Leifert v. Turkington

• Decision Date: 08 November 1932
• Citation: 115 Conn. 600,162 A. 842
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: LEIFERT v. TURKINGTON, Sheriff.

162 A. 842

115 Conn. 600

LEIFERT v. TURKINGTON, Sheriff.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

November 8, 1932

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Litchfield County; Elbert B Hamlin, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceeding by Herman Ledfert against Frank H Turkington, Sheriff. From a judgment discharging the writ petitioner appeals.

No error.

Valid part of judgment was not affected by attempt to suspend sentence without authority, and mittimus for its execution might properly issue.

Thomas F. Wall, of Torrington, for appellant.

J Howard Roberts, of Waterbury, for appellee.

AVERY J.

From the pleadings in this case, it appears that on June 2, 1932, Herman Leifert was presented before a justice of the peace in the town of Goshen upon a grand juror's complaint, charging him with beating his daughter in violation of General Statutes, § 6061, entitled " Cruelty to persons." At the conclusion of the hearing, the justice sentenced him to thirty days in the county jail at Litchfield and fined him $100 and costs. On the same day execution of the sentence was ordered suspended until his daughter could be placed permanently in a home. June 13, 1932, the justice ordered the fine remitted and issued a mittimus to the sheriff of Litchfield county, directing his confinement in the county jail for a period of thirty days, and until the costs of prosecution were paid. On the same day, Leifert petitioned the court of common pleas for Litchfield county for his release, claiming that he was unlawfully detained by the sheriff of the county.

The appeal advances three claims: (1) That the justice of the peace was not authorized to take final jurisdiction in the matter; (2) that the judgment was beyond his jurisdiction and void; (3) that he had no right to suspend the sentence and afterward issue a mittimus. The complaint against the petitioner was brought under General Statutes, § 6061. A violation of this section is punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. The claim of the petitioner is that the justice could not take final jurisdiction of a complaint charging a breach of this statute, because of the provisions of General Statutes, § 6396, which provides that, " No justice of the peace shall have final jurisdiction of any prosecution for crime, the punishment for which may be imprisonment in the State Prison." General Statutes, § 6508, provides that: " Punishment by imprisonment, when not otherwise provided, shall be in the jail of the county in which the offense was committed or in the State Prison, but any sentence of confinement in the State Prison shall be for the period of at least one year and, whenever the punishment provided in any statute may be confinement in the State Prison for a period less than one year, the court pronouncing judgment may sentence the accused to imprisonment in jail for not more than one year nor less than forty days." The claim of the petitioner is that as section 6061 provides that a person violating its provisions may be " imprisoned not more than one year," such person may be imprisoned under this statute in the state prison; and, therefore, an offense under this statute is one of which a justice of the peace cannot take final jurisdiction under General Statutes, § 6396. This claim of the petitioner overlooks the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, General Statutes, § 6507, first enacted in 1901, which provides that: " When any person shall be sentenced to the State Prison, otherwise than for life or in connection with a sentence of execution for a capital offense, the court imposing the sentence shall establish a maximum and minimum term for which such convict may be held in said prison. The maximum term shall not be longer than the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law as a penalty for such offense, and the minimum term shall not be less than one year. ***" In State v. McGuire, 84 Conn. 470, 477, 80 A. 761, 764, 38 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1045, we stated that: " The purpose of the act doubtless was to encourage and hold out hope to the convict that by good conduct and reform he may secure his liberty after the expiration of the minimum term, or at most before he has served the maximum sentence. *** The purpose and effect of the indeterminate sentence law was to prevent the fixing of a determinate sentence by the court which sentenced the convict. It was bound to fix a minimum, as well as a maximum term." As the maximum sentence for the offense of which the petitioner was charged is imprisonment for one year and the minimum sentence for which he could be committed to state prison is one year, it is obvious that the purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law could not be carried into effect if a sentence was imposed having a maximum and minimum of one year. A sentence in which the maximum and minimum period of confinement expire at the same time would be for a definite period, and would not comply with either the letter or spirit of the...