United States v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, ETC.

• Decision Date: 03 February 1956
• Docket Number: No. 35004.,35004.
• Citation: 138 F. Supp. 53
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW-CIO) Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

138 F. Supp. 53

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW-CIO) Defendant.

No. 35004.

United States District Court E. D. Michigan, S. D.

February 3, 1956.

Fred W. Kaess, U. S. Atty., George E. Woods, Chief Asst. U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.

Harold A. Cranefield, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Detroit, Mich., for defendant.

PICARD, District Judge.

Motion to dismiss the indictment in the above matter, each of its four counts alleging a separate violation of Section 610, Title 18 of the U.S.C.A., Federal Corrupt Practices Act, prohibiting political expenditures by labor unions. The pertinent section is set out in the appendix together with the Act's definitions of "expenditure" and "contribution". Section 591.

Here the specific charge is that the "expenditure" violation came in connection with the selection of candidates for a senator and representatives to the United States Congress during the 1954 primary and general elections. It is alleged that defendant paid a specific amount from its general treasury fund to Luckoff and Wayburn Productions, Detroit, Michigan, to defray the costs of certain television broadcasts sponsored by the Union from commercial television station WJBK.

It is charged that the broadcasts urged and endorsed selection of certain persons to be candidates for representatives and senator to the Congress of the United States and included expressions of political advocacy intended by defendant to influence the electorate and to affect the results of the election.

It is further charged that the fund used came from the Union's dues, was not obtained by voluntary political contributions or subscriptions from members of the Union, and was not paid for by advertising or sales.

Findings of Fact

For the purposes of this motion the charges alleged are taken as true. United States v. Jones, 5 Cir., 207 F.2d 785; Knoell v. United States, 3 Cir., 239 F. 16; United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366, 24 L.Ed. 852.

The contention of defendant is, first, that the expenditures, admittedly so made, are not the type of expenditures intended to be covered and prohibited by Section 610 of the Act. Six other reasons for dismissing the indictment follow, and all are to the effect that should this court find that the expenditures made by defendant are covered by Section 610, then the provisions of that section are unconstitutional because —

(a) They abridge both freedom of speech and of the press, peaceable assemblage and right of petition, in violation of the First Amendment;

(b) They unlawfully abridge the right to choose senators and representatives in Congress as guaranteed by the Seventeenth Amendment;

(c) They create an arbitrary and unlawful classification and discriminate against labor unions, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (d) They are arbitrary and capricious, and deprive defendant and its members of liberty and property without due process of law — in violation of the Fifth Amendment;

(e) The statute is vague and indefinite, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; and finally

(f) The provisions invade the rights of defendant and its members, under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.

It will be particularly noted that six of the seven reasons advanced for dismissing the indictment are based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of the law. Therefore it becomes our duty under the decisions to determine whether or not defendant's first objection is valid for if we are able to determine that the conduct complained against is not proscribed by the Act, without passing upon the law's constitutionality, we must do so. United States v. C. I. O., 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 92 L.Ed. 1849; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, at page 10, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 1877; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41-45, 73 S.Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598.

Conclusions of Law

In answer to that first objection we recall very briefly certain salient features in the history of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. The first legislation of this type was enacted in 1907 and did not include labor unions in its prohibition; neither did it include the word "expenditure" and as pointed out in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 41 S.Ct. 469, 65 L.Ed. 913, it did not apply to "primaries". Admittedly it was not until 1947 that the word "expenditure" was written into the Act which then covered "primaries" and "contributions" of all kinds with a definition of the distinction noted between "expenditure" and "contribution". Since that final enactment (1947), which re-adopted the War Labor Disputes Act, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 1501 et seq., including unions and adding primaries, three tests and interpretations of what the law meant have been made, one by the Supreme Court of the United States, one by the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, and one by a District Court.

We examine those decisions.

United States v. C. I. O. (Murray), 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 92 L.Ed. 1849.

The first interpretation of this statute (June 1948) was United States v. C. I. O. and Philip Murray, its president, 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 1358. In that instance the C. I. O. had published a front page statement by Mr. Murray urging election of a certain congressional candidate in Maryland. This publication occurred in its regular C. I. O. News, a weekly, owned and published by the C. I. O. with money coming from the general funds of the Union (as in the case at bar) but with this additional feature; this particular issue of the News went not alone to the C. I. O. membership but extra copies were run off and distributed to the public.

On defendant's motion the District Court, 77 F.Supp. 355, dismissed the indictment on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional as an unwarranted abridgement of the First Amendment. On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States held that it had long been a policy that if the statute could be interpreted in a manner avoiding the constitutional question it should be, and the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reed with these words, held that the prohibition in the Act against "expenditure" did not include an "expenditure" such as the one involved;

"We are unwilling to say that Congress by its prohibition against corporations or labor organizations making an `expenditure in connection with any election' of candidates for federal office intended to outlaw such a publication."

Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion.

Four other Justices, however, to-wit Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking through Mr. Justice Rutledge, agreed the indictment should be dismissed but on the ground that the entire section 313 (610) was unconstitutional. Meeting the question full on they said:

"If § 313 as amended (610) * * * can be taken to cover the costs of any political publication by a labor union, I think it comprehends the `expenditures' made in this case. By reading them out of the section, in order not to pass upon its validity, the Court in effect abdicates its function in the guise of applying the policy against deciding questions of constitutionality unnecessarily. I adhere to that policy. But I do not think it justifies invasion of the legislative function by rewriting or emasculating the statute. This in my judgment is what has been done in this instance."

Mr. Justice Rutledge also notes that there is nothing in the Act as adopted that makes the "source" of the funds important. If the Union sponsored the "ad", it was immaterial whether the funds used came either through dues, from newspaper subscriptions, or a special fund raised for that purpose, although Senator Taft, who assumed the burden of defending this particular section in the Senate, differentiated between funds used from dues, and those subscribed for or raised for a certain special purpose. In that case also (C. I. O. News, supra) it was emphasized that the word "expenditure" was merely added to the Act to cover situations not previously included within the accepted legislative interpretation of "contribution". Justice Reed said

"Apparently `expenditures' was added to eradicate the doubt that had been raised as to the reach of `contribution,' not to extend greatly the coverage of the section." (Emphasis ours.)

Therefore we find that when the first decision interpretive of this Act was announced by the Supreme Court of the United States one District Judge and four Justices of the Supreme Court had held the section unconstitutional and five Justices of the Supreme Court refused to pass upon its constitutionality as unnecessary, but nevertheless dismissed the indictment because it did not state a cause of action, to-wit, "expenditure" didn't include the type of "expenditure" made by the Union, although authorized by its president.

It will also be noted that Mr. Justice Reed's majority opinion states that unless the legislation is so construed

"the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality." (Emphasis ours.)

United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481, 2 Cir., 172 F.2d 854.

The second case of interpretation was United States v. Painters Local Union No. 481, 172 F.2d 854, 856, decided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1949. The charge was against the Union and its President for placing and paying for a political ad in a daily newspaper of general circulation and a political broadcast over a commercial radio station, both out of funds from the general treasury of the Union.

In our opinion this case is on all fours with the case at bar except that it was a "television" broadcast instead of "radio" — which difference we do not deem important.

In Painters Local Union, supra, motion for dismissal by defendant was denied by the District Court, 79 F.Supp. 516, which held the act constitutional. The question of...