Meekin v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1900
• Citation: 164 N.Y. 145,58 N.E. 50
• Parties: MEEKIN v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

164 N.Y. 145

58 N.E. 50

MEEKIN

v.BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 2, 1900.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Second department.

Petition by Clara Meekin, as administratrix of Laurie Meekin, deceased, to revive an action brought by Charles Meekin, as administrator of said deceased, against the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company. From an order of the appellate division (64 N. Y. Supp. 291) affirming an order made by the court at special term reviving and continuing the action, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

On the 5th of October, 1899, an action was brought by Charles Meekin, as administrator of his deceased daughter, Laurie Meekin, against the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, to recover damages for negligently causing her death. After issue was joined and the action had been placed on the calendar for trial, Charles Meekin died, and the petitioner was appointed administratrix of his estate. Upon a petition showing the foregoing among other facts, she applied at special term, on notice, for an order to revive and continue the action in her name as plaintiff. The motion was opposed, and upon the hearing it appeared that Charles Meekin was the sole next of kin of Laurie Meekin, who, however, left her mother, five brothers, and six sisters, her surviving. From an order granting said motion, with costs, the railroad company appealed to the appellate division of the Second department, which affirmed the order, after striking out the award of costs. Subsequently leave to appeal from the order of affirmance was granted, and the following question certified for decision: ‘Does an action to recover damages for negligently causing the death of his intestate survive the death of the administrator, who was also the father and sole next of kin of the deceased, where such intestate left, her surviving, other persons, who, had such father not survived said intestate, would have been next of kin of such deceased?’

John L. Wells, for appellant.

Isaac M. Kapper, for respondent.

VANN, J. (after stating the facts).

By the act of 1847, now substantially embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure, a right of action unknown to the common law was created, which has since been perpetuated by the revised constitution. Laws 1847, c. 450; Const. art. 1, § 18. The personal representatives of a decedent who left a husband, wife, or next of kin are authorized to ‘maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default, by which the decedent's death was caused, against a natural person who, or a corporation which, would have been liable to an action in favor of the decedent, by reason thereof, if death had not ensued.’ Code Civ. Proc. § 1902. The damages recovered in such an action ‘are exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's husband or wife, and next of kin; and, when they are collected, they must be distributed by the plaintiff, as if they were unbequeathed assets, left in his hands, after payment of all debts, and expenses of administration.’ Id. § 1903. ‘The damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such a sum as the jury * * * deems to be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries, resulting from the decedent's death, to the person or persons, for whose benefit the action is brought.’ Id. § 1904. The Revised Statutes, which are modified to some extent by these provisions of the Code, authorize an executor or administrator to maintain an action ‘for wrongs done to the property, rights or interests of another,’ after his death, against the wrongdoer, and after his death ‘against his executorsor administrators in the same manner and with the like effect in all respects as actions founded upon contract.’ This provision, however, does not extend to actions for slander, libel, assault and battery, or false imprisonment, nor to actions ‘for injuries to the person of the plaintiff or to the person of the testator or intestate of any executor or administrator.’ 2 Rev. St. (9th Ed.) p. 1907. The question, therefore, is whether the right of action created by the act of 1847, and continued by the Code of Civil Procedure, is to recover damages for wrongs done to the property rights or interests of another, or for injuries to the person of the decedent. Some confusion has arisen because the statute creates a property right out of an injury to the person, and confers it, not upon the one injured, but upon his representatives, for the benefit of his wife and next of kin. The theory of the statute is that damages should be recovered for injuries to the estate of the beneficiaries of the action, which injuries were caused by the death of the decedent. The beneficiaries named in the statute sustain such a legal relation to the deceased, by blood or marriage, that it is presumed they would have been pecuniarily benefited by his continuance in life, and hence damages are allowed for a wrongful act or omission causing his death. If he had lived, the support, education, or services required from him by law, as well as benefits in the nature of gifts conferred in the past, might have been continued, to the pecuniary advantage of the beneficiary. So, the decedent, by continuing to live, might increase his estate, and thus increase the amount to be inherited from him upon his death in the course of nature. Hence the statute declares that the damages awarded shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the death, not to the person injured, but to the person for whose benefit the action is brought. While a personal injury must cause the death, damages are allowed, not for an injury to the person deceased, but for an injury to the estate of the beneficiary. The statute thus contemplates the indirect, rather than the direct, effect of the wrongful act. This is evident from the well-settled law that nothing can be recovered for the pain or suffering of the deceased, if he lingers before dying, or for punitive damages, even when aggravating circumstances would warrant them if the action were between the person injured and a person inflicting the injury. The amount of damages in this class of cases depends upon the value of the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits from the continuance in life by the decedent to the husband or wife and next of kin. This is a right of property which becomes vested in the beneficiaries at the moment of death, and can be converted into money through a statutory action brought for their benefit by the personal representatives, who are simply trustees for the purpose. Wooden v. Railroad Co., 126 N. Y. 10, 26 N. E. 1050,13 L. R. A. 458. The damages bear interest from the date of the death, in accordance with the general rule relating to injuries to property, which is never applied in cases of injury to the person. When collected, the damages are distributed ‘as if they were unbequeathed assets.’ Thus the statute creates a right of action for damages to the estate of the beneficiaries caused by a wrongful act or omission which deprived them of some pecuniary benefit reasonably to be expected from the continuance in life of the decedent. That right of action was the property of the beneficiary, which was not forfeited by his death, but became a part of his estate. No order of revivor would have been necessary in this case if the beneficiary had not been the sole administrator.

The weight of authority is in accordance with these views, although the gradual development of the law upon the subject has resulted in some diversity of opinion. While the question was not up in one of the early cases, it was touched upon during the discussion. Oldfield v. Railroad Co., 14 N. Y. 310, 316. In Quin v. Moore, 15 N. Y. 432, it was held that the interest of the beneficiary was capable of assignment, which is a test of the right to revive. In deciding the case the court said: ‘The interest of Mrs. Kerns was also assignable. In respect to purely personal torts, it is true that at common law, the right of action ceases with the life of the injured party. But in this case, although the tort was personal to the child who died, the statute comes in and declares that a right of action shall survive to the administrator. The theory of the statute is that the next of kin have a pecuniary interest in the life of the person killed, and the value of this interest is the amount for which the jury are...