Oxford Medical Group, P.C. v. Vossoughian

• Decision Date: 30 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 01 CIV. 4802(CM).,01 CIV. 4802(CM).
• Citation: 154 F.Supp.2d 782
• Parties: Application of the OXFORD MEDICAL GROUP, P.C. Petitioner, v. Ahad VOSSOUGHIAN, M.D., United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Evonne Jennings Tolbert as Acting Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights, Respondents, for An Order Pursuant to FRCP 81 and 9 USC § 3 Staying or Dismissing the Investigation/Processing or Proceedings of Complaints Made By Ahad Vossoughian to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and The New York State Division of Human Rights.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

154 F.Supp.2d 782

Application of the OXFORD MEDICAL GROUP, P.C. Petitioner, v. Ahad VOSSOUGHIAN, M.D., United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Evonne Jennings Tolbert as Acting Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights, Respondents for An Order Pursuant to FRCP 81 and 9 USC § 3 Staying or Dismissing the Investigation/Processing or Proceedings of Complaints Made By Ahad Vossoughian to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and The New York State Division of Human Rights.

No. 01 CIV. 4802(CM).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

July 30, 2001.

Jack S. Dweck, The Dweck Law Firm, LLP, New York City, for Petitioner.

Robert L. Becker, Raff & Becker, L.L.P., New York City, Stephanie Garner, Washington, DC, Carrie Heather Cohen, State of N.Y. Office of the Attorney General, New York City, for Respondents.

DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE

MCMAHON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Oxford Medical Group, P.C., is a medical practice group headquartered in Westchester County, New York. Dr. Ahad Vossoughian was hired by Oxford effective July 6, 1999, pursuant to an employment contract. (Dweck Aff. at Ex. 1) The contract contained an arbitration clause that provided as follows:

14. Arbitration

The parties agree to do their best to work out ways and means, in good faith, by frank and fair discussion between them, to amicably settle any disagreements, claims, questions or controversies which may arise out of or relate to this Agreement or out of its interpretation or any alleged breach thereof. In case of failure to reach accord by any such direct ways and means, all claims, disputes, or other matters in question between the parties to this Agreement, arising out of, or relating to this Agreement or breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration in the County of Westchester in accordance with such rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Association as may then be in effect. The parties agree to abide by the decision of the arbitrator and such decision may forthwith be converted, if necessary, into a judicial decree or order by any court of competent jurisdiction. The costs of arbitration, including attorneys' fees, shall be borne in accordance with the determination of the arbitrators. Nothing contained in this Section shall be deemed to preclude the Corporation from seeking relief by way of an injunction or specific performance in the event that the Corporation could be irreparably injured by the action or failure to act of the Employee.

Within a year, Dr. Vossoughian's employment relationship with Oxford deteriorated, and Oxford ultimately fired the doctor. Oxford and Dr. Vossoughian disagree about the reasons why, but that disagreement is of no relevance to this Court, except to note that Dr. Vossoughian, who is 70 years old, believes that he was fired because of his age, and that Oxford vigorously disputes this allegation.

On January 12, 2001, Oxford suspended Dr. Vossoughian pending an investigation into allegations that he had given substandard care to patients. On January 15, 2001, Oxford filed a demand for arbitration in which it sought both a declaratory judgment that Dr. Vossoughian had breached his employment agreement and enforcement of the restrictive covenant and confidentiality provisions contained therein. On January 27, 2001, Dr. Vossoughian received a letter from Oxford that terminated his employment, purportedly for cause. On February 6, 2001, Dr. Vossoughian filed his own demand for arbitration alleging that Oxford had breached the employment agreement and seeking declaratory judgment that the liquidated damages, restrictive covenant, and confidentiality provisions of the agreement were illegal and unenforceable.

Three days later, on February 9, 2001, Dr. Vossoughian filed charges of discrimination and retaliation with The New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) against Oxford and Dr. Marc J. Strauss, its President. Pursuant to the workshare agreement between the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the SDHR, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.13(a)(3) and (4), Dr. Vossoughian's charge was cross-filed with the EEOC.

On March 16, 2001, Oxford amended its demand for arbitration to include Dr. Vossoughians' age discrimination claims against it. Oxford also demanded that the Arbitrator enjoin any investigation into Dr. Vossoughian's charges by the EEOC or SDHR. By order dated April 12, 2001, the Arbitrator ruled that the age discrimination claim was subject to arbitration, in light of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001), but that he had no authority to enjoin either administrative agency from processing Dr. Vossoughian's complaint. By subsequent order dated May 25, 2001, the Arbitrator ruled that he did not have jurisdiction to hear Dr. Vossougian's age discrimination claim against Dr. Strauss, on the ground that he was not a party to the contract containing the arbitration clause.

On May 15, 2001, Oxford filed a petition in which it seeks, pursuant to section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 ("FAA") to stay the SDHR and the EEOC from investigating Dr. Vossoughian's charge of discrimination¹. Oxford's time to answer the charge of discrimination has been extended, by stipulation of the parties, until such time as this motion is decided.

The motion is denied, for the following reasons:

(1) This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the EEOC and the SDHR..

(2) Administrative proceedings may not be stayed pursuant to the FAA.

In other words, this Court is wholly without authority to entertain this wrongheaded action. It is, accordingly, dismissed.

(1) This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the EEOC and SDHR.

The Petition on its face purports to be brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 81 and Section 3 of the FAA. Rule 81 provides only that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in proceedings brought under the FAA, but only to the extent that matters of procedure are not provided for in the FAA itself. This is not a jurisdiction-conferring provision of law.

This leaves Section 3 of the FAA, which is the provision that grants courts the authority to stay court proceedings in aid of arbitration. It is, however, well-settled that the FAA does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts, even though it creates federal substantive law. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 852, 862 n. 9, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1075, 121 S.Ct. 770, 148 L.Ed.2d 669 (2001). Instead, a party seeking to invoke the protection of the FAA in federal court must assert an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, such as a federal question or diversity of citizenship. Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 25. No such claim is asserted here against either the EEOC or the SDHR. The underlying dispute between Dr. Vossoughian and Oxford arises under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., but no claim is asserted under that statute against either administrative agency, and for good reason—the ADEA does not provide for a claim to be brought against the EEOC or a sister State agency. Section 7 of ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626, provides that an aggrieved person may initiate a suit against an employer alleged to have violated the Act, and Section 15 of ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a, permits federal employees and applicants for federal employment to bring actions for violations of ADEA against the discriminating agency. Like its sister statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., ADEA does not confer jurisdiction over an action against the EEOC "challenging any aspect of the administrative processes (or any application of that process) by which complaints of discrimination are investigated and resolved." Storey v. Rubin, 976 F.Supp. 1478, 1483 (N.D.Ga.1997). The ADEA simply dos not provide a remedy against the EEOC for individuals who are not EEOC employees or applicants for employment with the EEOC. Sterling v. Lehman, 574 F.Supp. 415, 417 (N.D.C...