Worthington v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1900
• Citation: 164 N.Y. 81,58 N.E. 102
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: WORTHINGTON v. LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO.

164 N.Y. 81

58 N.E. 102

WORTHINGTON

v.LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 2, 1900.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Action by Amasa Worthington against the London Guarantee & Accident Company, a foreign corporation. From a judgment of the appellate division (62 N. Y. Supp. 591) affirming a judgment of the appellate term of the supreme court (58 N. Y. Supp. 1088) which reversed a judgment of the municipal court of the city of New York in favor of plaintiff, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Robert L. Morrell, for appellant.

Frederick Hulse, for respondent.

BARTLETT, J.

This action was commenced in the municipal court of the city of New York, borough of Manhattan, First judicial district, against the defendant, a foreign corporation created by the laws of Great Britain, and having an office in the city of New York. The plaintiff sued to recover a sum of money alleged to be due on contract, and recovered judgment. The appellate term reversed the judgment, and the appellate division affirmed the order and judgment of reversal.

The only question discussed in the opinions of the appellate courts was that of jurisdiction; it being held that the municipal court of the city of New York had no jurisdiction of the defendant, notwithstanding the fact that the Greater New York charter provides in express terms, in section 1364, that said court has jurisdiction ‘of a foreign corporation having an office in the city of New York,’ for the reason that this provision of the charter is violative of article 6, § 18, of the state constitution, which provides that the legislature ‘shall not hereafter confer upon any inferior local court of its creation, any equity jurisdiction or any greater jurisdiction in other respects than is conferred upon county courts by or under this article.’ The argument of the respondent is that the municipal court is a new, inferior, local court created by the charter, and, as the state constitution (article 6, § 14) limits the jurisdiction of county courts to residents of the county, the legislature was without power to confer jurisdiction as to defendants not residing within the limits of the present city of New York. This view of the law has been approved by the two appellate tribunals, and a question is certified to this court by the appellate division reading as follows, viz.: ‘Has the municipal court of the city of New York jurisdiction to render judgment against the defendant in this cause?’ This decision has such a serious effect on the business interests of a great city, containing about 3,500,000 inhabitants, that the question may well be asked whether a situation is not presented where the familiar rule of construction may be applied most rigidly,-that a statute can be declared unconstitutional only when it can be shown beyond reasonable doubt that it conflicts with the fundamental law, and that until every reasonable mode of reconciliation of the statute with the constitution has been resorted to, and reconciliation has been found impossible, the statute will be upheld. People v. Board of Sup'rs of Westchester Co., 147 N. Y. 1, 41 N. E. 563. To the charter, as to every statute, the presumption of constitutionality attaches. The burden rests upon the defendant to show it is unconstitutional.

It is well at the outset to recall the jurisdiction of inferior local courts in the territory now embraced within the city of New York prior to January 1, 1898, when the greater city came into existence. The district courts in the old city of New York, answering to justices' courts in the other portions of the state, had existed for nearly 150 years, and, under the consolidation act (section 1285), had jurisdiction in civil actions, for a limited amount, of nonresidents of the county and foreign corporations, provided they had an office in the city of New York. Within the limits of the old city of New York, there was neither county court nor justice of the peace. In Brooklyn there existed courts known as ‘justices' courts,’ with nonresident jurisdiction, and in other portions of the territory now embraced within the greater city were justices of the peace and county courts; the former having jurisdiction of defendants who were nonresidents of the county, and the latter confined to residents. The old city of New York, as is well known, had a large number of nonresidents who came within its limits every day to do business, and against whom numberless small claims were constantly arising in favor of residents. For time out of mind these claims had been collected in the district courts in the exercise of jurisdiction that greatly promoted the interests of those seeking to enforce these minor causes of action; but, if the decision in the case at bar is to stand, these comparatively insignificant demands are to be litigated in the supreme court, and, if under $50, all remedy is cut off, as costs would not be recoverable in a court of record. Code Civ. Proc. § 3228, subd. 4. If this is the legal situation, it is beyond legislative remedy, and must await the slow process of a constitutional amendment. It is quite inconceivable that the legislature contemplated any such radical change, and its clear intention, in view of the growing needs of the greater city, was to continue in full force the jurisdiction over nonresidents and foreign corporations as to minor claims. It requires clear and unmistakable language to a deprive the local courts of the city of New York of jurisdiction over causes of action originating within the territorial limits of the tribunal, and where the defendant, if a nonresident, is served within the boundaries of the city, or, if a foreign corporation, has a place of business therein. The task imposed upon the commissioners who drafted the charter of the greater city required them to unite into one great municipality the cities of New York and Brooklyn, and a large number of contiguous cities, towns, and villages. The student of the charter is constantly impressed with the fact that it is not a new enactment, but a continuation of the consolidation act of 1882, and its amendments as modified. This principle of construction is made a part of the charter. Section 1608. The general scheme of the charter was to continue in existence the old city of New York, and, to a great extent, its municipal and judicial machinery, and to unite with it the outlying territory, which aggregation on a day named would become the new city of New York. This scheme being kept in mind, the details of the charter are rendered clear and harmonious. The first step was a provision that the wards of the old city of New York should be continued, with their present boundaries and numbers, and known as wards of the borough of Manhattan and the Bronx, respectively. Section 1578. The provision was also made to continue the wards of the former city of Brooklyn as wards in the borough of Brooklyn. Section 1577. The remaining territory, which was to constitute the greater city, was dealt with in a very different manner. The five towns and all the incorporated villages within the county of Richmond were abolished, and that territory became wards in the borough of Richmond in the new city. Sections 1579, 1580. Certain towns and villages in the county of Queens were also abolished, and the territory carved up into wards in the borough of Queens in the greater city. Section 1581. This was followed by the provision that upon the taking effect of the charter all offices in these cities, villages, towns, and school districts were abolished, except as otherwise provided. Section 1615. This swept out of existence, with unimportant exceptions, justices of the peace and all local courts. The county of Richmond and a portion of the county of Queens came into the greater city without judicial machinery, except as provided by the new charter. The old city of New York and the city of Brooklyn were possessed of local courts that were to be the basis of a system for the new city. The matter of inferior local courts is dealt with in chapter 20 of the charter. The city court of New York was continued (section 1345), and the justices thereof were permitted to serve until the expiration of their respective terms. Section 1346. From and after midnight of the 31st of January, 1898, the justices' courts and the office of justice of the peace in the cities of Brooklyn and Long Island City were abolished. Section 1350. Section 1351 reads as follows: ‘On and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the district courts of the city of New York and the justices' courts of the First, Second and Third districts of the city of Brooklyn are hereby continued, consolidated and reorganized under the name of ‘The Municipal Court of the City of New York,’ which said court shall be a local civil court within the city of New York, as constituted by this act, and shall not be a court of record, or have any equity jurisdiction; but shall have the jurisdiction, powers, duties and organization hereinafter prescribed.'

We are of opinion that the district courts of the old city of New York, and the justices' courts in the three districts named in the former city of Brooklyn, were not abolished, but were continued, consolidated, and reorganized under a new name. This is so, not only because it is the plain reading of the statute, but for the reason that other provisions of the charter, to which we have referred, and to which we shall presently refer, make it very clear. It is argued that the new name and a few changes as to jurisdiction create a new court. This contention cannot be sustained. It was never supposed when the name of the ‘Marine Court of the City of New York’ was changed to that of the ‘City Court of New York,’ a new court was created, even when accompanied by a few changes as to jurisdiction. In the case at bar the district court's jurisdiction as to money...