Bradley v. Cramer

• Citation: 59 Wis. 309,18 N.W. 268
• Parties: BRADLEY v. CRAMER AND OTHERS.
• Decision Date: 08 January 1884
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

59 Wis. 309

18 N.W. 268

BRADLEY

v.CRAMER AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Filed January 8, 1884.

Appeal from circuit court Milwaukee county.

The complaint alleges, in effect, that the plaintiff is the widow of D. C. Bradley, who committed suicide in Kenosha county, December 25, 1881; that January 4, 1882, the defendants, as publishers and proprietors of the Evening Wisconsin, maliciously published concerning the plaintiff in said newspaper the false and defamatory matter following, to-wit: “ Probable Cause of D. J. Bradley's Suicide, (meaning the said D. C. Bradley.) D. J. Bradley, (meaning and referring to said D. C. Bradley,) whose death resulted from nearly severing his head from his body with a razor a short time ago at Kenosha, was employed by James M. Beach, of this city, Wisconsin manager of the Wheeler & Wilson Sewing Machine Company, as an agent. He was stationed at Eau Claire. His son was sent by Mr. Beach to Chicago, and all his expenses paid while he learned the business. On the last return to Eau Claire he was allowed a pretty good salary, but Mrs. Bradley (meaning this plaintiff) sent him to school, hired a girl in his place at three dollars per week, and pocketed the balance of his wages, (meaning that this plaintiff had fraudulently taken from said company wages for her son that he had not earned.) In order to keep up a certain amount of style, other little irregularities were resorted to by Bradley, which the company finally discovered. To make these peculations good to the company brought Mr. Bradley into financial difficulties. His wife (meaning the plaintiff) then left him. He went to Kenosha, where she was, but the interview is a secret, except as to the result, which was Bradley's death by suicide. While in this city Mr. Bradley was somewhat addicted to the use of liquors, but while at Eau Claire was said to have abandoned the habit. The exactions of his wife (meaning this plaintiff) are said to have been prime factors in bringing about self-destruction. The Wheeler & Wilson Sewing Machine Company regarded deceased with great favor, and did a great deal for him, still retaining his services after discovering the peculations above mentioned.” That by means of said publication the plaintiff was injured in her reputation to her damage, etc. The defendants demurred to the complaint, and stated four grounds of demurrer; but three of these being clearly without merit, counsel confine their discussion on both sides to only one, which is, in effect, that it appears upon the face of the complaint that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was sustained by the court, and from the order sustaining the demurrer this appeal is brought.Quarles & Winslow, for appellant, Hattie E. Bradley.

Finches, Lynde & Miller, for respondents, William E. Cramer and others.

CASSODAY, J.

It is settled that an action for libel may be sustained for words published which tend to bring the plaintiff into public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, even though the same words spoken would not have been actionable. Lansing v. Carpenter, 9 Wis. 542;Cary v. Allen, 39 Wis. 482;Cottrill v. Cramer, 43 Wis. 245. Written slander is necessarily attended with such deliberation, and its publication is so well calculated to produce permanent mischief that an action may be maintained for the publication of written words, when it could not be maintained for the publication of the same words by mere oral discourse. Folkard's Starkie, § 154. Hence, every written publication which implies, or may be generally understood to imply, reproach, dishonesty, scandal, or ridicule to any person, is a libel. Id. §§ 155, 156. Such written publication, though not charging a punishable offense, is, nevertheless, libelous, if it falsely and maliciously tends to subject the party to whom it refers to social disgrace, public distrust, hatred, ridicule, or contempt. Villers v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403; Cox v. Lee, L. R. 4 Exch. 284; Miller v. Butler; 6 Cush. 72;State v. Spear, 13 R. I. 324; Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio, 359. Words employed in an alleged libel are, of course, to be construed by courts and juries in the plain and popular sense in which other people would naturally understand them. Folkard's Starkie, § 155; Montgomery v. Deeley, 3 Wis. 709;Weil v. Schmidt, 28 Wis. 137;Campbell v. Campbell, 54 Wis. 94; [S. C. 11 N. W. REP. 456;] 1 Denio, 358;More v. Bennett,48 N. Y. 475. So, in construing the article in question, the scope and object of the whole article is to be considered, and such construction put upon its language as would naturally be given to it. Spencer v. Southwick, 11 Johns. 592;1 Denio, 358;48 N. Y. 476. Counsel for the defendant is undoubtedly right in claiming the rule to be, in effect, “that it is for the judge to decide whether a publication is capable of the meaning ascribed to it by an innuendo, and for the jury to decide whether such meaning is truly ascribed to it.” That is the rule held in Blagg v. Sturt, 10 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 899, by the court of exchequer chamber, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench, as announced by Lord Chief Justice DENMAN, and quoted and followed by this court in Campbell v. Campbell, supra. That rule so announced has recently received the express sanction of the house of lords. Capitol & C. B. L. v. Henty, L. R. 7 H. L. 744. So this court has expressly sanctioned the rule contended for by the same counsel, to the effect that it is not the office of an innuendo to enlarge the meaning of the words employed in the publication, but merely to point out their application to the facts previously alleged. Weil v. Schmidt, supra; Campbell v. Campbell, supra; Langton v. Hagerty, 35 Wis. 151.

This is abundantly supported by the numerous cases cited in the brief of counsel. Among these are Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 65; Frischman v. Bennett, 87 N. Y. 238;Peterson v. Sentman, 37 Md. 153;Dyer v. Morris, 4 Mo. 215;Gosling v. Morgan, 32 Pa. St. 273; Goldstein v. Foss, 4 Bing. 489. See, also, Coburn v. Harwood, 12 Amer. Dec. 37, and note; Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 Johns. 211; S. C. 4 Amer. Dec. 339, and note. Perhaps there is no better illustration of the rule than the recent case in the house of lords, above mentioned, where it was held that, in their natural meaning, the words “H. & Sons hereby give notice that they will not receive in payment checks drawn on any of the branches of the bank,” were not libelous, and that the inference suggested by the innuendo, to the effect that the plaintiff was insolvent, was not such as reasonable persons would draw. Whenever it becomes necessary to enlarge the meaning of the words employed in the publication in order to make them libelous, the complaint should, of course, contain the necessary averments or colloquium of facts showing that under the circumstances accompanying the publication the article was in fact libelous. In the leading case of Van Vechten v. Hopkins, supra, the majority opinion sums up the office of an averment, colloquium, and innuendo respectively, thus: “The use in pleading of an averment, is to ascertain that to the court which is general or doubtfully expressed, so that ...