Peterson v. Sentman

Decision Date19 December 1872
Citation37 Md. 140
PartiesPETER PETERSON v. SARAH SENTMAN.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Harford County.

This was an action of slander brought by the appellee against the appellant in the Circuit Court for Cecil County and removed at the instance of the latter to Harford County. The declaration averred:

For that, whereas, the said plaintiff is a good, honest, true and faithful citizen of the State of Maryland, and as such has always behaved and conducted herself. And for that, whereas also the plaintiff is a feme sole, and a housekeeper, and has always been a virtuous, modest and chaste citizen, and until the committing of the grievances hereinafter mentioned, had always been esteemed to be of unblemished reputation, and that before and at the time of the committing of the said grievances, she, the said plaintiff, enjoyed the society, conversation and friendship and countenance of all good, worthy and estimable citizens of the said State, and lived and associated with them on terms of mutual confidence, esteem, etc.

Yet the said defendant, well knowing the premises and envying the happiness of the said plaintiff, and maliciously contriving and intending to injure and ruin her in her character, and to deprive her of the good will, society, conversation friendship and commerce of the good citizens of said State and especially to injure her in her character for chastity virtue and modesty in the estimation of all good citizens of said State, and particularly in the estimation of all good citizens of the community where she resides and maintains her household, to wit: On the ____ day of ____, A. D. 186--, at the county and State aforesaid, in a certain discourse which he, the said defendant, then and there had in and about the plaintiff's character and reputation for chastity, in the presence and hearing of divers good and worthy citizens of said State of Maryland, to the said plaintiff, and of and concerning said plaintiff, in the presence and hearing of said citizens, falsely and maliciously spoke to her, and published to, of and concerning her, the said plaintiff, then and there being a feme sole, the several false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory words touching her character and reputation for chastity, and tending to the injury thereof, following, that is to say: "You" (meaning the plaintiff) "are a bad woman, and keep a bad house, and I can prove it," meaning thereby to charge that the plaintiff was not a chaste woman, was a whore, and kept a common bawdy house.

And for that in a conversation concerning the chastity of the plaintiff, the said defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the said plaintiff, then and now being a feme sole, the words touching the character for chastity of the said plaintiff, being a feme sole, and tending to the injury thereof, following, that is to say: "You" (meaning the plaintiff) "are a bad woman, and keep a bad house, and I can prove it," meaning thereby and intending to assert and to be so understood, that the plaintiff was an unchaste woman and kept a bawdy house.

And for that the said defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the said plaintiff then and now being a feme sole, the words touching the character and reputation for chastity of the plaintiff being a feme sole, and tending to the injury thereof, following, that is to say: "She" (meaning the plaintiff) "was an ornary" (meaning ordinary) "whore and kept an ornary house for ornary men to go to," meaning thereby that she kept a bawdy house.

Whereby the plaintiff has sustained damage and claims therefore ten thousand dollars.

To this declaration the defendant pleaded not guilty, and two special pleas in justification. Issue was joined on the first plea; and the plaintiff, demurred to the special pleas in justification; the court sustained the demurrer. The defendant then pleaded five pleas, the first not guilty, on which issue was joined, and the others in justification; the second plea was as follows:

And for a further plea in this behalf the defendant saith that the plaintiff ought not to have and maintain her said action against him, because he says that before the speaking and publishing of the said words, of and concerning the said plaintiff, in the said declaration mentioned, to wit, on January 1st, 1860, and from that time until the first of April, 1866, the said plaintiff was living in a certain house of her father, situated in Cecil County, and that during the time aforesaid, to wit, on the first of September, 1865, and on the first of January, 1866, and on the fifth of February, 1866, and on divers other days and times during the period aforesaid, while she was living as aforesaid at the house of her father, the said plaintiff then and there permitted a certain Elisha Brown and a certain David Moore, and divers other male persons, to take and use improper, lewd and indecent liberties and familiarities with her, and with them indulged in improper, lewd and indecent conduct, and then and there had criminal intercourse and carnal connection with them; wherefore the defendant saith that he well might and did speak and publish the said words in plaintiff's declaration alleged, of and concerning the said plaintiff, meaning thereby, as the said plaintiff hath alleged, and that the said words and the said meaning thereof were true, because he says the same were spoken of and concerning the said liberties, familiarities and lewd and improper conduct by her then and there permitted and indulged in, and her said criminal intercourse and carnal connection with said David Moore and with divers other persons at the times and place aforesaid.

