14500 Ltd. v. CSX Transp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 March 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO.1:12CV1810
• Parties: 14500 LIMITED Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

14500 LIMITED Plaintiff,
v.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant.

CASE NO.1:12CV1810

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

Dated: March 14, 2013

JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J:

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff 14500 Limited's Motion to Remand (ECF # 5). For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion.

The facts of this case are largely not in dispute. Plaintiff is a trucking company with property located in the city of Cleveland, Ohio. Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") owns the Collinwood Railyard whose property abuts Plaintiff's. Plaintiff contends that the previous owner of its property and subsequently Plaintiff thereafter, have encroached on Defendant's property to the point of erecting a fence around a portion of Defendant's property. As a result, Plaintiff and its predecessors have excluded Defendant from the property for more

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than twenty-one years. In June 2012, Plaintiff filed an action in state court to quiet title due to adverse possession and for prescriptive easement. Plaintiff alleges that the adversely possessed property is necessary for it to maintain its operation.

On July 13, 2012, Defendant removed the case to this Court alleging complete federal preemption under Section 10501(b) of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act ("ICCTA"), 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. and, alternatively, under 28 U.S.C. §1332 due to the diversity of the parties. According to Defendant, this parcel is necessary for its present and future operation of the railyard. In fact, Defendant contends the parties entered into preliminary discussions for the sale of the disputed property but Defendant ultimately determined the property was essential to its future expansion.

At issue before the Court is whether the ICCTA completely preempts Plaintiff's claims to quiet title based on adverse possession and prescriptive easement under state law.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 1441 "provides that an action is removable only if it could have initially been brought in federal court." Cole v. Great Atl. & Pacific Tea Co., 728 F.Supp. 1305, 1307 (E.D.Ky.1990). Put another way, "[a] civil case that is filed in state court may be removed by the defendant to federal district court if the plaintiff could have chosen to file there originally." Warthman v. Genoa Twp. Bd. of Trs., 549 F.3d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir.2008). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests upon the removing party, i.e., the defendant. Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir.1994). "Concern about encroaching on a state court's right to decide cases properly before it, requires this court to construe removal

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jurisdiction narrowly." Cole, 728 F.Supp. at 1307 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941)). A removed case must be remanded if the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In addition, "[w]here there is doubt as to federal jurisdiction, the doubt should be construed in favor of remanding the case to the State court where there is no doubt as to its jurisdiction." Walsh v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 264 F.Supp. 514, 515 (E.D.Ky.1967); see also Breymann v. Pennsylvania, O. & D. R.R., 38 F.2d 209, 212 (6th Cir.1930).

Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)). "Subject matter jurisdiction is the unwaivable sine qua non for exercise of the federal judicial power." Crabtree v. Wal-Mart, 2006 WL 897210 at *1 (E.D.Ky. Apr. 4, 2006), slip copy; Richmond v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 919 F.Supp. 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)). Want of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by the parties or by the Court on its own initiative. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). "[D]efects in subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and may be addressed by a court on its own motion at any stage of the proceedings." Curry v. U.S. Bulk Transp., Inc., 462 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Owens v. Brock, 860 F.2d 1363, 1367 (6th Cir.1988)).

In the absence of diversity, a civil action filed in state court may be removed to federal court only if the claim "arises under" federal law. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003). "Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be

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removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). "Since a defendant may remove a case only if the claim could have been brought in federal court, . . . the question for removal jurisdiction must also be determined by reference to the 'well-pleaded complaint.'" Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).

However, an exception to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule is the "complete preemption" doctrine. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 399 (1987) "[A]ny claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Id. at 393. Because CSX is the party seeking removal, and since the face of Limited's well-pleaded Complaint does not state a federal claim, CSX carries the burden of establishing Limited's cause of action is completely preempted. See Valinski v. Detroit Edison, 197 Fed. Appx. 403, 2006 WL 2220979 at *12 (6th Cir., Aug. 4, 2006).

ICCTA and Complete Preemption

The ICCTA, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. was implemented by Congress to regulate railroads and broaden the express preemption of the Interstate Commerce Act. It created the Surface Transportation Board and conferred upon it exclusive jurisdiction over certain interstate railroad activity as outlined in 49 U.S.C. § 10101, including: encouraging competitive rates, minimizing the need for federal regulatory control, requiring fair and expeditious regulatory decisions, promoting a safe and efficient railroad system and promoting public health and safety. The ICCTA defines "railroad" as: ..."(C) a switch, spur, track, terminal, terminal facility, and a freight depot, yard, and ground, used or necessary for transportation."(Emphasis added). It also

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defines "transportation" to include: 9(A) "a locomotive, car, vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning use." (Emphasis added).

The ICCTA confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the STB over:

(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this

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