Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co.
| Decision Date | 24 July 1970 |
| Docket Number | 42008--11 and 42435--8,Nos. 41970--3,s. 41970--3 |
| Parties | , 8 UCC Rep.Serv. 512 Duane FARR, Ben Farr, Darrell Farr, Farr Plumbing and Heating Co., Respondents, Thomas Correll, Respondent, v. ARMSTRONG RUBBER COMPANY, Appellant, Elmer N. Olson Company, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The trial court correctly instructed the jury that before strict liability in tort can apply, plaintiffs must prove that a defect existed in a product when it left the possession of the defendants and was unreasonably dangerous to the user or to 2. The trial court's instruction on strict liability in tort incorporates the substance of Restatement, Torts (2d) § 402 A, which provides generally that a commercial seller who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user is liable for physical harm to the user caused by the defective condition, even though he was not negligent and even though he was not in privity with the user. The rule set forth in § 402 A has been adopted as the law in Minnesota.
his property; and that a product is defective if it fails to perform reasonably, adequately, and safely the normal, anticipated, or specified use to which the manufacturer intends that it be put.
3. A 'defect' has been defined as any condition not contemplated by the user which makes the product unreasonably dangerous to him; this definition of defect, appearing in cases involving strict liability in tort, is closely related to the concept of defect as it appears in cases dealing with breach of implied warranty. Under the strict liability in tort doctrine, as in the case of express or implied warranty of fitness or merchantability, if the article is defective, that is, not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such articles are sold and used, and the defect arose out of the design or manufacture, and it proximately causes injury or damage to the ultimate purchaser or reasonably expected consumer, liability exists.
4. In order to establish a prima facie case of strict liability against a manufacturer, a plaintiff need merely introduce evidence that he has bene injured by the product; that the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for use; and that such defective condition existed when the product left the hands of the manufacturer. Where the evidence would reasonably support a finding of these three elements, plaintiff is entitled to a jury instruction on strict liability in tort.
5. In an action based on the theory of strict liability in tort, the implied warranty cases still dictate the quality of product the manufacturer must deliver, and the extent of his liability, except in so far as limitations derived from the law of contract were applied in such cases. In other words, strict liability in tort removes from consideration contract rules when in fact no contract exists.
6. We find no evidence of any event or incident during the trial which might have caused any passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. In the absence of such evidence, the verdicts are not so excessive as to compel a new trial on the issue of damages. There was ample evidence to sustain a finding by the jury that there were injuries to each individual plaintiff which will result in pain, discomfort, and disability in varying degrees of seriousness, and the jury was fair and reasonable in its award. Thus, the court properly sustained the verdicts.
7. One of the circumstances under which a tortfeasor may recover indemnity is where he has only a derivative or vicarious liability for damage caused by the one sought to be charged. In the instant case, Olson's liability stems solely from its passive role as the retailer of a defective product furnished to it by the manufacturer, and it therefore is entitled to indemnity.
8. In cases where a party seeking indemnity has been required to defend claims arising out of another's wrongful conduct and also to defend accusations which encompass his separate wrongful acts, the court may properly disallow attorney's fees in indemnity action. Since Olson was required to defend against breach of warranty claims, it was in the position of defending its own wrongful conduct and therefore reasonable attorneys' fees must be denied.
Robert W. Barnett, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Miller & Neary, Minneapolis, for respondents Farr.
Hvass, Weisman, King & Allen, Minneapolis, for respondent Correll.
Meagher, Geer, Markham & Anderson, O. C. Adamson II, and James W. Torke, Minneapolis, for respondent Elmer N. Olson Co.
Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and NELSON, WILLIAM P. MURPHY, OTIS, and JAMES F. MURPHY, JJ.
Plaintiffs, Duane and Ben Farr, Darrell Farr, Farr Plumbing and Heating Company, and Thomas Correll, recovered verdicts against defendants, The Armstrong Rubber Company and Elmer N. Olson Company, in these personal injury actions. In each action Armstrong appeals from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial and Olson appeals from the judgments entered. Armstrong also appeals from judgments granting Olson indemnity, and Olson seeks review of that part of those judgments which denied it recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees.
