Abbett v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.
| Decision Date | 14 June 1883 |
| Citation | 16 N.W. 266,30 Minn. 482 |
| Parties | Jonathan T. Abbett v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Lochren, J., presiding, refusing a new trial, after verdict for defendant under the direction of the court.
Order affirmed.
Merrick & Merrick, for appellant.
W. H Norris, for respondent.
This was an action for damages for injuries to plaintiff's horse and wagon, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant. At the time of the accident the horse and wagon were in charge of one Barnum, the servant of plaintiff. When the evidence closed, the court directed a verdict for defendant, on the ground that it appeared that Barnum was guilty of negligence which contributed to the injury. The correctness of this direction is the only question presented by the case.
Negligence is ordinarily a question for the jury. It is always so where the evidence on material points is conflicting, or where, the facts being undisputed, different minds might reasonably draw different conclusions from them. Negligence cannot be conclusively established, as a matter of law, upon a state of facts on which fairminded men of ordinary intelligence may differ as to the inferences to be drawn from it; and when the question of negligence arises upon even a conceded state of facts from which reasonable men might arrive at different conclusions, it must be submitted to the jury, and if the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are not certain or incontrovertible, the question of negligence cannot be passed upon by the court. The evidential facts may be all admitted, and yet the question of negligence not be a question for the court; for in such case this is the main fact, the existence or non-existence of which is to be inferred from the other facts. But where the facts are undisputed or conclusively proved, and there is no reasonable chance for drawing different conclusions from them, then the question, as in any other case, becomes one of law for the court. And even if there be controversy in the evidence as to some facts, yet if those that are uncontroverted clearly and indisputably establish negligence, it is still a question of law for the court. While it is undoubtedly true that a court might, in its discretion, set aside a verdict as against the weight of evidence, and submit the question to another jury, in a case where it would have no right to take the question entirely away from the jury, yet we apprehend that whenever it would be the bounden duty of the court to set aside a verdict because there is no evidence to sustain it, or because it is against the evidence, it would be no error to direct a verdict or grant a nonsuit.
All that remains is to apply these general rules to the facts of this case. After a careful examination of the evidence, we think the following facts are conceded or conclusively proved: Defendant's road in the city of Minneapolis running north-west and south-east, crosses Franklin avenue which runs east and west, at its intersection with Cedar avenue, which runs north and south. This portion of the road is between the depot and the city yard, and the lower or freight yard in south Minneapolis, and is used in the almost constant handling of cars in the usual course of business between the two yards, as well as for the passage of regular trains, being traversed by at least from 40 to 50 trains and engines per day, besides the regular trains. These irregular trains do not run on schedule time. At this crossing at which the accident occurred, the railroad consists of two parallel and straight main tracks, the eastern one of which is used for outgoing and the western one for ingoing trains. At or near this crossing there are also some switch or side-tracks, coming into the main tracks. There is also a sign-board containing the words "Look out for the cars." The company also kept a flagman at the crossing.
Barnum the driver of the horse and wagon, had been employed at plaintiff's store, on the corner of Franklin and Cedar avenues, for about a month, clerking and driving this delivery wagon, and hence was necessarily familiar with the tracks and the passage of trains. On the morning in question, he approached this crossing from the east, by Franklin avenue, driving this wagon. Galliger, the flagman, signalled him of an approaching train, and then...
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