Chace v. Loisel, 5D13–4449.
| Decision Date | 24 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 5D13–4449.,5D13–4449. |
| Citation | 170 So.3d 802 |
| Parties | Sandra CHACE, Petitioner, v. Robert LOISEL, Jr., Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Damon A. Chase of Chase Freeman, P.A., Lake Mary, for Petitioner.
Christopher M. Sprysenski of Salfi Sprysenski, P.A., Altamonte Springs, for Respondent.
Petitioner, Sandra Chace, seeks a writ of prohibition to quash the trial court's order denying her motion to disqualify the trial judge presiding over her and Respondent Robert Loisel, Jr.'s dissolution of marriage case. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion.
The following allegations formed the basis for Petitioner's motion to disqualify. Prior to entry of final judgment, the trial judge reached out to Petitioner, ex parte, in the form of a Facebook “friend” request. Upon advice of counsel, Petitioner decided not to respond to that invitation. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution, allegedly attributing most of the marital debt to Petitioner and providing Respondent with a disproportionately excessive alimony award. Following entry of the final judgment, Petitioner filed a formal complaint against the trial judge, alleging that the judge sent her a Facebook “friend” request and then retaliated against Petitioner after she did not accept the request. Respondent later filed a motion for clarification of certain provisions in the final judgment, which is currently pending below. In the meantime, Petitioner had learned of other cases involving similar ex parte social media communications by the judge that resulted in her disqualification. Subsequently, the subject motion to disqualify was filed, a hearing was held on that motion, and the motion was denied as legally insufficient. The instant petition was then filed in this Court.1
If the grounds asserted in a motion for disqualification are legally sufficient to create a well-founded fear in the mind of a party that he or she will not receive a fair trial, it is incumbent upon a judge to disqualify herself. See Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240, 242 (Fla.1986). To determine whether the motion is “legally sufficient,” this Court must resolve whether the alleged facts, which, accepted as true, would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that she could not get a fair and impartial trial before that judge. An affiant's mere subjective fear is insufficient to form the basis for disqualification. Id.
It seems clear that a judge's ex parte communication with a party presents a legally sufficient claim for disqualification, particularly in the case where the party's failure to respond to a Facebook “friend” request creates a reasonable fear of offending the solicitor. The “friend” request placed the litigant between the proverbial rock and a hard place: either engage in improper ex parte communications with the judge presiding over the case or risk offending the judge by not accepting the “friend” request.
In Domville v. State, 103 So.3d 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), rev. denied, State v. Domville, 110 So.3d 441 (Fla.2013), the Fourth District addressed a Facebook issue with regard to judges “friending” attorneys through social media. That court determined that a judge's social networking “friendship” with the prosecutor of the underlying criminal case was sufficient to create a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial in a reasonably prudent person. Id.
We have serious reservations about the court's rationale in Domville. The word “friend” on Facebook is a term of art. A number of words or phrases could more aptly describe the concept, including acquaintance and, sometimes, virtual stranger.
A Facebook friendship does not necessarily signify the existence of a close relationship. Other than the public nature of the internet, there is no difference between a Facebook “friend” and any other friendship a judge might have. Domville 's logic would require disqualification in cases involving an acquaintance of a judge. Particularly in smaller counties, where everyone in the legal community knows each other, this requirement is unworkable and unnecessary.2 Requiring disqualification in such cases does not...
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