Gray v. Metro. St. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1901
• Parties: GRAY v. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

165 N.Y. 457

59 N.E. 262

GRAY

v.METROPOLITAN ST. RY. CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 1, 1901.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Action for injuries by John G. Gray, an infant, by his guardian ad litem, against the Metropolitan Street-Railway Company. From a judgment of the appellate division (57 N. Y. Supp. 587) affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff on account of the alleged negligence of the defendant. On the trial evidence was given tending to show that the plaintiff, aged 16 years, owing to the crowded condition of one of the defendant's street cars attempted to get upon the front platform, but was obliged to stand with one foot on the platform and the other on the step, while he held onto the dashboard with both hands. After the car started the conductor got off of the rear platform and ran along to get on in front in order to collect fares. After collecting from the plaintiff, he fell off, and while getting on again, by forcing himself between the plaintiff and another passenger, named Giblin, he crowded the plaintiff so that he fell from the car and was run over. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the appellate division affirmed, one of the justices dissenting.

Vann, J., dissenting.

Charles F. Brown, for appellant.

Thomas P. Wickes, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We find no reversible error in the record, except the following: On the trial Giblin gave evidence in corroboration of the plaintiff's theory of the accident. He further testified that one Julian, who was in the employ of the defendant, and investigated the facts of the case in its behalf, attempted to hire him to leave the state until after the trial. Julian emphatically denied this, but stated that while working on the case he sent for Giblin, had an interview with him, and, upon his suggestion, appointed a time and place for another meeting. The plaintiff attempted by the cross-examination of Julian to show that, as a representative of the defendant, he had offered Giblin $450 to leave the state; that Giblin had refused to take it; that Julian had then left the room for the purpose of obtaining authority to give Giblin more money, and, being unable to arrange it, had made an appointment to meet him at another place late in the evening, when he would be better prepared to ‘talk business.’ On both the direct and cross examination Julian admitted appointing another interview, and stated that he had ‘an object in view’ in so doing. On the redirect examination he was asked by the defendant to state what his object was, but the objection of the plaintiff to the question as immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent was sustained, and an exception was taken. This was an erroneous ruling. The testimony of Giblin tended to show that the defendant did not have an honest and just defense, because it had attempted, through Julian, to bribe an important witness for the plaintiff. After both parties had shown by Julian that he had arranged for a second interview with...