Behling v. Southwest Pennsylvania Pipe Lines

• Decision Date: 26 March 1894
• Docket Number: 38
• Citation: 160 Pa. 359,28 A. 777
• Parties: Behling v. Southwest Penn. Pipe Lines, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

28 A. 777

160 Pa. 359

Behling v. Southwest Penn. Pipe Lines, Appellant

No. 38

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

March 26, 1894

Argued October 17, 1893

Appeal, No. 38, Oct. T., 1893, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Washington Co., May T., 1893, No. 63, on verdict for plaintiff, Marie Behling. Reversed.

Trespass for burning house. Before McILVAINE, P.J.

The facts appear from the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The court charged in part as follows:

"[If you find from all the evidence in the case that the burning of the oil in the stream, and its running down from above on and over the defendant's pipes, was a condition which the company, or its representatives in charge of the lines could, as ordinarily prudent and careful men, easily have foreseen, and which under ordinary circumstances might have been expected, and the burning oil thus running over the pipes caused one of them to burst or break, and the company under existing circumstances had not used ordinary care and skill in laying, maintaining and protecting the pipe that burst, and that, in bursting, as a direct, natural and probable result, it threw burning oil or flame on the plaintiff's dwelling and fired it, then the defendant would be liable.] Second; but, if from all the evidence you find that the plaintiff's buildings were fired by the oil which flowed down the run, or that any one of her buildings was so fired and from it the fire was communicated to the others, then the defendant is not liable, even if it was negligent in laying and maintaining its pipe line; or, if you find from all the evidence that the defendant's pipes under all the circumstances, were laid and maintained with care and skill and in a proper manner, and burning oil running down the stream caused the pipe to burst, without any fault on the part of the company, then the plaintiff cannot recover, even if the bursting of the pipe and the oil thrown therefrom caused the plaintiff's property to be set on fire."

Plaintiff's point was among others as follows:

"5. If the jury find that the defendant, exercising the care and diligence which a reasonably prudent and careful man would have exercised, knew or ought to have known, when it laid its lines in Robb's run, that, as a natural and probable result, any waste oil from the many wells in Robb's valley must pass down said run over said lines, and that the defendant knew that large quantities of oil did so pass down said run for several months prior to this fire, and that this oil was imminently liable to be set on fire, accidentally or otherwise, at any time, burn any rubbish in said run and heat the defendant's lines and cause them to break or burst; that defendants, exercising such reasonable care and diligence, knew, or ought to have known, that, in case of a fire at any of the wells draining into said valley, the burning oil therefrom, as a natural and probable result, would flow down said run over said lines, and heat them and cause them to break or burst; and if the jury further find that the defendant was guilty of negligence in locating, laying, operating and maintaining its lines in said run under such circumstances, and that by reason of such negligence, as a proximate cause, the plaintiff's house and property were set on fire and destroyed, then the defendant is liable and the verdict must be for the plaintiff for an amount that will compensate her for the injury she has shown that she sustained." Affirmed. [4]

Defendant's request for binding instructions was refused. [9]

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $1,485.

Errors assigned were (2, 4, 9) instructions, quoting them.

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

Boyd Crumrine and M. F. Elliott, H. McSweeney and E. E. Crumrine with them, for appellant. -- The defendant was not guilty of negligence in locating, maintaining and operating its pipe line as it was located, maintained and operated at the time of the fire: Hauck v. Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366; New York etc. R.R. v. Young, 33 Pa. 182; Struthers v. Ry. Co., 87 Pa. 282; Phila. & R.R.R. v. Hummell, 44 Pa. 379.

Defendant company was under no more obligation to anticipate the burning of the Butler well than plaintiff was to foresee it and to take precautionary measures against it: Brown v. Lynn, 31 Pa. 510; Reeves v. R.R., 30 Pa. 454.

Where no contractual relation exists, negligence must be proved affirmatively by him who alleges it: Pawling v. Hoskins, 132 Pa. 617; Cosulich v. Standard Oil Co., 122 N.Y. 118.

Even if the defendant were guilty of negligence in relation to the waste oil, its negligence was not the natural or proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury: Whart. Neg. § 134; Hoag v. R.R., 85 Pa. 293.

There was no actionable nuisance chargeable to the defendant, and it is liable only for culpable negligence: Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 Exch. Cas. 265, affirmed in 3 H.L. 330; Lentz v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 612; Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324; Blythe v. Birmingham Water Works Co., 25 L.J. (Exch.) 212; Wood on Railways, 743; Parke's Ap., 64 Pa. 137; Cleveland R.R. v. Speer, 56 Pa. 325; Struthers v. Dunkirk R.R., 87 Pa. 282; People v. R.R., 74 N.Y. 302; West Penn. R.R. Co.'s Ap., 99 Pa. 155; R.R. v. Young, 33 Pa. 175; Turnpike Co. v. R.R., 54 Pa. 345.

