Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. v. Bibb
| Decision Date | 26 February 1958 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2438. |
| Parties | NAVAJO FREIGHT LINES, Inc., a New Mexico corporation, Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., a Nebraska corporation, Prucka Transportation, Inc., a Nebraska corporation, Denver Chicago Trucking Co., Inc., a Nebraska corporation, Watson Bros. Transportation Co., Inc., a Nebraska corporation, and Pacific Intermountain Express Co., a Nevada corporation, Plaintiffs, and Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., an Arkansas corporation, Intervenor, v. Joseph D. BIBB, Director of the Department of Public Safety of the State of Illinois, and William H. Morris, Superintendent of the Division of State Highway Police, Department of Public Safety of the State of Illinois, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Axelrod, Goodman & Steiner, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Mack Stephenson and Melvin N. Routman, Springfield, Ill., Harper, Harper & Young, Fort Smith, Ark., for Arkansas Best-Freight Lines, Inc., intervenor.
Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., by Richard W. Husted, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.
Before MAJOR, Circuit Judge, and BRIGGLE and MERCER, District Judges.
Plaintiffs instituted this proceeding, praying for a declaratory judgment that Sec. 121.02 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, being Sec. 218 b of Chap. 95½, as amended (Ill.Rev. Stat.), effective July 8, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), be held unconstitutional and void, and that defendants be enjoined from enforcing or instituting proceedings against plaintiffs under the Act. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., was granted leave to intervene. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order.
On January 15, 1958, a three-judge Court was convened in accordance with the requirements of Title 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2284. On January 15 and 16, 1958, the Court heard testimony offered by the respective parties, as well as argument of counsel, at the conclusion of which the matter was taken under advisement.
The Act under attack, entitled "Rear fender splash guards," provides:
"It is unlawful for any person to operate any motor vehicle * * * upon the highways of this state * * * unless such vehicle is equipped with rear fender splash guards which shall comply with the specifications hereinafter provided in this Section * * *."
The specifications require that the splash guards (1) contour the wheel; (2) cover the top 90° of the rear 180° (excepting vehicles of less than five inches clearance, and requiring that they contour within two inches of the body); (3) extend downward to within ten inches of the ground; (4) have a lip or flange of two inches upon the outside edge, and (5) retain its general parallel condition under all operating conditions when mounted as required by the statute not more than six inches from the tread when fully loaded.
Plaintiffs named in the caption are all corporations organized and existing under laws of states other than Illinois. They are all engaged in the transportation of property by motor vehicle as a common carrier in interstate commerce generally over regular routes. They all operate pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission. None of plaintiffs other than Watson Bros. render any intrastate transportation in Illinois and hold no authority from the Illinois Commerce Commission to operate in such commerce. Watson Bros. operates to a limited extent in intrastate commerce in Illinois, for which it holds authority from the Illinois Commerce Commission.
Joseph D. Bibb is Director of the Department of Public Safety of the State of Illinois, which department maintains the division known as the State Highway Police, of which defendant William H. Morris is Superintendent. These officials are charged with the duty and responsibility of enforcing the provisions of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, including the section involved in this proceeding.
Notwithstanding our findings of fact and conclusions of law entered concurrently with this opinion, we deem it advisable to elaborate on the factual as well as the legal situation. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (hereafter Navajo) is a New Mexico corporation with its principal office at Denver, Colorado. It operates between points in the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas. It operates approximately 32 million miles per year in interstate commerce, with 7% of its mileage over Illinois highways. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. (hereafter Ringsby) is a Nebraska corporation and operates between points in the states of California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming. It operates approximately 30 million miles per year in interstate commerce, of which 3% is over Illinois highways. Prucka Transportation, Inc. (hereafter Prucka) is a Nebraska corporation and operates between points in the states of Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska and Wyoming. It operates approximately 5 million miles per year in interstate commerce, of which 5% is over Illinois highways. Denver Chicago Trucking Co., Inc. (hereafter Denver) is a Nebraska corporation operating between points in the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. It operates approximately 57 million miles per year in interstate commerce, of which approximately 4% is over Illinois highways. Watson Bros. Transportation Co., Inc. (hereafter Watson) is a Nebraska corporation and operates between points in the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico and Wyoming. It operates approximately 58 million miles per year in interstate commerce, of which 7% is over Illinois highways. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. (hereafter Pacific) is a Nevada corporation and operates between points in California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. It operates approximately 90 million miles per year, of which 3% is over Illinois highways.
Each of the plaintiffs is at present operating its trailers with what is termed the conventional or straight mud or splash guard which is recognized as legal in all the forty-eight states except Illinois. Each of the plaintiffs, in order to operate in Illinois, will be required to equip its trailers with the contour type splash guard required by the Illinois Act, the cost of which is $30 or more per vehicle. Navajo will be required to make such installation on approximately 733 trailers, at a cost of $21,990; Ringsby, on approximately 468 trailers, at a cost of $14,040; Prucka, on approximately 150 trailers, at a cost of $4,500; Denver, on approximately 750 trailers, at a cost of $22,500; Watson, on approximately 1,528 trailers, at a cost of $45,840; Pacific, on approximately 1,200 trailers, at a cost of $36,000. Moreover, from two to four hours of labor are required to install or remove a contour splash guard. The expense incident to maintenance and replacement is heavy.
The service rendered by plaintiffs requires that they interchange trailers, and for many years this has been the practice. For example, a carrier which serves between Portland, Oregon and Denver, Colorado, will handle and originate a trailer load of perishable commodities destined for Chicago. The original carrier will move the trailer from Portland to Denver and then deliver it, without transferring the load, for movement to destination via any one of the plaintiffs herein. This interchange service constitutes a substantial proportion of the transportation business of each of the plaintiffs, ranging from 30% to 65%. For example, in the year 1956, the revenue derived by Pacific from traffic which moved through its Chicago terminal amounted to approximately $3,182,000. The revenue derived by Watson for the month of May, 1957, moving through its Chicago terminal, amounted to approximately $1,000,000, of which more than one-third was on traffic moved into the Chicago terminal from points outside of the state of Illinois. It derived revenue in the same month from freight moving through its Peoria, Illinois, terminal of approximately $107,000, of which about one-third was from freight moving into Peoria from points outside of the state of Illinois. Other plaintiffs received comparable revenue from interchange traffic passing through Illinois.
This interchange of traffic is necessary and essential for the efficient and prompt service which plaintiffs are required to render. More than that, a considerable portion of the service required of plaintiffs could not otherwise be rendered. For instance, plaintiffs render transportation service to the United States Government, including the transportation of explosives which are required to be handled in sealed trailers which cannot be opened until delivered. This service in the main could not be rendered absent the ability of the originating carrier to interchange with other carriers. Plaintiffs also carry substantial amounts of commodities which because of their nature, such as their size or weight, or because they are perishable, cannot be physically transferred from one trailer to another without damage and delay. Again, proper service can be rendered only because plaintiffs are able to interchange trailers, carrying such shipments, with other carriers which are authorized to complete the journey to the point of the shipment's destination. More than that, many shippers and consignees specify in their bills of lading that the commodity which they ship must remain in the same trailer until it reaches its destination.
This statement, so far, is in the main a brief résumé of the factual...
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Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc
...both States impossible. The statute was declared to be violative of the Commerce Clause and appellants were enjoined from enforcing it. 159 F.Supp. 385. An appeal was taken and we noted probable jurisdiction. 358 U.S. 808, 79 S.Ct. 26, 3 L.Ed.2d 53. The power of the State to regulate the us......
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