Conyers v. City of Chi.
| Decision Date | 10 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 12 C 06144,12 C 06144 |
| Citation | 162 F.Supp.3d 737 |
| Parties | Blake Conyers, Lamar Ewing, and Kevin Flint, individually and for a class, Plaintiffs, v. City of Chicago, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Joel A. Flaxman, Kenneth N. Flaxman, Kenneth N. Flaxman, P.C., Patrick William Morrissey, Thomas Gerard Morrissey, Thomas G. Morrissey, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Brendan Thomas Moore, City of Chicago Department of Law, Brian Weinthal, Jonathan B. Amarilio, Allan T. Slagel, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Megan Kelly McGrath, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
John J. Tharp, Jr.
Plaintiffs Blake Conyers, Lamar Ewing, and Kevin Flint, individually and on behalf of a class, bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the City of Chicago (the “City”). The plaintiffs allege that the City's policies pertaining to the destruction of personal property items seized from arrestees at the City's police station violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The City has moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Fourth Am. Compl., ECF No. 88. For the reasons stated below, the City's motion is granted with respect to the Fifth Amendment claim, but the plaintiffs may proceed on their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim.
The City requires that its police officers remove and inventory all personal property in the possession of arrestees who are detained at the City police station. At the time of arrest, the City provides arrestees with a Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) inventory receipt identifying the seized property and a written notice explaining how that property can be retrieved. Fourth Am. Compl., ECF No. 81, ¶ 15. Pursuant to CPD policy, if an arrestee is subsequently transferred to the Cook County Jail the City sends certain types of inventoried personal property with the arrestee to the Jail and retains all other types of inventoried personal property. Id. at ¶ 12.1 Since September 14, 2007, the City's policy has been to destroy any retained personal property of arrestees transferred to the Jail that is not claimed within 30 days of the inventory date. Id. at ¶ 23. Each of the plaintiffs had personal property items seized and ultimately destroyed as a result of the City's policies.
Plaintiff Conyers was arrested by City police officers on or about February 26, 2012, while in lawful possession of an earring, a bracelet, and two cell phones. Id. at ¶ 30. This property was removed and inventoried by the City, retained by the City upon Conyers' transfer to the Jail, and destroyed by City personnel because it was not claimed within 30 days. Id. at ¶ 32. Plaintiff Ewing was arrested by City police officers on or about December 20, 2012, while in lawful possession of a wallet, a debit card, a library card, and two cell phones. Id. at ¶ 37. This property was removed and inventoried by the City, retained by the City upon Ewing's transfer to the Jail, and destroyed by City personnel because it was not claimed within 30 days. Id. at ¶ 39. Plaintiff Flint was arrested by City police officers on or about January 1, 2013, while in lawful possession of a cell phone and a ring with a small stone. Id. at ¶ 44. This property was removed and inventoried by the City, retained by the City upon Flint's transfer to the Jail, and destroyed by City personnel because it was not claimed within 30 days. Id. at ¶ 45. All three plaintiffs remained incarcerated in the Jail throughout the 30-day period following their respective arrests. Id. at ¶¶ 29, 38, 45.
The City provided a written notice to each of the plaintiffs at the time of their arrest (the “Notice”) that included the following information:
If you are in jail or incarcerated, and your receipt is marked “Property Available for Return to Owner,” you may get money returned to you by sending copies of your receipt, your photo ID and the name of the facility where you are jailed or incarcerated to: Chicago Police Department Evidence and Recovered Property Section; 1011 S. Homan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, 60624. If the property is money, a check will be sent to you at the facility where you are jailed or incarcerated.
Plaintiffs Conyers and Ewing attempted to retrieve their property while incarcerated before learning that it had been destroyed. Conyers “filed a grievance with the Cook County Jail, requested assistance from the jail's social worker, and wrote a letter to [ERPS] seeking return of his personal property.” Id. at ¶ 31.3 Ewing “prepared a form authorizing his cousin to [claim his] property” and had his cousin go to ERPS to attempt to retrieve the property before the 30-day period had elapsed. Id. at ¶ 38. Flint made no attempt to retrieve his property while incarcerated but eventually learned of its destruction upon his release. Id. at ¶ 45.
In dismissing the Third Amended Complaint, see Order Dismissing Third Amended Complaint, Dkt. 80, the Court gave plaintiffs specific instructions with respect to repleading and filing a Fourth Amended Complaint. The Court dismissed plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment-based § 1983
claim with prejudice to the extent that it purported to assert a facial challenge to the City's policy, but without prejudice to the extent that it presented an as-applied challenge. Order, Dkt. 80, at 15. However, the Court cautioned that an as-applied Fifth Amendment challenge could not be pursued unless and until Plaintiffs have exhausted all potential remedies under state law. Id. at 15. The plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment-based § 1983 claim was also dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. The Court granted the plaintiffs leave to replead that claim within 28 days. Id. The plaintiffs timely filed their Fourth Amended Complaint, and this Motion to Dismiss followed.
The plaintiffs allege that the City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because its policies pertaining to the destruction of retained personal property of arrestees transferred to the Jail deprive arrestees of rights secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. To state a claim against a municipal entity under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law violated a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the violation was caused by a policy or custom of the defendant. See
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ; Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv. , 577 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir.2009). The City argues that the Complaint (1) does not assert a valid § 1983 claim based on the Fifth Amendment because the plaintiffs have not exhausted state law remedies, and (2) it does not assert a valid § 1983 claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment because the plaintiffs have not satisfied the standing requirements of Article III. The City's arguments are addressed in turn below.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. Amend. V
. The plaintiffs claim that the City's disposal of their property after 30 days without providing adequate notice or opportunity to reclaim it amounts to a deprivation of their property without just compensation. Compl. at ¶ 7. The plaintiffs, however, cannot bring an as-applied Takings Clause challenge in federal court until they have pursued all state law remedies that are available to them.4
Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City , 473 U.S. 172, 194–95, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985) ; Peters v. Vill. of Clifton , 498 F.3d 727, 731–32 (7th Cir.2007).5 The City argues that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust state law remedies to redress the loss associated with the disposal of their property. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 7. But the plaintiffs maintain that the Illinois Local Government and Governmental Employee Tort Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. et seq. , precludes them from pursuing tort claims against the City in state court, and thus there are no state law remedies available for them to exhaust. There are substantial reasons to doubt the plaintiff's premise, however, and so the Court cannot conclude that the plaintiff has satisfied the exhaustion requirement. In a takings case, “a state violates the constitution only by refusing to pay up.” SGB Financial Services, Inc. v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis – Marion County, Indiana , 235 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir.2000)
. The plaintiffs have not established that it is inevitable that they will be bounced from state court and so they do not as yet have a ripe takings claim.
The plaintiffs maintain that § 4-103 of the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employee Tort Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/4-103
(the “Act”), provides the City with immunity from claims involving the sale or destruction of inmate property. Section 4-103 states:
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