DeJesus v. Bradt

• Decision Date: 31 March 2016
• Docket Number: 6:13–CV–6066 EAW
• Citation: 174 F.Supp.3d 777
• Parties: Denny DeJesus, 10-B–2030, Plaintiff, v. Mark L. Bradt, Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility, and William Hughes, Deputy Superintendent of Attica, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

174 F.Supp.3d 777

Denny DeJesus, 10-B–2030, Plaintiff,

v.Mark L. Bradt, Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility, and William Hughes, Deputy Superintendent of Attica, Defendants.

6:13–CV–6066 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed March 31, 2016

Denny DeJesus, Marcy, NY, pro se.

J. Richard Benitez, NYS Attorney General's Office, Rochester, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD

, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Denny DeJesus (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, is a practicing Muslim inmate currently housed at Marcy Correctional Facility. Plaintiff brings the instant action pursuant the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.,

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging defendants Mark L. Bradt and William Hughes (“Defendants”) interfered with Plaintiff's ability to properly observe Ramadan in the year 2012, while he was housed at Attica Correctional Facility. (Dkt.8). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was not permitted to fast and shower during Ramadan as required by his faith.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt.35). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action on February 8, 2013 (Dkt.1), followed by the filing of a first amended complaint on March 22, 2013 (Dkt.6), and a second amended complaint on June 7, 2013 (Dkt.8). The second amended complaint is the operative pleading in this matter. On June 25, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

(Dkt.9). Defendants answered the second amended complaint on January 6, 2014 (Dkt.13), and the case proceeded to discovery before Magistrate Judge Jonathan W. Feldman.

On February 17, 2015, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing “the treatment of plaintiff was in furtherance of the facility's interest in the preservation of order and security.” (Dkt. 35–1 at 2). The parties continued to engage in discovery (Dkt. 39; Dkt. 43; Dkt. 44; Dkt. 46; Dkt. 47; Dkt. 48; Dkt. 51), and Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further discovery on June 4, 2015. (Dkt.52).

Plaintiff then filed three motions for discovery and extensions of time (Dkt. 57; Dkt. 58; Dkt. 61), which the Court construed as further responses in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment and a request to file a supplemental brief in response to the motion for summary judgment. (Dkt.62). The Court directed Plaintiff to file any papers in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on or before August 21, 2015, and Defendants to file any reply papers on or before September 4, 2015. (Id. ).

Plaintiff filed a further response to Defendants' motion on August 26, 2015. (Dkt.64).¹ Defendants did not submit reply papers.

On March 23, 2016, Magistrate Judge Feldman denied Plaintiff's outstanding motion to compel. (Dkt.66).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed and drawn from the parties' Rule 56 Statements of Fact unless otherwise noted.

Plaintiff is a practicing Muslim and is currently an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”). (Dkt. 35–2 at ¶ 1; Dkt. 64 at 1). He resided at Attica Correctional Facility during Ramadan in the year 2012. (Dkt. 35–2 at ¶¶ 1–2; Dkt. 64 at 1). During that year, Ramadan commenced on July 20, 2012, and ended on August 18, 2012. (Dkt. 35–2 at ¶¶ 1–2; Dkt. 35–3 at 14:18–24; Dkt. 64 at 1).

In a memorandum dated July 18, 2012, Defendant Hughes stated, in part, as follows:

Staff is advised that no containers will be allowed to be carried into the messhalls [sic] and only those food items normally allowed to exit the regular meals will be allowed to be carried out of the messhall [sic] by Ramadan participants, in addition to a Sahur bag.

(Dkt. 35–2 at ¶¶ 3–4; Dkt. 35–3 at 63; Dkt. 64 at 3–4). Prior to this direction by Defendant Hughes, “observant inmates were granted permission to bring plastic bowls, containers and thermoses to the mess hall for the Ramadan evening meal, and bring food back with them to their cells.” (Dkt. 35–2 at ¶ 5; Dkt. 64 at 5).

