Yeaton v. Boston & L. R. Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 September 1883
• Citation: 135 Mass. 418
• Parties: Richard H. Yeaton v. Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

135 Mass. 418

Richard H. Yeaton v. Boston and Lowell Railroad Corporation

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

September 8, 1883

Suffolk. Tort for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while in the defendant's employ as a brakeman. At the trial in the Superior Court, before Blodgett, J., the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, in the sum of $ 11,000 and the defendant alleged exceptions. The facts appear in the opinion.

Exceptions sustained.

D. S Richardson, & J. H. George (of New Hampshire), for the defendant.

W. Gaston & C. L. B. Whitney, for the plaintiff.

C. Allen J. Devens & W. Allen JJ., absent.

OPINION

C. Allen J.

The general rule of law, that a servant takes upon himself the risk of the dangers which ordinarily attend or are incident to the business in which he voluntarily engages, is well settled and undisputed. Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co. 102 Mass. 572, 583. Huddleston v. Lowell Machine Shop, 106 Mass. 282. Sullivan v. India Manuf. Co. 113 Mass. 396. Ladd v. New Bedford Railroad, 119 Mass. 412. Hough v. Railway Co. 100 U.S. 213. Swainson v. North Eastern Railway, 3 Ex. D. 341, 351. Charles v. Taylor, 3 C. P. D. 492. Lovell v. Howell, 1 C. P. D. 161. The plaintiff, while recognizing the general rule, contends that it is not applicable to this case, mainly on two grounds; namely, that there was no evidence that he knew or understood that it was any part of his duty to assist in moving damaged cars; and, secondly, that, if he was so to assist, it was only in the manner which his experience or instructions led him to believe was the usual manner, namely, by not being ordered to get upon damaged cars, and certainly not unless previously notified that they were damaged. This argument is much elaborated by the plaintiff's counsel, but we have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff's case does not fall within any qualification of the general rule.

According to the plaintiff's own testimony, he was employed, early in October, 1880, as a brakeman in the defendant's yard, and was put to work in the yard at East Cambridge, on the switching engine, which was an engine used to change cars about the yard, to make up trains, and to shift out the cars. The accident happened on October 27, from a broken brake on an unloaded dump car. The plaintiff applied for employment to one Crockett, the master mechanic then having charge of the repairs at East Cambridge; and afterwards, by his direction, to one Ash, who had general charge of the freight yard and freight department, and who employed the switching men and the brakemen. The plaintiff had had some experience in railroading, and knew how to "brake," and how to make up trains. The plaintiff and others employed with him were in the habit of taking damaged cars and putting them upon a certain track in the yard called the hospital track; two or three times a week they would have cars to place on the hospital track. Whenever there had been damaged cars, during his employment, his attention had been called to it; generally by the yard-master, who usually told the men that those cars had been damaged, and that he wanted them put on such and such a track, wherever he wanted them moved. They could tell a damaged car by the looks of it usually. The plaintiff was sometimes accustomed to examine to see whether cars were damaged, and probably (as he testified) looked at these cars to see whether they were out of order, but saw nothing out of order about them. He added, that he did look at or examine them; that he was in the habit of looking to see if they were safe to handle, as he presumed; and that naturally, if a man sees a car is broken, he will shun it.

The plaintiff was forty-five years old, and, with his admitted experience, was thus of sufficient age and intelligence to understand the nature of the risk to which he was exposed by his employment. He knew that broken cars were to be moved and handled in the yard, and he voluntarily undertook and continued in a service which he knew included the moving and...