Church Divinity School of Pacific v. Alameda County

• Citation: 152 Cal.App.2d 496,314 P.2d 209
• Parties: The CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF the PACIFIC, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY of ALAMEDA, a political subdivision of the State of California, and the City of Berkeley, a municipal corporation of the State of California, Defendants and Respondents. BERKELEY BAPTIST DIVINITY SCHOOL, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF BERKELEY, a municipal corporation, County of Alameda, a political subdivision of the State of California, Defendants and Respondents. The PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF BERKELEY, a municipal corporation, County of Alameda, a political subdivision of the State of California, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 16961, 17026, 17030.
• Decision Date: 16 July 1957
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 209

314 P.2d 209

152 Cal.App.2d 496

The CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF the PACIFIC, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY of ALAMEDA, a political subdivision of the State of California, and the City of Berkeley, a municipal corporation of the State of California, Defendants and Respondents.

BERKELEY BAPTIST DIVINITY SCHOOL, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF BERKELEY, a municipal corporation, County of Alameda, a political subdivision of the State of California, Defendants and Respondents.

The PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF BERKELEY, a municipal corporation, County of Alameda, a political subdivision of the State of California, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 16961, 17026, 17030.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

July 16, 1957.

Ridley Stone, Berkeley, for appellant Church Divinity School of the pacific.

Gaylord & Gaylord, San Francisco, for appellant Berkeley Baptist Divinity School.

Dudley H. Nebeker, Charles R. Hoge, Oakland, for appellant Pacific School of Religion.

J. F. Coakley, Dist. Atty., Frank D. Parker, Asst. Dist. Atty., James E. Jefferis, Deputy Dist. Atty., Oakland, for respondent Alameda County.

Fred C. Hutchinson, Robert T. Anderson, Berkeley, for respondent City of Berkeley.

KAUFMAN, Presiding Justice.

In these actions, consolidated upon appeal, brought to recover property taxes paid under protest to the City of Berkeley and County of Alameda for the year 1953-1954, by the appellants, graduate colleges of theology, the trial court found and concluded that the following properties did not meet the requirements prescribed by section 203 of the Revenue and Taxation Code for the 'collegiate exemption' authorized by section 1a of Article XIII of the State Constitution: A student parking lot and four single family residences occupied rent free by faculty members, owned by appellant Church Divinity School of the Pacific; four apartment houses occupied by married students and their families owned by appellant Berkeley Baptist Divinity School; two apartment houses occupied by faculty members and married students owned by appellant Pacific School of Religion.

The rentals charged by the various schools for these facilities were below those charged for comparable accommodations in the area. The trial court found and concluded that the following were entitled to the exemption: a dormitory owned by the Pacific School of Religion, occupied by seven single students and two married students; a single students' dormitory owned by the Berkeley Baptist Divinity School, and a one family residence occupied rent free by the President of the Berkeley Baptist Divinity School. No appeal is taken as to these properties.

The only issue on appeal is whether the properties involved were entitled to the tax exemption accorded to 'property used exclusively for purposes of education' within the meaning of section 1a of Article XIII of the State Constitution. It is not questioned that the appellants are duly organized California non-profit corporations and educational institutions of collegiate grade who have met the other requirements of the constitutional provision and the statute for properties other than those in dispute here, or that the appellants have complied with the proper procedures for claiming a refund of property taxes. Section 1a of Article XIII of the State Constitution reads as follows:

'Any educational institution of collegiate grade, within the State of California, not conducted for profit, shall hold exempt from taxation its buildings and equipment, its grounds within which its buildings are located, not exceeding 100 acres in area, its securities and income used exclusively for the purposes of education.

'The exemption granted by this section applies to and includes a building in the course of construction on or after the first Monday of March, 1950, if the same is intended when completed to be used exclusively for the purposes of education. (Added Nov. 3, 1914; amended Nov. 4, 1952.)'

Section 203 of the Revenue and Taxation Code reads as follows:

'The college exemption is as specified in section 1a of Article XIII of the Constitution.

'An educational institution of collegiate grade is an institution incorporated as a college or seminary of learning under the laws of this State, which requires for regular admission the completion of a four-year high school course or its equivalent, and confers upon its graduates at least one academic or professional degree, based on a course of at least four years in liberal arts and sciences, or on a course of at least three years in professional studies, such as law, theology, education, medicine, dentistry, engineering, veterinary medicine, pharmacy, architecture, fine arts, commerce, or journalism.

