U.S. v. Chrysler Corp.
| Decision Date | 30 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 98-5047 and 98-5069,s. 98-5047 and 98-5069 |
| Citation | 158 F.3d 1350 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 96cv01236).
John G. Roberts, Jr. argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Gregory G. Garre and Erika Z. Jones. Lawrence S. Robbins entered an appearance.
Irene M. Solet, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, Douglas N. Letter, Appellate Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, and Enid Rubenstein, Attorney, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Michael E. Robinson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, entered an appearance.
Andrew D. Koblenz, Charles H. Lockwood, Alan Charles Raul and Thomas W. Merrill were on the brief for amici curiae American Automobile Manufacturers, et al. Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar entered appearances.
Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("NTMVSA" or "Act"), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") may seek the recall of a motor vehicle either when a vehicle has "a defect related to motor vehicle safety" or when a vehicle "does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard." 49 U.S.C. § 30118(b) (1994). These provisions are not mutually exclusive, nor are they coterminous. Thus, an allegation of noncompliance may or may not include a charge that a vehicle has a safety defect.
The instant case involves only an allegation of noncompliance. There is no claim here that the vehicles in question suffer from safety defects. The precise issue before the court is whether NHTSA must provide notice of what is required under a safety standard before seeking a recall under 49 U.S.C. § 30118 for noncompliance with that standard. We find that, in light of both the requirements of 49 U.S.C. §§ 30112 and 30115 and the due process clause, notice is required before a noncompliance recall may be ordered. Because there was no notice here, we reverse the District Court's recall order.
On June 4, 1996, NHTSA filed this suit against Chrysler seeking, inter alia, a recall of approximately 91,000 Model Year 1995 Chrysler Cirrus and Dodge Stratus cars. NHTSA alleged that the cars in question did not comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 210 ("Standard 210"), which regulates seat belt assembly anchorages. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.210 (1997). On February 4, 1998, the District Court granted NHTSA's request and ordered a recall. See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 995 F.Supp. 150 (D.D.C.1998). Vehicles manufactured after May 15, 1995 were not made subject to the recall, because "tapping plates" were added to reinforce the anchorages in these vehicles. See id. at 153 n. 5.
The promulgation of safety standards under the NTMVSA, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169, has been delegated to NHTSA. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.50(a) (1997). Pursuant to this authority, NHTSA adopted Standard 210, which requires seat belt assembly anchorages to withstand certain forces to ensure that seat belts will remain attached to the vehicle in the event of a crash. Anchorages must withstand two phases of a test procedure: First, they must be able to withstand force as it is increased to 3,000 pounds over thirty seconds. Second, after 3,000 pounds of force is reached, the anchorages must withstand that force for ten seconds. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.210 p S5.2. The test procedures require the use of a "pelvic body block," an L-shaped metal block that represents a human pelvis. The standard, however, does not specify the placement of this block during testing. See id. pp S5, S5.2. Chrysler tested the 1995 Cirrus and Stratus model designs for compliance with Standard 210 on November 8, 1993, by placing the pelvic body block against the seat back. Subsequently, in March 1995, Chrysler certified the 1995 Cirrus and Stratus cars. In July 1995, NHTSA hired General Testing Laboratories ("GTL") to conduct compliance testing on a number of vehicles, including a 1995 Chrysler Cirrus. When GTL performed the Standard 210 compliance test on the 1995 Cirrus, it placed the pelvic body block away from the rear seat back to prevent the seat buckles and webbing from breaking during the test; this was done instead of replacing the original belt webbing with wire rope, as Standard 210 allows. When testing was done with the pelvic body block placed away from the rear seat back, the anchorage on one of the rear seat belts failed after approximately 24 seconds with 2,829 pounds of applied force.
NHTSA notified Chrysler of the failure and requested that Chrysler institute a recall. Chrysler performed its own tests in August 1995, simulating the testing done by GTL, and its results were similar to those of GTL, i.e., the anchorages failed when the pelvic body block was placed forward of the seat back. See Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 105. Thus, Chrysler did not argue that GTL's test results were in error. Rather, Chrysler claimed that GTL's decision to place the pelvic body block forward of the seat back, rather than replace the seat belt webbing, was the cause of the test failure. In other words, Chrysler asserted that it had followed permissible test procedures and had satisfied the requirements of Standard 210 using these procedures, so it did not matter whether GTL reached different results using different test procedures. Chrysler therefore refused to institute a recall.
In December 1995, NHTSA officials acknowledged that neither Standard 210 nor the laboratory test procedures developed by the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance specified a position for the pelvic body block. See J.A. 129. However, NHTSA asserted that, pursuant to a 1991 Federal Register notice, manufacturers must pass the strength test "with the safety belt and other vehicle features at any adjustment" whenever a standard does not indicate the specific test conditions. See 56 Fed.Reg. 63,676, 63,677 (1991). NHTSA thus suggested that Chrysler was on notice that it might be required to satisfy Standard 210 using the test procedures employed by GTL.
