the fuck out." Davidson asked her if there was anyone else in the house, and she said no. Davidson asked her whom she had argued with; Tierney told him "it was none of his business," but then added that the person had left the house. Again Davidson asked who had been arguing with her; again Tierney denied any argument; again Tierney told Davidson to "get the fuck out." Davidson persisted and Tierney now responded that the other person had gone. Davidson warned Tierney that he feared for the safety of the children and told her that they could be placed with Social and Rehabilitative Services if they remained in danger.

At that point in the conversation, Davidson surveyed the visible areas of the house and moved towards the children's bedroom. Tierney stepped in front of him to block the bedroom doorway; Davidson grabbed her wrist in a firm grip, and moved her backward through the doorway into the bedroom, letting go after about ten seconds without hurting her. In the children's bedroom, Davidson looked under the beds. Again Davidson warned that the children would be removed if they were in danger, and held Philip's wrist for five seconds without hurting him.

Meanwhile, Williams arrived at the house and learned from a bystander that Davidson was inside. Williams found the door open, and could hear Tierney and Davidson yelling. He then entered the house to provide backup.

After Williams reached the bottom of the stairs, a man grabbed him by the shoulder and loudly told him to leave. This was Patrick Newton, Tierney's boyfriend and the father of her children. The Officers, perceiving that Williams was being assaulted and fearing that Newton might gain control of his service revolver, jumped on Newton to subdue him. Williams tried to wrestle Newton to the ground. Tierney claims that the Officers delivered six or seven punches to Newton's head. As Williams was pinning Newton on the floor, Tierney tried to pull Williams off and tackle him. In response, Williams struck Tierney on the forearm with his nightstick. The Officers eventually pepper-sprayed Newton, subdued him, handcuffed him, and led him from the house. ³

As the Officers removed Newton, Tierney attempted to follow them out of the house, but Davidson grabbed her arm and threatened to remove the children if she did not stop interfering. After Newton was placed in the police car, Tierney saw Davidson speaking with a man she had never seen, who was inside her doorway, one step down from the landing. Tierney told the man to leave; Davidson told her that the man on the step was his informant; and several seconds later, both men left the house.

Newton was later charged with impeding an officer during an investigation of an alleged domestic assault, but the Vermont District Court granted Newton's motion to suppress and dismissed the case. The state court found that even if the statements of the neighbors and the suddenly silent premises could lead police reasonably to believe that an emergency existed when they entered the premises, the Officers had little evidence after entry to support a reasonable conclusion that an emergency continued to exist. There was no overturned furniture, no blood, no dangerous weapon, no hysterical victim, no noise; the putative victim told Davidson that the other party had left, and asked Davidson to leave as well. The state court ruled that the Officers' continued search of the premises exceeded the scope of a permissible search because "insufficient circumstances existed for a reasonable person, without further information, to conclude that an emergency still existed or that anyone inside was still in need of assistance at that point." The state's attorney did not appeal.

Plaintiffs now assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Vermont constitution and common law. ⁴ After completion of discovery, the Officers moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity from suit even under Tierney's version of the facts. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the state court suppression decision "precludes a finding that the defendants are entitled to a qualified immunity defense as a matter of law." The court continued:

Here ... there exists a genuine factual dispute as to whether the defendants entered a closed door upon initial entry into plaintiff's home. There are also factual disputes regarding the reasonableness of the defendants' asserted belief in "exigent circumstances" and, assuming the initial existence of exigent circumstances, whether and when the defendants exceeded the permissible scope of their limited privilege to be in plaintiff's home. Accordingly, on the instant record, the Court cannot conclude the defendants did not violate clearly established law, nor can it find the defendants' actions were objectively reasonable.

DISCUSSION

I

We consider at the outset plaintiffs' argument that we lack jurisdiction to entertain this interlocutory appeal. Generally, "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). We have held that an interlocutory appeal is available

to challenge the trial judge's rejection of the immunity defense where the defendant contends that on stipulated facts, or on the facts that the plaintiff alleges are true, or on the facts favorable to the plaintiff that the trial judge concluded the jury might find, the immunity defense is established as a matter of law because those facts show either that he "didn't do it" or that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his action did not violate clearly established law.

Salim v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 90-91 (2d Cir.1996). Even where the lower court rules that material disputes of fact preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity, we may still exercise interlocutory jurisdiction if the defendant contests the existence of a dispute or the materiality thereof, or (what may be the same thing) contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity even under plaintiff's version of the facts. See Salim, 93 F.3d at 91; see also Martinez v. City of...