The third plea was pleaded to the first count of the declaration, and averred that the plaintiff ought not, by reason of anything in the first count of her declaration alleged, to have or maintain her action against him, because, that before the speaking and publishing of the words in said count mentioned, of and concerning the plaintiff, she permitted the same lewd and indecent familiarities and indulged in the same criminal intercourse; the plea then concluded as follows: Wherefore the defendant says he well might and did speak and publish the said words in said first count mentioned, of and concerning the said plaintiff, and he avers that the said words so spoken by him were true, and that he did mean thereby to say that the plaintiff was not a chaste woman, but that he did not mean thereby that she kept a common bawdy house.

The fourth and fifth pleas were similar to the third, being pleaded, the one to the second count of the declaration, and the other to the third. To these pleas of justification the plaintiff demurred and the court sustained the demurrer. The defendant thereupon pleaded five new pleas, on which issue was joined.

At the trial the plaintiff proved that the defendant had spoken the words as alleged in the first and second counts of the declaration, and with a slight difference those as alleged in the third count.

The defendant offered evidence to sustain his pleas of justification.

First Exception. The defendant proved by Alameda Peterson, that she had seen the plaintiff and Elisha P. Brown in bed together more than once, in the plaintiff's room--that she had never seen them in bed together in Brown's room; that she had seen David Moore in bed with the plaintiff once; that when he jumped in the bed, he broke the bed rail; that she and her sister went into the plaintiff's room and saw her and Brown in bed together, and that she sometimes slept with the plaintiff when Brown was there. The witness said she told her mother about the breaking of the bed rail, at the time, but did not tell of the other occurrences until some time in March, 1866.

To impeach the witness, proper foundation having been laid by specific questions, the plaintiff proved that the witness had sworn under a commission in this case, that no one was present when she saw the plaintiff and Brown in the same bed; that she told her mother of the occurrence as soon as she went home, a day or two afterwards; that it was the only time she ever saw the plaintiff and Brown occupy the same chamber, or sleep in the same bed; that she had seen Moore and the plaintiff in bed together several times, etc.

The defendant thereupon, to corroborate the witness, offered to prove by Adelia Peterson, her mother, that the occurrence in which the bed rail was broken was communicated to her by the witness in 1865, while she was living at the house of her grandfather, but that the other occurrences were not communicated to her until some time in March, 1866. To this corroborating testimony the plaintiff objected, and the court sustained the objection. The defendant excepted.

Second Exception. The plaintiff prayed the court to instruct the jury as follows:

1. That if the jury shall find from the evidence, that the defendant spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff, the words charged in the declaration; in ascertaining the meaning of such words, they must construe them in the sense in which hearers of ordinary and reasonable understanding would ascribe to them, and in which they are most likely to be understood by the hearers.

2. That if the jury shall find from the evidence, that the defendant spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff, the words alleged in the declaration, or in any one of the counts thereof, and that at the time of such speaking the plaintiff was a feme sole, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover, unless they shall also find from the evidence that the plaintiff had carnal connection with Elisha P. Brown and David Moore, or either of them, as alleged in the defendant's plea of justification.

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6 cases
  • Cook v. Pulitzer Publishing Company
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 21 Marzo 1912
    ...81; McGinniss v. Knapp, 109 Mo. 139; 13 Pl. & Pr. 55; Gaither v. Adv. Co., 102 Ala. 462; Blagg v. Sturt, 59 Eng. Com. L. 899; Peterson v. Sentman, 37 Md. 140; Argabright James, 46 W.Va. 144; Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 233; Ukman v. Record, 189 Mo. 393. The amended petition in this case sets f......
  • Baugh v. Moore
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 19 Diciembre 1913
    ...to be in the possession of the party on whom the demand was made, without charging him with the animus furandi. In Peterson v. Sentman, 37 Md. 140, 11 Am. Rep. 534, this court has said: "Words will not be construed impute a crime, if in their milder sense they have another and harmless mean......
  • Weeks v. News Pub. Co.
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 9 Enero 1912
    ...583; De Witt v. Scarlett, 113 Md. 147, 77 A. 271. In 1 Poe's P. & P. (3d Ed.) § 173, Mr. Poe repeats the statement of the court in Peterson v. Sentman, supra, "words will not be understood to impute a crime if, in their milder sense, they have another and harmless meaning, unless the connec......
  • Baugh v. Moore
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 18 Marzo 1914
    ... ... Baugh to the appellee is examined in the light of these ... cases, and applying the rule laid down in Peterson v ... Sentman. 37 Md. 140, 11 Am. Rep. 534, it cannot fairly ... be said that the language warrants the meaning sought to be ... given to it in ... ...
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