Sneathen v. Sneathen

• Decision Date: 11 May 1891
• Citation: 104 Mo. 201,16 S.W. 497
• Parties: SNEATHEN et al. v. SNEATHEN et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

16 S.W. 497

104 Mo. 201

SNEATHEN et al. v. SNEATHEN et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

May 11, 1891.

DEEDS — DELIVERY — VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE — BILL TO REMOVE CLOUD.

1. Where a woman marries believing her former husband to be dead, but, hearing that he is still alive, commences divorce proceedings, which she discontinues on reliable information of his death, and then marries her second husband

again, she is the lawful wife of the second husband.

2. Though not in possession, the heirs can maintain a bill to set aside a deed made by their father, when it appears that the widow is in possession of the property as a homestead, and that therefore the heirs cannot attack the validity of the deed in question by a suit in ejectment.

3. Where a man executes a deed of his property to his grandchildren, reserving a life-estate to himself and wife, and delivers it to his wife, telling her to deliver it to the grantees the first time she sees them, and she puts the deed away intending to deliver, but does not do so until after the grantor's death, there is a valid delivery of the deed, notwithstanding that, shortly after the execution of the deed, the grantor, on seeing one of the grantees, said that he wished he had the deed with him so that he could give it to the grantee, as that circumstance does not tend to show that there had not been a delivery of the deed to the grantor's wife for the grantees.

Error to circuit court, De Kalb county; JOSEPH P. GRUBB, Judge.

S. G. Loring, for plaintiffs in error. Stephen S. Brown, for defendants in error.

BLACK, J.

William Sneathen died on the 25th April, 1881. Prior thereto, and on the 24th March, 1881, he and his wife, Perdilla, executed a deed purporting to convey the home place, consisting of 120 acres of land, to Malcom Anderson, Emory Anderson, and William Anderson, who are the grandchildren of William Sneathen by his first marriage, the grantors reserving in the deed a life-estate to themselves. The plaintiffs in this case are also children and grandchildren of William Sneathen by his first marriage, and by this suit they seek to set aside that deed. The substantial averments of the petition are that, though Perdilla was the lawful wife of one Moore, yet she and William Sneathen lived and cohabited together from 1860 to his death; that she, by the use of fraud and threats and undue influence, persuaded and compelled him to make the deed; that he failed to deliver the deed during his life-time, and after his death she procured and delivered the same to the grantees therein named.

1. The evidence shows that William and Perdilla were married in 1860. She then supposed her former husband was dead, but, hearing that he was still living she commenced proceedings for divorce, pending which she received reliable information that he was dead. The divorce proceedings were then dismissed, and she and Sneathen were again married. With this evidence, and it is all there is upon the subject, it must be held that she was the lawful wife of Sneathen for many years prior to his death.

2. The evidence bearing upon the question of fraud, compulsion, and undue influence shows that this and other deeds made by the deceased at the same time cut off the plaintiffs from any portion of their father's real estate. He was 78 years old when the deeds were made. While age had brought about physical infirmities, and to some extent weakened his mental capacity, still he rode about his farm, looked after his stock, and could and did attend to his ordinary business affairs. There is no reliable evidence of compulsion or fraud on the part of the wife. It is sufficient to say that the issue of fraud, compulsion, and undue influence tendered by the plaintiffs stands unproved. On the contrary, it is disproved by all the trustworthy evidence in the case.

3. The defendants insist that this is a suit to remove a cloud from the plaintiffs' alleged title as heirs, and that the suit cannot be maintained because the plaintiffs are not in possession; and in support of these propositions we are cited to Davis v. Sloan, 95 Mo. 552, 5 S. W. Rep. 702, and Graves v. Ewart, 99 Mo. 13, 11 S. W. Rep. 971. If those cases are examined with any degree of care, it will be seen that a suit in equity to remove a cloud from a title may be maintained in those cases where the plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. So in Keane v. Kyne, 66 Mo. 216, the plaintiff had a remedy at law. Although the plaintiffs are not in possession, still, if they have no remedy at law, a court of equity will entertain a bill to remove the cloud. Story, Eq. Jur. (12th Ed.) § 700, note 4; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1399, note 4. The property in question was the homestead of the deceased, and the widow, who is a defendant in this case, has a homestead right therein, though the deed is invalid, and this right is exclusive in her, since the children are all adults. Besides this, the widow has the right to remain in possession of the mansion-house and plantation thereto belonging until dower is assigned to her, and that has not been done in this case. For these reasons the plaintiffs cannot recover in ejectment, even if the deed should be held to be of no validity, and they therefore have no remedy at law. The jurisdiction in equity to remove a cloud is not only remedial, but it is also preventive. It is right and proper that the question as to the validity of the deed should be determined while the evidence is at hand, and, if it is invalid, it should be so declared, so as to prevent distant vexatious legislation. Story, Eq. Jur. (12th Ed.) § 700; Gardner v. Terry, 99 Mo. 523, 12 S. W. Rep. 888.

4. The real question in this case is that concerning the alleged non-delivery of the deed. The evidence bearing upon this issue is, in substance, this: William Sneathen owned and resided upon the 120 acres of land now in question, and he also owned another 40-acre tract. His wife, Perdilla, owned another 40 acres, and also a one-fifth interest in her deceased father's estate. Sneathen went to a justice of the peace, and requested him to prepare four deeds, at the same time explaining the reason why he desired to execute them. There was no haste in the...