Rapier v. Harris

• Decision Date: 19 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-1348,97-1348
• Citation: 172 F.3d 999
• Parties: Ricky J. RAPIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sheriff William HARRIS, Jail Commander Jon Marvel, Correctional Officer Ray Higginbotham, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 999

172 F.3d 999

Ricky J. RAPIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sheriff William HARRIS, Jail Commander Jon Marvel Correctional Officer Ray Higginbotham, et al Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-1348.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 28, 1998.

Decided April 19, 1999.

Jerold S. Solovy, Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, Ricky J. Rapier, pro se, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert L. Wright, William W. Earls (argued), Wright, Shagley & Lowery, Terre Haute, IN, for Defendants-Appellees.

Jerold S. Solovy, pro se, Melissa C. Brown (argued), Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, for Jerold S. Solovy, Amicus Curiae.

Before CUDAHY, EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Ricky Joe Rapier brought a § 1983 claim against the Sheriff of Vigo County, Indiana, various employees of the Vigo County Jail, and a police detective (collectively, "the defendants") for alleged violations of his constitutional rights during his detention at the jail while awaiting trial. He seeks review of the district court's decision to grant summary judgment for the defendants. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I BACKGROUND

A. Facts

On July 19, 1992, Mr. Rapier was arrested by the Terre Haute Police for disorderly conduct, resisting law enforcement, and three counts of battery on a law enforcement officer. He remained at the Vigo County Jail as a pretrial detainee until June 6, 1993. On July 31, 1992, Mr. Rapier was seen taking two food trays for himself, in violation of the Jail Rules. When confronted about this violation, Mr. Rapier became combative and was moved to the "drunk tank." While in the tank, Mr. Rapier yelled obscenities and insults at two jail officers.

On August 4, 1992, Officer Higginbotham and an inmate-trustee placed a food tray for Mr. Rapier on the shelf of the door to the solitary cell where he was being held. ¹ Mr. Rapier threw the tray of food and iced tea at the officer and the trustee. When Officer Harvey, the supervising officer, arrived on the scene, Mr. Rapier threw a container of urine at him. Mr. Rapier then flooded his cell by stuffing things in the toilet and was found holding part of a spoon, which inmates are required to return after meals for safety reasons. Mr. Rapier was then moved to another solitary cell.

On September 25, 1992, Mr. Rapier attacked inmate-trustee Griffin, using a When Mr. Rapier was placed in solitary confinement after the September 25 attack, he did not receive written notice or a hearing or any other process. His misconduct continued while he was in solitary confinement, resulting in various interdepartmental reports and memoranda, and he remained there for 270 consecutive days. For various periods of time during his segregation, Mr. Rapier's phone and commissary privileges were suspended, he was denied writing materials, he received no access to recreational facilities, he was denied showers and personal hygiene items, and, on three occasions, Mr. Rapier was denied the non-pork meals he requested. In addition, inmate-trustee Griffin was allowed to serve Mr. Rapier his meals. While deprived of various services and supplies while in solitary confinement, he was not deprived of anything necessary for his sustenance.

weapon fashioned from a broken broom handle. Mr. Rapier stabbed Griffin in the back and face and then chased after him. Griffin required hospital treatment for his injuries. On the same day, Mr. Rapier was placed in solitary confinement. Mr. Rapier was charged with Battery, a class C felony, for his attack on Griffin and pleaded guilty on May 3, 1993.

B. Holding of the District Court

The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because it found that Mr. Rapier had not established the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law. We shall summarize the court's resolution of the issues relevant to this appeal.

The district court first determined that Mr. Rapier's placement in solitary confinement without notice or a hearing did not violate his due process rights. Although due process entitles a pretrial detainee to be free from punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt, the court explained, a disability imposed during pretrial detention does not constitute impermissible punishment if it is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective and is not imposed with intent to punish. See R.76 at 8-9 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). The district court found that Mr. Rapier's placement in segregation was not "punishment" but was instead rationally related to the legitimate government objective of maintaining the safety of other inmates and jail personnel. Thus, Mr. Rapier's placement in segregation did not violate due process.

The district court also held that Mr. Rapier's free exercise rights were not violated when he was denied non-pork meals on three occasions out of 810 meals. The court found that the denials did not result from jail policies or regulations but instead resulted from occasional shortages due to limited resources.

The district court, having concluded that Mr. Rapier did not suffer the deprivation of any federally secured right, found it unnecessary to analyze the defendants' claim of qualified immunity.

II DISCUSSION

We begin with the fundamental principle that a person held in confinement as a pretrial detainee may not be subjected to any form of punishment for the crime for which he is charged. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). ² Any other rule would render nugatory the basic proposition that a person is innocent until there is a judicial determination of guilt. See id. ³ Nevertheless, a person lawfully detained in pretrial confinement because there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime is subject to certain restrictions on his liberty. The government may take measures that are reasonably calculated to effectuate the pretrial detention. See id. at 537, 99 S.Ct. 1861. The government also has

legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up for trial. For example, the Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees.

Id. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861. These restraints may at times be "discomforting," but, as long as they are "reasonably related" to the effective management of the confinement facility, they are not considered punishment for the crime that the detainee is suspected to have committed. In deciding whether a particular measure is reasonably related to the function of pretrial confinement, we must be careful, the Supreme Court has admonished, to remember that the implementation of such measures is "peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters." Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n. 23, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition to the regulatory measures that prison officials may take to ensure the effectiveness of pretrial confinement, a pretrial detainee can be punished for misconduct that occurs while he is awaiting trial in a pretrial confinement status. Notably, the basis for this punishment is not the underlying crime of which he stands accused; rather, this punishment is based upon the detainee's actions while in pretrial confinement. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir.1996); Collazo-Leon v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir.1995).

Unlike sentenced prisoners for whom much institutional punishment can be considered to be within the parameters of the imposed sentence of confinement, see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), pretrial detainees, serving no sentence and being held only to answer an accusation at trial, have no expectation that, simply by virtue of their status as pretrial detainees, they will be subjected to punishment. Indeed, in Sandin, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that "Bell correctly noted that a detainee 'may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.' " Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861). This distinction between convicted prisoners serving a sentence and pretrial confinees has been recognized by the courts of appeals that have addressed this issue. The First and Ninth Circuits have recognized specifically that pretrial detainees may constitutionally be punished for infractions committed while awaiting trial, but also have recognized the need for procedural protections prior to the imposition of any punishment. In Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517 (9th Cir.1996) , the Ninth Circuit held that "pretrial detainees may be subjected to disciplinary segregation only with a due process hearing to determine whether they have in fact violated any rule." Id. at 524. The court explained that, in contrast to convicted prisoners, pretrial detainees have no sentence that could be deemed to encompass such disciplinary confinement. See id. at 524-25. Moreover, the court noted, "a due process hearing helps to ensure that disciplinary punishment is what it purports to be, rather than punishment in advance of conviction for the crime that led to detention--the evil condemned by Bell." Id. at 524 n. 4. More...