Wood v. Hub Motor Co.

Decision Date30 June 1964
Docket Number3,Nos. 1,2,40569,Nos. 40568,s. 40568,s. 1
Citation110 Ga.App. 101,137 S.E.2d 674
PartiesHensley K. WOOD v. HUB MOTOR COMPANY et al. Elizabeth A. WOOD v. HUB MOTOR COMPANY et al
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. (a) A petition showing that a manufacturer has placed a new automobile in the stream of trade, that the plaintiff purchased the automobile from a retail dealer, that a latent defect (between the steering mechanism and the front wheels) in the automobile existing at the time it left the manufacturer caused it to be unmerchantable and not reasonably suited for the use intended in that it became unmanageable and uncontrollable while being operated upon the highway, and that the plaintiff was damaged as a consequence of the defective mechanism, stated a cause of action against the manufacturer for breach of a statutory implied warranty under former Code Ann. § 96-307.

(b) A petition alleging that the plaintiff purchased from a dealer an automobile, manufactured by the Ford Motor Company, and reasonable caution on the part of the purchaser did not disclose any defects; that the automobile was not merchantable and reasonably suited for the uses intended in that, while it was being driven in a normal and careful way it suddenly, unexpectedly, and without warning became unmanageable and uncontrollable and veered into the wrong lane of traffic and collided with another vehicle, and both of them were demolished; that latent mechanical defects between the steering mechanism and the front wheels, which existed at the time of manufacture, caused the malfunction; that between the time of the purchase of the automobile and the collision, the automobile was not involved in any other wreck, was driven with caution, and serviced in accordance with the instructions furnished by the manufacturer and retailer defendants; that at the time of the collision, the automobile was being operated in a normal and safe manner and no external cause or failure (other than the latent defects) made it veer into the wrong lane of traffic and collide with another vehicle; and that the innumerable parts of the steering mechanism were so badly damaged that it was impossible for the plaintiff to allege what particular part caused the automobile to become unmanageable and uncontrollable, was not subject to special demurrers attacking the allegations, piecemeal and generally, as being conclusions unsupported by facts alleged, too indefinite and uncertain and insufficient to put the defendants on notice as to the plaintiff's contentions as to the nature and location of the alleged latent defects and enable the defendants to properly prepare their defense.

In separate actions Hensley K. Wood and Mrs. Elizabeth A. Wood sued Hub Motor Company and Ford Motor Company for their respective injuries and damages arising from a collision of an automobile purchased by Hensley K. Wood from Hub Motor Company and manufactured by Ford Motor Company. The petitions sought to recover from the manufacturer and the dealer on an implied warranty and as finally amended, alleged that Mrs. Wood (at the time of the collision Mr. Wood's fiancee), was driving the automobile in a northerly direction along Florida State Route No. 77 at about 50 miles per hour in the northbound lane for traffic of such paved public highway when suddenly, unexpectedly, and without warning, such automobile became unmanageable and uncontrollable and veered from said northbound lane to the southbound lane where it struck a southbound vehicle head-on. Hensley K. Wood was also riding in such automobile at the time of the collision. Further allegations of the petitions are stated in Division 1 of the opinion.

General and special demurrers of each defendant to the petitions as amended were sustained and the petitions dismissed. The plaintiffs, in their separate writs of error, now assign error on these adverse judgments.

Benjamin B. Garland, J. Richmond Garland and M. T. Hartman, III, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Smith, Ringel, Martin, Ansley & Carr, Ralph H. Witt, H. A. Stephens, Jr., T. J. Long and Ben Weinberg, Jr., Atlanta, for defendant in error.

HALL, Judge.

1. In 1957 the General Assembly imposed implied warranties by manufacturers of personal property sold in this State. Ga.L.1957, p. 405; Code Ann. § 96-307: 'The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property, either directly or through wholesale or retail dealers, or any other person, shall warrant the following to the ultimate consumer, who, however, must exercise caution when purchasing to detect defects, and, provided there is no express covenant of warranty and no agreement to the contrary: 1. The article sold is merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended. 2. The manufacturer knows of no latent defects undisclosed.' This law has now been repealed (Ga.L.1962, pp. 156, 427), but was in effect at the time of the sale upon which these actions are founded. (Under § 109A-2-314 of the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code, effective January 1, 1964, 'a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.' Ga.L.1962, p. 156.)