According to Defendant Hughes, the prior practice created an opportunity for inmates observing Ramadan to collect food at their cells and engage in unauthorized bartering in violation of DOCCS standards for inmate behavior. (Dkt. 35–2 at 6; Dkt. 35–3 at 75). Defendant Hughes claims there was also a concern about hygiene related to the collection of food in cells. (Dkt. 35–2 at 6; Dkt. 35–3 at 75). Defendant Hughes purports he “decided to eliminate the provision allowing inmates to bring plastic bowls, containers and thermoses to the mess hall for Ramadan evening meals” because of the order, safety, and security concerns the provision created. (Dkt. 35–2 at 7; Dkt. 35–3 at 75). Plaintiff argues that no misbehavior reports were issued to Muslim inmates during Ramadan for bartering of food, and asserts that there was no legitimate hygiene concern because the inmates would only bring one meal back to the cell to consume during the night. (Dkt. 64 at 6–7).

Under the new policy, at the breaking of the fast, Muslim inmates were allowed approximately one or one and one half hours to consume two meals, and were sent back to their cells with a Sahur bag. (Dkt. 35–2 at 8; Dkt. 35–3 at 16:4–7). The Sahur bag contained a third meal (a cold meal) to eat in the night hours before starting the fast. (Dkt. 35–3 at 19:2–22). Defendant Hughes claims that “observant inmates are allowed to take back to their cells the same items and portions of food which general population inmates are allowed to take to their cells following a meal.” (Dkt. 35–2 at ¶ 9; Dkt. 35–3 at 76). The inmate orientation/guideline manual for Attica Correctional Facility indicates: “[c]ertain rationed items may be carried from the mess hall but all other food must be consumed in the mess hall. Inmates may be permitted to take out a maximum of 2 rationed items.” (Dkt. 64–3 at 6).

Plaintiff contends that one hour and thirty minutes was not sufficient time for him and other Muslim inmates to eat the two meal portions at once. (Dkt. 35–3 at 16:13–25–26:1–2; Dkt. 64 at 7). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Muslim inmates were using that time to perform other tasks besides just eating, and ultimately had approximately 30 minutes to consume two meals. (Dkt. 55 at 2–3, 8–9). As a result, Plaintiff claims, he was denied the second portion of his double portion because he could not take it back to his cell after implementation of the new policy. (Dkt. 35–3 at 20:7–17; Dkt. 64 at 7–8).

Plaintiff also claims that he was denied a shower on nine or ten occasions during Ramadan. (Dkt. 8 at ¶ 8; Dkt. 35–3 at 20:18–25–21:1–22; Dkt. 64 at 9). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he was denied showers during the four weekends of Ramadan and one Wednesday. (Dkt. 35–3 at 21:10–13; Dkt. 64 at 9).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that summary judgment should be granted if the moving party establishes “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no rational jury could find in favor of that party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party “ ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. ’ ” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir.2002)

(quoting Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ) (emphasis in original). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment....” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original).

In addition, “[i]t is well-settled that pro se litigants generally are entitled to a liberal construction of their pleadings, which should be read to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir.2001)

(internal quotations and citation omitted); see also

Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 687 (2d Cir.2004) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (“It is well-established that ‘when [a] plaintiff proceeds pro se ... a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations.’ ”). Moreover, “a pro se litigant should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he has a valid claim.” Satchell v. Dilworth, 745 F.2d 781, 785 (2d Cir.1984).

II. Plaintiff's RLUIPA Claims

Defendant moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims for damages based on RLUIPA. (Dkt. 35–1 at 5–6). “Section 3 of RLUIPA provides that ‘[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise [of an institutionalized person],’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a)

, ‘in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance,’ id. § 2000cc–1(b)(1), or in a way that affects or would affect ‘commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes,’ id. § 2000cc–1(b)(2).” Washington v. Gonyea, 731 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir.2013) (alterations in original). It is well established that “RLUIPA does not authorize claims for monetary damages against state officers in either their official or individual capacities.” Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d...