Commonwealth v. Bell
| Citation | 288 Pa. 29,135 A. 645 |
| Decision Date | 03 January 1927 |
| Docket Number | 84 |
| Parties | Commonwealth v. Bell, Appellant |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
Argued September 29, 1926
Appeal, No. 84, March T., 1926, by defendant, from judgment of Superior Court, April T., 1926, No. 162, affirming judgment of sentence of Q.S. Allegheny Co., Sept. T., 1925 No. 875, on verdict of guilty in case of Commonwealth v. John A. Bell. Affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court. See 88 Pa.Super. 216.
Indictment in quarter sessions for offenses committed by president of a bank in his official capacity. Before HENNINGER, P.J. specially presiding.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Sentence on verdict of guilty on certain counts. Affirmed by Superior Court. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned was, inter alia, judgment of Superior Court, quoting it.
The judgment of the Superior Court, affirming the sentence of the Court of Quarter Sessions of the Peace of Allegheny County, is affirmed, and it is ordered that the defendant, John A. Bell, appear in the latter court at such time as he may be there called, and that he be by that court committed until he has complied with so such of his sentence as had not been served at the time the appeal in this case was made a supersedeas, unless he shall sooner be discharged therefrom according to law.
O. K. Eaton, with him John S. Robb, Jr., W. W. Hindman and Vincent A. Baldauf, for appellant. -- The doctrine of repeal by implication applies to criminal statutes as well as others.
Section 6 of the Act of 1878, is not deprived of validity because of the absence of a repealing clause, nor is the Act of 1860, for the same reason, kept in existence. They are absolutely inconsistent; there is such a manifest and total repugnance that the two enactments cannot both stand: Schuylkill Haven Boro. v. Trinity Church, 62 Pa.Super. 413.
Where the legislation in the supplement is germane to the subject of the original bill the object of such supplement is sufficiently expressed in the title which quotes the title of the original act: State Line, etc., App., 77 Pa. 429; Pottstown Boro., 117 Pa. 538.
The act in question has not been declared unconstitutional by any decision in this Commonwealth. In the following case the sufficiency of the title of the act was questioned with particular reference to the first four sections: Com. v. Flecker, 17 Pa. C.C.R. 671. See also Com. v. Shoener, 30 Pa.Super. 321; Com. v. Keuhne, 42 Pa.Super. 361; Com. v. Scheiring, 61 Pa.Super. 261.
The evidence admitted amounted to proof of distinct and different crimes and independent offenses: Shaffner v. Com., 72 Pa. 60.
One embezzlement does not prove another (unless some connection between the two be shown) any more than one assault proves another: Com. v. House, 223 Pa. 487.
To convict a defendant on evidence which should not have been admitted is not giving him the full and fair hearing to which he is entitled as a part of his constitutional rights.
Samuel H. Gardner, District Attorney, with him H. R. Phillips, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee, cited as to admissibility of evidence of other acts committed by the defendant and not alleged in the indictment: Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. 388; Com. v. Swab, 59 Pa.Super. 485; Com. v. Bell, 166 Pa. 405; Com. v. House, 6 Pa. Superior Ct. 92; Com. v. Johnson, 133 Pa. 293; Kramer v. Com., 87 Pa. 299.
Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.
Defendant, who for many years had been president of a trust company of this Commonwealth, authorized to receive deposits of money, was indicted under the Act of April 23, 1909, P.L. 169, being charged, in fourteen separate counts, with various crimes committed by him in his official capacity. He was acquitted so far as respects the fifth and sixth counts, but convicted on the others. Subsequently a perpetual stay was entered as to the first four counts; he was sentenced on the last eight; the Superior Court affirmed the sentence, and from its judgment we allowed the present appeal.
The first four counts allege the commission of offences more than four years prior to indictment found. For this reason defendant moved to quash them, alleging that the applicable statute of limitations was four years, as fixed by section 6 of the Act of June 12, 1878, P.L. 196. The Commonwealth claimed that that section was void, under article III, section 3, of our state Constitution, because its subject-matter was not clearly expressed in the title to the statute. To this we cannot assent. The Act of 1878 is entitled "An act supplementary to an act entitled 'An act to consolidate, revise and amend the penal laws of this Commonwealth,' approved the 31st day of March, Anno Domini 1860 [P.L. 382]." The contention seems to be that because the Act of 1860 says nothing regarding the limitation of actions, no supplement thereto can constitutionally deal with that subject, especially as it is covered by another statute of 1860, of the same date, commonly called the Criminal Procedure Act, P.L. 427. We are not concerned, however, with the course pursued by the legislature of 1860. It had the right, within constitutional limitations, to make as many or as few statutes as it pleased regarding the general subject of crimes; but it could not, by the course it chose to pursue, affect the right of the legislature of 1878, to legislate in such a way as it desired.
It has been uniformly held that where the title to an act alleges it is a supplement to a preceding statute, any provision which could have been inserted in the earlier act, without infringing constitutional provisions, may be inserted in the later one, and this is so although that particular subject had not been dealt with in the original statute (State Line & Juniata R.R. Co.'s App., 77 Pa 429; In re Pottstown Borough, 117 Pa. 538; Phila. v. Ridge Ave. Ry. Co., 142 Pa. 484, 491) provided only the supplementary act be germane also to the subject dealt with in the original act (Mt. Joy Borough v. Lancaster, etc., Turnpike Co., 182 Pa. 581), as in this case it was, since that subject was crimes and the liability therefor. One of the best descriptions of a supplemental act is found in the opinion of the lower court, adopted by us in Troop v. Pittsburgh, 254 Pa. 172: "When we speak of a supplemental act, we intend something added to, something new, and in legislation we mean, by a supplement to an act already in force, to add to it something not contained in the original, which new and added legislation is nevertheless germane to the subject of that already in force." Apparently recognizing this, the Commonwealth calls attention to the fact that the earlier sections of the Act of 1878 are really amendments and not supplements to the Act of 1860. It will be time enough to decide whether their provisions are sufficiently disclosed by the title, when that question is duly raised. At this time we are only interested in the sixth section, and it is clearly covered by the title, for a statute of...
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