'An educational institution of collegiate grade is not conducted for profit when it is conducted exclusively for scientific or educational purposes and no part of its net income inures to the benefit of any private person. (Stats.1939, c. 154, p. 1280, § 203.)'

The courts of this State have not been called upon before to interpret the meaning of 'property used exclusively for the purpose of education', as used in the above constitutional provision. All the previous constructions of Article XIII, Section 1a have been concerned with the 'educational institution of collegiate grade' requirement. Pasadena University v. Los Angeles County, 190 Cal. 786, 214 P. 868; 2 Op.Atty.Gen. 18; Lutheran Hospital Soc. of Southern California v. County of Los Angeles, 25 Cal.2d 254, 153 P.2d 341; California Institute of Technology v. Johnson, 55 Cal.App.2d 856, 132 P.2d 61; Pasadena Playhouse Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 69 Cal.App.2d 611, 159 P.2d 679; In re Estate of Halm, 196 Cal. 778, 239 P. 307; In re Estate of Davis, 74 Cal.App.2d 357, 168 P.2d 789; University of Southern California v. Robbins, 1 Cal.App.2d 523, 37 P.2d 163, certiorari denied 295 U.S. 738, 55 S.Ct. 650, 79 L.Ed. 1685. In 2 Op.Atty.Gen. 18, the tax exemption granted by section 1a was extended to the property of a non-profit college, the major portion of which was used by Naval Pre-Flight Program. In Pasadena Playhouse Ass'n v. County of Los Angeles, 69 Cal.App.2d 611, 159 P.2d 679, it was held that a school of drama met the requirements for the exemption under the Constitutional provision and Revenue and Taxation Code Section 203.

There have, however, been numerous interpretations of the 'used exclusively' requirement of the welfare and religious exemptions authorized by Section 1c of Article XIII of the State Constitution and Revenue & Tax. Code Section 214. It must first be determined whether the educational institutions here involved are in the same category as other private property owners who obtain their exemptions as acts of grace from the sovereign state or whether as educational institutions they fall within the special category of exceptions to the rule that all property must bear equally the costs of government, because of the highly important and semi-public function of education which they perform. The former rule of strict construction of exemption statutes has been followed in this state as to the welfare and religious exemptions. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. v. County of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.2d 426, 182 P.2d 178; Goodwill Industries of Southern California v. County of Los Angeles, 117 Cal.App.2d 19, 254 P.2d 877. Appellants and respondents rely on Cedars of Lebanon Hospital v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal.2d 729, at page 734, 221 P.2d 31, at page 34, 15 A.L.R.2d 1045, where in construing the welfare exemption, the court said that: 'it is immaterial that the institutions * * * [who seek the exemption] may contribute to the public welfare and serve the interests of the state, for they, like other private owners of property, have the burden of showing that they clearly come within the terms of the exemption.' The court went on to add that the construction must still be a reasonable one with due regard for the ordinary meaning of the language employed and the object sought to be accomplished thereby. Supra, 35 Cal.2d at page 735, 221 P.2d at page 34. In the very recent case of Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal.2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, in holding that the word 'charitable' of Article XIII, Section 1c could be regarded to apply to educational purposes in order to grant the exemption to schools of less than collegiate grade owned by religious organizations, our Supreme Court appears to have rejected the rule of strict construction of tax exemption statutes. Either under the broader rule of the above case or under the 'strict but reasonable' rule of the Cedars of Lebanon Hospital case, however, we think the properties in dispute here were used exclusively for the purposes of education within the meaning of Section 1a of Article XIII.

In determining what constitutes an exclusive use for education, it is appropriate first to note generally the nature of an 'educational institution of collegiate grade' or 'college', and to examine the legislative history of the exemption. The best definition is found in the case of Yale University v. Town of New Haven, 1899, 71 Conn. 316, 42 A. 87, 89, at page 91, 43 L.R.A. 490, in which after reviewing the history of the term from the year 1200, the court said: 'The settled meaning of 'college' as a building or group of buildings in which scholars are housed, fed, instructed and governed under college discipline, while qualifying for their university degree, * * * is now attacked. * * * This meaning has been attached to the English word for 800 years; it was the only meaning known at the time our first American colleges were founded.' The constitutional provision and statute were enacted in 1914 and 1915. Respondents relying on a dictum in California Institute of Technology v. Johnson, 55 Cal.App.2d 856, at page 860, 132 P.2d 61, at page 63,...