Jones v. Watts

• Decision Date: 05 June 1944
• Docket Number: No. 10860.,10860.
• Citation: 142 F.2d 575
• Parties: JONES et al. v. WATTS et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

142 F.2d 575 (1944)

JONES et al. v. WATTS et al.

No. 10860.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 8, 1944.

Rehearing Denied June 5, 1944.

Bennett B. Patterson, of Houston, Tex., for appellants.

W. F. Leigh, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Houston, Tex., for appellees.

Before SIBLEY, HUTCHESON, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal we face the question, What is the remedy to stop the enforcement of a money judgment in favor of the United States which is asserted to be void for want of any service on the defendants?

In March, 1932, an automobile belonging to appellant S. M. Jones was seized because intoxicating liquor was being transported therein by one Holt. Jones gave bond, with appellant Wm. H. Jones and another as sureties, for the forthcoming of the automobile at the trial. Holt pleaded guilty and imposition of sentence was suspended. No judgment forfeiting the car appears to have been taken under 27 U.S.C.A. § 40 as the law then was. Suit, however, was instituted by the United States upon the bond, and the record shows an entry by the Deputy Marshal of service, as we read it, on each of the appellants, and a third defendant now deceased. Appellants, however, contend that under a decision of a Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Mahan v. McManus, 102 S. W. 789, the entry is insufficient to show who was served. No appearance was made, and on May 27, 1933, judgment was taken by default in favor of the United States for the penalty of the bond, the judgment reciting due service. Execution was issued but not collected. On April 14, 1942, appellants filed a formal suit against the United States in which they prayed that the judgment be cancelled and annulled, and for general legal and equitable relief, the grounds put forward being that there was in fact no liability on the bond and the judgment was entered by mistake and accident, that there was no service of citation upon either of them, and the Marshal's return of service was insufficient on its face to support the judgment by default. The United States appeared and moved to dismiss this suit on the ground that it was an original suit, and the Sovereign had not consented to be thus sued. This motion was sustained on the authority of Zegura v. United States, 5 Cir., 104 F.2d 34. The plaintiffs obtained leave of the Court to amend the suit into one against the Clerk of the Court and the Marshal, omitting the United States as a party. This was done, and the amended bill took the form of a bill in equity to remove the cloud of the judgment from the title to their property, averring the absence of any remedy at law. The prayers were enlarged to ask the cancellation of the judgment and the removal of its cloud and also injunction against issuing or enforcing any writs of execution, garnishment or attachment based on the judgment. The Clerk and Marshal moved to dismiss because the United States was a necessary party to the grant of the relief prayed and not amenable to suit, and there was no cause of action alleged against themselves warranting the relief sought. The Court without deciding the motion to dismiss heard the case on an answer denying most of the allegations, and gave judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appeal.

We think the suit rightly failed, but that it should have been disposed of on the motion to dismiss rather than by a trial. The judgment and its lien belong to the United States, and the persons who happen to be the Clerk of Court and the Marshal have no interest in it. If the United States makes a proper request to the Clerk for an execution he must issue it, and on like request the Marshal must levy. They have no duty to defend the judgment, and its validity cannot be affected by litigation with them. To enjoin the court's officers from performing their official duties with respect to the judgment would paralyze it and destroy its value. We think it plain that the United States is an indispensable party, and the Clerk and Marshal, who have done and purpose to do nothing but their official duty, are not proper parties to be sued.

But appellants say in reply that would be to leave them without any remedy, and their property is clouded and may be sold without due process of law through a void judgment. We agree that a personal judgment for money cannot be rendered, and is void, if the court rendering it has not acquired jurisdiction of the defendant by a lawful service, unless service is waived by appearance or otherwise. If these appellants can by proper and sufficient evidence show that they were never served they are entitled to a remedy. An ancient remedy in courts of law was by audita querela in the court which rendered the judgment, and without limit of time. In modern practice this procedure has been substituted by motion in the cause, with notice, or by statutory remedies. 5 Am.Jur., Audita Querela, pages 491, 494;...