The petition of Mr. Wood, who purchased the automobile, alleged: The automobile was not merchantable and reasonably suited for the uses intended in that, while it was being driven in a normal and careful way it suddenly, unexpectedly, and without warning became unmanageable and uncontrollable and veered into the wrong lane of traffic and collided with another vehicle, and both of them were demolished. Latent mechanical defects between the steering mechanism and the front wheels, which existed at the time of manufacture, caused the malfunction. At the time he purchased the automobile he exercised caution to detect defects, but discovered none, and neither he nor Mrs. Wood knew of the defects until the time of the collision. The automobile had been driven approximately 11,500 miles at the time of said collision; it was reasonably expected to provide safe and efficient transportation for at least two years or 25,000 miles, whichever came first. Between the time of the purchase of the automobile and the collision, the automobile was not involved in any other wreck, was driven with caution, and serviced in accordance with instructions furnished by defendants. At the time of the collision, the automobile was being operated in a normal and safe manner and no external cause of failure (other than the latent defects) made it veer into the wrong lane of traffic and collide with another vehicle. The innumerable parts of the steering mechanism were so badly damaged that it was impossible for the plaintiff to allege what particular part caused the automobile to become unmanageable and uncontrollable.

The trial court sustained the general demurrer as well as special demurrers attacking the above allegations, piecemeal and generally, as being conclusions unsupported by facts alleged, too indefinite and uncertain, and insufficient to put the defendant on notice as to the plaintiff's contentions as to the nature and location of the alleged latent defects and enable the defendant to properly prepare its defense.

The statutory implied warranty is 'an obligation that the law places upon a party as a result of some transaction entered into'; it is not a contractual obligation. Bookholt v. General Motors Corp., 215 Ga. 391, 394, 110 S.E.2d 642, 644. Accord: Bond & Maxwell v. Perrin, 145 Ga. 200, 209, 88 S.E. 954; Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 158, 132 S.E. 889; A. D. L. Sales Co., Inc. v. Gailey, 48 Ga.App. 798, 173 S.E. 734; Smith v. Eastern Light Co., 49 Ga.App. 593, 176 S.E. 545. It remains effective for a reasonable time. 46 Cornell L.Q. 607, 612. Breach and consequent damages complete a cause of action on an implied warranty. A petition which makes both of these elements appear is not subject to demurrer. Welfare Finance Corp. v. Waters, 98 Ga.App. 20, 23, 104 S.E.2d 669. This petition shows a transaction covered by the statute. The plaintiff need only show that the automobile was not reasonably suited for the purposes for which it was commonly intended and that because of its unsuitability he was damaged.

Negligence is not an element of breach of warranty. If goods do not conform to the warranty, the warrantor's utmost care will not relieve him of liability. We may assume that proof would show that the defect and failure of the machine to function properly was not due to any negligence of the manufacturer. This will not impair the plaintiff's cause of action under the statute. Accord Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1; Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81. The purpose of the statute is '* * * that the enterprise which causes losses should lift them from the individual victims and distribute them widely among those who benefit from the activities of the enterprise * * * This would include strict liability on the part of the manufacturer upon an implied warranty for unreasonable dangers lurking in any kind of product.' James, 'General Products--Should Manufacturers Be', 24 Tenn.L.Rev. 923, 924-925; Noel, 'Strict Liability of Manufacturers', 50 American Bar J. 446; 1 Williston On Sales 617, § 237.

We recognize that some negligence cases have held that facts which in evidence would give rise to an inference of negligence without proof of a specific negligent act are insufficient to pass the test of pleading when no specific act of negligence is alleged; 'res ipsa loquitur' cannot aid pleadings. See Hudgins v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 122 Ga. 695, 50 S.E. 974. These precedents are not applicable, however, in this action upon statutory implied warranties. Certai...

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