Township of Jackson v. Wagner

• Decision Date: 04 June 1889
• Docket Number: 271
• Parties: TOWNSHIP OF JACKSON v. ELLEN T. WAGNER
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

17 A. 903

127 Pa. 184

TOWNSHIP OF JACKSON v. ELLEN T. WAGNER

No. 271

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 4, 1889

Argued February 22, 1889

ERROR TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LEBANON COUNTY.

No. 271 January Term 1889, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 164 September Term 1887, C.P.

On September 8, 1887, Ellen T. Wagner brought statutory trespass against the township of Jackson, to recover damages for injuries to her person received when driving upon a public highway. Issue.

At the trial on November 12, 1888, the testimony showed, in substance, that on July 9, 1887, the plaintiff, with her sister and three children, were driving in a horse and buggy along a public highway called Mill street, laid out of the approved width of thirty-three feet. When near the village of Myers-town, the road going through an open and cultivated region, with no dangerous exposures, they passed a point where there had been a quarry opened at the side of the road. Stones had also been taken from the road-bed and piled alongside the traveled way for about twenty-five feet in length and at places several feet high, leaving, however, an unobstructed roadway of about fifteen feet in width to the water-way on the other side, though near the stone pile there was a hole or depression in the roadway caused perhaps by a washout.

After the plaintiff had passed some distance beyond the stone pile the horse, becoming frightened by the sight of a couple of donkeys, one of which was in a cart and the other running loose, stopped short, turned round suddenly, broke down the left front wheel of the wagon and started back, drawing the wagon on three wheels and the hub of the broken wheel. When the stone pile was reached, the hub of the broken wheel struck it, as a hind wheel dropped into the depression in the road-bed, when the wagon was overturned, the plaintiff thrown out and seriously, and, as was claimed, permanently injured. The plaintiff testified that she had nearly stopped the horse, and that she believed that if it had not been for this hole, she would have stopped him in a moment.

The contentions of the parties sufficiently appear in portions of the charge to the jury, McPHERSON, J.:

Just what the precise situation then was, there is some dispute about, and the jury must determine it from the evidence. One side testifies that the horse was under perfect, or substantially perfect, control; that it could easily have been guided and restrained; that the wheel being off on the left, or north side, would act as a brake, and make it more easy to control the horse; and that therefore, from that and the other circumstances in the case bearing upon the condition of things at that time, the plaintiff was negligent, either in not stopping the horse before they came to this pile of stones and the washout in the road, or having come to or near that point, in not turning the horse away so as to avoid either or both of these obstructions in the road.

Now that is of course a very important question. It is submitted to the jury for their determination as one of the important questions in the case. That is, entirely aside of the negligence of the township, was the plaintiff upon her part guilty of negligence which helped to bring about this accident -- negligence which contributed to this accident? Was she careless herself? . . .

So taking all the facts into consideration; the facts that these women, with the children, were doubtless in a position of danger, and that there was a great deal in their situation to alarm them, and alarm them seriously -- taking all these matters into account, the jury must decide, as I say, whether the plaintiff was guilty of doing anything, or omitting to do anything, which contributed to her accident or injury. If she was, she cannot recover.

If, however, you find that she did everything which in the circumstances ordinarily prudent persons would have done, then you come to the question whether the township has been negligent; that is, whether the supervisors have been negligent; because the case rests upon their doing or not doing, as the case may be. The supervisors are the officers in charge of the roads, and the township is responsible for their negligence with reference to the roads.

A country road differs in some respects from a road that runs through a town. It is not necessary that a country road should be kept in a condition to be traveled from one side to the other. That would cause to townships an expense which in many cases, in most cases, indeed, they are not able to bear. There is no such requirement in our statutes, and no such rule of law. It is enough if a township keeps a sufficient portion of the road, the centre of the road, in good order, so that it can be traveled upon, and free from obstructions. Just how wide that portion ought to be is of course something that I cannot lay down to you, and it has never been laid down. It is not said, for instance, that there should be at least fifteen feet in the middle of the road, or that there should be at least twenty feet, or that ten feet is sufficient. The rule is that there must be a sufficient portion for ordinarily safe and convenient travel, upon the particular road and at the particular place. For instance, to illustrate that, a road that is unfrequently traveled -- suppose one or two times a day -- would properly get along with less care and with less of the road in order for travel, than a road over which vehicles were constantly passing. You can see that of course for yourselves without any further discussion of the matter. . . .

It is said here that that was not the case; that a portion of the road was obstructed by a pile of stones, and also by a washout, or hole, as it has been called; and those are the important matters in the case bearing upon the question of the negligence of the supervisors. I withdraw from the consideration of the jury entirely any question with reference to the stone quarry, and the degree to which it may or may not have encroached upon the road. In my judgment, that has nothing to do with the case. I do not see that it has been shown to have contributed to the accident in any way; and therefore, as I say, I instruct you to entirely disregard any testimony in the case with reference to this quarry being within the limits of the road. Just leave the quarry out of view entirely, and confine your attention to the pile of stones and the washout.

There is varying testimony with regard to this particular obstruction; as to the size of the pile of stones, and as to the depth, length and breadth of the hole. The jury must in the first instance find from the testimony, as best they can, taking the weight of it, what these obstructions really were; how high, how broad and how long was the pile of stones? So, with regard to the washout; how deep was it, and what was its position in the road? I understand it to be substantially agreed that it was in the traveled portion of the road, but the jury must determine. As I understand, the pile of stones was right along the side of the traveled track; and, quite near the foot of the pile, in the track of the road, was the washout; then came the track of the road a distance as to which the witnesses are not entirely agreed; then came the gutter, then the sidewalk, and finally the south line of the road.

Having determined the position and size of these obstructions, the jury must then decide whether they did unreasonably obstruct the road. Did they leave the rest of the road sufficient for the safe and convenient use of the public? If they find that they did not, then there would still be another question in the case; and that is the knowledge of the supervisors of their existence, and their failure to remove the stones or to fill up the hole. Because, although it might be that obstructions in the road made the road unsafe and inconvenient for travel, it would not follow that the township was responsible. It would still be necessary to show that the proper officers were in fault in neglecting to put things in their proper order. . . .

I will briefly go over the steps at this point. You must find in the first place that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. Then you must find that this road was unreasonably obstructed. Then you must find that the unreasonable obstruction of the road was due to the neglect of the supervisors. If you find any of those facts against the plaintiff, she has no case. If you find them all in her favor, then you come to a further point as to which there is little or no question: What directly caused her injury? You must find that her injury was caused by one of these obstructions.

Both sides agree that the overturning of the buggy, which was the immediate physical cause of her injuries -- that, in connection with the stones, or wherever she fell; the jury will determine where it was -- that the overturning of the buggy was caused either by the hole or by the stones; so that the jury, I take it, will have no difficulty in finding that her injuries were the result of contact with the stones or with the hole. If they decide that to be so, having found all the other matters to which I have alluded against the township, then they would come to the question of damages. . . .

Those are some points to be answered. The plaintiff's points are as follows [inter alia]:

1. The township authorities are bound to keep the road in good condition, free from obstruction, so free that even a skittish horse may be employed without danger.

Answer: This is affirmed, although in a country road the whole width need not be kept in such condition.

2. If the injury of the plaintiff was caused by the township authorities not maintaining the road of sufficient breadth or by...