Randolph v. O'riordon
| Decision Date | 07 January 1892 |
| Citation | 29 N.E. 583,155 Mass. 331 |
| Parties | RANDOLPH v. O'RIORDEN et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
C.H. Crosby and W.S. Slocum, for plaintiff.
H.W Bragg, for defendant.
The presiding judge instructed the jury, in substance, among other things, that they might find one or both of the defendants liable; that, in order to find either liable, they must find that there was carelessness on the part of his driver which was the natural, probable, and proximate cause of the accident; and that, if the accident was due to the carelessness of both drivers, then both defendants were liable. He also instructed them that if one driver was careless, and his carelessness was the natural, probable, and proximate cause of the accident, and the other driver was not careless, then they should return a verdict against the defendant who was master of the careless driver, and for the defendant whose driver was not careless. The jury rendered a verdict against defendant O'Riorden, and for defendant Bryant. The defendant O'Riorden now claims that the jury should have been instructed also as he requested, viz., that, if the carelessness of Bryant's driver contributed to the accident, he (O'Riorden) was not liable, whether it was or was not the proximate cause of the accident. This claim rests on the position that the negligence (if any) of the driver was to be imputed to the plaintiff, and that, again on the position that the relation of servant and master existed between them. If the plaintiff and the driver of Bryant's hack had been total strangers to each other, it is obvious that it would have been no defense for O'Riorden to say that the negligence of Bryant's driver contributed to the accident. That defense could not be availed of by him, unless there was some relation between the plaintiff and the driver which would make him responsible for or identified with his acts; and in the present case that relation, if it existed at all, must have been the relation of master and servant. The facts were that the defendant Bryant was hired by the plaintiff, Peter Randolph, to superintend the funeral of his grandchild, Bryant to furnish the carriages and drivers. Bryant furnished a hack, and a driver named Hewton, who had been in his employ for some time as his hackman. While the plaintiff was returning from the funeral, Hewton driving, the accident occurred. No directions appear to have been given to or control assumed over Hewton by the plaintiff. We think upon these facts that the relation of master and servant did not exist between the plaintiff and Hewton. What Bryant really agreed with the plaintiff to do was to transport him to and from a certain place or places. For that purpose he sent his hack and his driver. The hack was in his control, through his agent or driver, all the time. It was the same as if Bryant himself were driving and managing and controlling the team. And it would be contrary to common experience to say that Bryant would have been or that Hewton was the servant of the plaintiff, or that he was Hewton's master, or would have been Bryant's master. Whether the hack and driver were hired at a public stand or of a private person could make no difference, nor whether the party furnishing them was engaged in the business of a common carrier of passengers or not. It would not do to say that one who buys a passage from New York to Liverpool sustains the relation of master to the officers and crew and owners of the steamer on which he embarks. No more would it do to say that one who buys conveyance for his own person or his family from one place to another within the same city or adjoining cities thereby assumes towards the driver of the hack, which the party who agrees to convey him furnishes, the relation of a master to a servant, or liability for his acts, uncommanded and uninterfered with by him. The defendant relies upon Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115. It is enough, perhaps, to say of that case that it has been expressly overruled and disaffirmed in England, and has not been followed by the supreme court of the United States, and the courts of last resort in many different...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Sluder v. St. Louis Transit Co.
...control over Cavanaugh as to the management of his team, or the route he was to take. This identical question arose in Randolph v. O'Riordon, 155 Mass. 331, 29 N. E. 583, and the Supreme Court of that state held the relation of master and servant was not created by a mere contract like this......
-
Bessey v. Salemme
...The exceptions of the defendant were overruled, the jury having returned a verdict of guilty. In the case of Randolph v. O'Riordon, 155 Mass. 331, 29 N.E. 583, the plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued one Bryant, owner of the hack in which they were riding, and one O'Riordon, the owner of a w......
-
Shultz v. Old Colony St. Ry.
...Court of the United States in Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366, 6 S.Ct. 391, 29 L.Ed. 652, where the facts were very similar to Randolph v. O'Riordan, supra. Thorogood Bryan was discredited as resting 'upon indefensible ground,' and the court lays down the rule in this language: 'That one ca......
-
Sluder v. St. Louis Transit Co.
...v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499; Dean v. Branthwaite, 5 Esp. 36; Sammell v. Wright, 5 Esp. 263; Little v. Hackett, 116 U.S. 366; Randolph v. O'Riordan, 155 Mass. 331; Huff v. Ford, 126 Mass. 24; Femmer v. Bros., 109 Iowa 455; Joslin v. Ice Co., 50 Mich. 516; Richardson v. Van Ness, 53 Hun 267; We......