After a notice of noncompliance and a public hearing, NHTSA issued a final decision in June 1996. See 49 U.S.C. § 30118(b). NHTSA ordered Chrysler to notify owners, purchasers, and dealers of the noncompliance no later than July 8, 1996, and to provide a remedy without charge. Chrysler refused and NHTSA filed this action, alleging that Chrysler had violated §§ 30112(a) and 30115 of the Act and requesting that the District Court order a recall and award civil penalties.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court first sought to determine NHTSA's exact interpretation of Standard 210. This was no mean feat, because NHTSA had articulated its interpretation "in different ways." See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 995 F.Supp. at 155 & n. 8. The District Court finally concluded that "NHTSA's interpretation of [Standard 210] is that vehicles must comply with [Standard 210] when tested with the pelvic body block in any position that would extend the lap belt to accommodate a 50th percentile 6-year-old to a 95th percentile adult male." Id. at 155. The testing range cited by the District Court is nowhere to be found in Standard 210; rather, it is taken from Standard 208. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 p S7.1.1 (1997). In any event, neither party disputes that the District Court's statement is an accurate description of NHTSA's current interpretation of Standard 210.
The District Court found that, because Chrysler had exercised reasonable care, it had not violated § 30112(a) of the Act, which prohibits the manufacture of a vehicle that does not comply with the applicable standards. The trial court also found that Chrysler had not violated § 30115, which prohibits the certification of a vehicle that is not in compliance with all applicable standards. Most importantly, the District Court held that a manufacturer exercising reasonable care would not have "been able to identify with ascertainable certainty that vehicles must comply with [Standard 210] when tested with the pelvic body block in any position that would extend the lap belt to accommodate a 50th percentile 6-year-old to a 95th percentile adult male, i.e., with the pelvic body block positioned between 2 to 6.5 inches from the seat back." See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 995 F.Supp. at 162.
The District Court then went on to hold that a recall could be ordered without regard to whether Chrysler had reasonable notice of the standard giving rise to the alleged noncompliance. Because the 1995 cars here at issue did not comply with NHTSA's current interpretation of Standard 210, the District Court ordered Chrysler to notify owners, purchasers, and dealers of the noncompliance by March 30, 1998, and to provide a remedy without charge. See id. at 163-164; United States v. Chrysler Corp., 995 F.Supp. 150 (D.D.C.1998), reprinted in J.A. 260-61. After a panel of this court denied Chrysler's emergency motion to stay the District Court's recall order, Chrysler initiated a recall process by notifying owners, purchasers, and dealers of the alleged noncompliance, offering to provide a remedy at no charge, and submitting a "Noncompliance Information Report" to NHTSA. Chrysler has not, however, completed all that is required under the recall order.
The Government suggests that we need not reach the merits of this case, because, in light of Chrysler's recall of some of the cars at issue, the appeal is moot. Chrysler responds that the appeal is not moot, because it has not completed all that is required by the recall order....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Southern Indiana Gas and Elec. Co.
...1987). See also Trinity Broad, of Fla., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 211 F.3d 618 (D.C.Cir.2000); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350 (D.C.Cir. 1998); United States v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 128 F.3d 216 (4th Cir.1997); Gen. Elec, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C.Cir.1995); Beazer East,......
-
U.S. v. Lachman, 03-2274.
...otherwise a drastic penalty would result. See Trinity Broad. of Fla., Inc. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 618 (D.C.Cir. 2000); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350 (D.C.Cir.1998); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C.Cir.1995); Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ) Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649 (D.C.Cir.1......
-
In re Navy Chaplaincy
...further prejudice and unequal treatment.” Id. A case is not moot if a court can provide an effective remedy. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1353 (D.C.Cir.1998) (noting that “ ‘even the availability of a partial remedy’ is ‘sufficient to prevent a case from being moot’ ” (qu......
-
Federal Election Com'n v. Arlen Specter '96
...Elec., 53 F.3d at 1329 (citing Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir.1976)). See also United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1356 (D.C.Cir.1998) (finding insufficient notice of interpretation where agency's regulation was silent on question, Federal Register Noti......
-
CHAPTER 6 TRANSMISSION AND GATHERING LINE LEAKS AND SPILLS: HOW THE UPSTREAM AND MIDSTREAM SECTOR NEEDS TO PLAN, RESPOND, AND DEFEND
...provide an ascertainably certain interpretation of a regulation, then the agency cannot enforce the regulation. In U.S. v. Chrysler Corp, 158 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the court held that "Chrysler cannot be required to recall cars for noncompliance with Standard 210" if the company "had ......