Viewing, as we must, the evidence and all permissible inferences most favorable to the sustaining of the verdict, the jury could have found the following facts: On September 6, 1963, a single-vehicle accident occurred in the province of Alberta, Canada. The vehicle involved was a three-quarter ton pickup truck equipped with a camper loaded on the box of the truck. The truck was owned by plaintiff Farr Plumbing and Heating Company and was occupied by the four individual plaintiffs. The accident occurred when the truck, without warning, veered off the left side of the highway and overturned. All four occupants of the vehicle sustained substantial personal injuries.
The cause of the truck's leaving the highway was a blowout of the left rear truck tire, a 7.00 by 17 double-duty, lugtype tire of 8-ply rating manufactured by defendant Armstrong and sold to plaintiff Farr Plumbing and Heating Company by defendant Olson, an Armstrong tire distributor.
The two rear tires of the pickup truck were purchased following three conversations between a salesman for Olson and plaintiff Duane Farr concerning the use of the tires for a camping trip through the Canadian wilderness. The salesman assured Duane Farr that the tires would be 'adequate' for the intended purposes. Armstrong describes these tires in its advertising literature as--
'DOUBLE DUTY LUG
'Over the Road Regular Ply
'The Double Duty Lug Tire--Regular Ply is ideal for contractor hauling and gravel pit operations, for use on dump trucks and concrete mixers--the type of operation that requires some off the road work, but also long hauls on the highway.'
At trial, plaintiffs' experts testified that it was their opinion that the blowout was the result of a defect in the manufacture of the tire which caused a separation of the rubber coat stock or of the tread from the cords within the tire. Defendants' expert was of the opinion that the tread separation was the result of impact damage.
The case was submitted to the jury on the theories of breach of warranty, as applied to Olson only; strict liability in tort, as applied to both Olson and Armstrong; and negligent failure to warn, as applied to Armstrong only. The jury returned a general verdict against both defendants and in favor of plaintiffs in the following amounts:
Thomas Correll $65,000
Benjamin Farr 7,500
Duane Farr 4,500
Darrell Farr 12,000
Farr Plumbing and
Heating Company 2,500
The court granted indemnity in favor of defendant Olson against defendant Armstrong with the exception that Olson's request for reasonable attorneys' fees was disallowed.
The issues presented on this appeal are (1) Was the court's definition of 'defect' in its charge to the jury on strict liability in tort correct and proper? (2) Were the verdicts of the jury excessive and given under the influence of passion and prejudice? (3) Was Olson entitled to indemnity where both Olson and Armstrong were found liable to plaintiffs under a general verdict? (4) Is Olson entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defense of the action?
1--2. With respect to the first issue, defendant Armstrong contends that the court's definition of 'defect' in its instruction on strict liability in tort was couched in the same terms which were used in defining express or implied warranties, and, as a result, the jury was virtually compelled to return a verdict against Armstrong.
In its instructions the court first stated that the mere fact that an accident or collision has occurred does not in and of itself mean that there was a breach of warranty or that the tire involved was defective. The court then submitted an instruction on the concepts of breach of express warranty and breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, stating that with respect to either kind of warranty, goods are required to satisfy the purpose in conformance with such warranty, and if the goods, in this case the tires, did not reasonably satisfy such purpose, there has been a breach of warranty without regard to whether or not the tires were defectively manufactured.
The court then gave the following instructions with respect to strict liability in tort:
'I will now instruct you on the law applicable to Armstrong Company as the manufacturer, and Elmer N. Olson Company, as the seller, with reference to duties to manufacture or to sell a product free of defects which render it dangerous. This law is called, 'strict liability in tort.' That is a rule or a law that is defined as follows: One who manufactures or sells any product in a Defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, or to...
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