Negligence must be proved, not assumed: Cooley on Torts, 659; Penna. R.R. v. MacKinney, 124 Pa. 469; Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479; Meir v. R.R., 64 Pa. 226; R.R. v. Anderson, 94 Pa. 358; Hayman v. R.R., 118 Pa. 511; Spear v. R.R., 119 Pa. 61; Thomas v. R.R., 148 Pa. 183; Farley v. Traction Co., 132 Pa. 61; Fearn v. Ferry Co., 143 Pa. 122; R.R. v. Napheys, 90 Pa. 135.

The alleged negligence was not the proximate efficient cause of the injury: Ry. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512; West Mahanoy Twp. v. Watson, 116 Pa. 344; Hoag v. R.R., 85 Pa. 293; R.R. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 353; Jackson Twp. v. Wagner, 127 Pa. 184; Herr v. Lebanon, 149 Pa. 227; Schaeffer v. Jackson Twp., 150 Pa. 145; Pass. Ry. v. Trich, 117 Pa. 390; Chartiers Twp. v. Phillips, 122 Pa. 601; Bunting v. R.R., 118 Pa. 204; Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. 171; Haverly v. R.R., 135 Pa. 50.

The facts upon which the questions of negligence and proximate efficient cause were to be determined were undisputed, and it was error to submit the questions to the jury: Smith, Neg. 22; Cooley on Torts, 666; West Mahanoy Twp. v. Watson, 112 Pa. 574; West Mahanoy Twp. v. Watson, 116 Pa. 351; Pass. Ry. v. Trich, 117 Pa. 400; Chartiers Twp. v. Phillips, 122 Pa. 601; Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. 363; Jutte v. Bridge Co., 146 Pa. 400.

J. F. Taylor, W. F. McIlvaine with him, for appellee. -- Defendant was guilty of negligence in locating, laying, maintaining and operating its pipe line, as it was located, laid, maintained and operated at the time of the fire: Whart. Neg., 2d ed. § 274; 4 A. & E. Ency. L. 250; 6 Ib. 552; Ry. v. Gilleland, 56 Pa. 445; Keiser v. Gas Co., 143 Pa. 276; Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257; McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. 436.

Defendant cannot shield itself from the natural and necessary consequences of its own negligence, by attempting to hide behind the principle that it was not bound to foresee negligence in others. It did not have to foresee any such negligence in order to charge it with a duty. All that was necessary was for it to take account, as it was bound to do, of the existing conditions in and about Robb's run, and the natural and probable results likely to follow in case it laid its lines up that run under these conditions: McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. 436; B. & O.R.R. v. School District, 96 Pa. 65.

Defendant was negligent and that negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Defendant cannot relieve itself by pleading the negligence of a third party: Burrell Twp. v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 363; Carlisle Boro. v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. 544; Koelsch v. Phila. Co., 152 Pa. 355.

The facts in the case were disputed, and the question of negligence and proximate cause were both for the jury: P.R.R. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. 259; Johnson v. Brunner, 61 Pa. 58.

The duty of a pipe line company in choosing a location for, in laying, and in operating its pipe line, is not fixed but varies according to the circumstances; and, therefore, whether this particular company had exercised due care and prudence in this particular instance, was a question for the jury: Schilling v. Abernethy, 112 Pa. 437; Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr, 83 Pa. 332; Neslie v. Pass. Ry., 113 Pa. 300; Penna. R.R. v. Peters, 116 Pa. 206; R.R. v. Coon, 111 Pa. 430.

The question, also, as to what was the proximate cause of the injury, was for the jury: Haverly v. State Line R.R., 135 Pa. 50; P.R.R. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373; Lehigh Valley R.R. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. 123; Wagner v. Jackson Twp., 133 Pa. 61; Barthold v. Phila., 154 Pa. 109.

A pipe line or lines, to convey oil, laid as, and under the circumstances under which, defendant's lines were laid; and breaking and throwing burning oil on plaintiff's house and causing its destruction, as was done in this case, would have been a nuisance to plaintiff's property, if defendant had been unincorporated: Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257; Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324; Lentz v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 612; Hauck v. Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366.

Under § 2, act June 2, 1883, P.L. 63, defendant was liable.

Before GREEN, WILLIAMS, McCOLLUM, MITCHELL, DEAN and THOMPSON, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE WILLIAMS:

The house of the plaintiff, situated near the banks of Robb's run in the borough of McDonald, was burned on the night of the tenth of November, 1891. The defendant company was engaged in transporting oil from the wells of the McDonald oil field to its storage tanks, and to the markets in Pittsburgh and other cities. The plaintiff alleges that the burning of her house was due to the negligence of the...