Williams v. General Motors

• Decision Date: 21 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-3351,97-3351
• Citation: 187 F.3d 553
• Parties: (6th Cir. 1999) Marilyn H. Williams Plaintiff-Appellant, v. General Motors Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 553

187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999)

Marilyn H. Williams Plaintiff-Appellant, v. General Motors Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-3351

Argued: April 21, 1998

Decided and Filed: August 5, 1999

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 30, 1999^*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron; No. 96-01023--David D. Dowd, Jr., District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Mark S. Colucci, Youngstown, Ohio, for Appellant.

Robert S. Walker, John W. Edwards II, Mary Jordan Hughes, JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: RYAN, DAUGHTREY, and LAY,^** Circuit Judges.

DAUGHTREY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which LAY, J., joined. RYAN, J. (pp. 569-72), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge.

Marilyn Williams sued General Motors Corporation, her employer for more than 30 years, alleging sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to General Motors, finding that the incidents of alleged sexual harassment, while offensive, were not so severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile work environment under the standard set out in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). The court further found that Williams had not alleged a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII.

We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the retaliation claim. With respect to the hostile-work-environment claim, however, we conclude that the alleged incidents, seen in context, create a material question of fact as to whether the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to give rise to a violation of Title VII, and we therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment on that claim. Moreover, because we believe the district court employed an incorrect analysis in concluding that Williams had not alleged conduct sufficient to sustain a finding of a hostile work environment, we write to clarify the appropriate analysis for hostile-work-environment claims.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Marilyn Williams, began working at General Motors Corporation's Delphi-Packard Plant in Warren, Ohio, in 1965 or 1966. Over the years, she worked in various departments. From September 1994 until May 1996,¹ Williams worked in the tool crib, a warehouse used to store materials and components used at the plant, from which materials were distributed by an attendant to assemblers who requested them. In May 1995, Williams was transferred to the third, or "midnight shift," to fill a vacancy caused by another employee's retirement.

While working the midnight shift in the crib, Williams alleges that she was subjected to sexual harassment in the form of a hostile working environment. As summarized by the district court in its memorandum opinion, she alleged the following:

1. Don Giovannoe, an hourly tool crib employee, constantly used the "F-word" as part of his vocabulary.

2. In June of 1995, as Giovannoe approached the window at the counter of the tool crib, Appellant heard him say, "Hey slut."

3. In July of 1995, Pat Ryan, her general supervisor, while talking to Williams' co-worker, Dodie, looked at Williams' breasts and said something to the effect of "You can rub up against me anytime." He also said, "You would kill me, Marilyn. I don't know if I can handle it, but I'd die with a smile on my face."

4. A few days after the incident alleged in No. 3, Williams was bending over and Ryan came up behind her and said, "Back up; just back up," or "You can back right up to me," or words to that effect.

5. On another occasion, in July of 1995, Williams was sitting at her desk writing the name "Hancock Furniture Company" on a piece of paper. Ryan came up behind her, put his arm around her neck and leaned his face against hers, and said, "You left the dick out of the hand."

6. Workers conspired against her: she was forced to take the midnight shift when Steve Bivolesky retired, even though Don Giovannoe had originally agreed to take the job.

7. In September of 1995, when she came in for her midnight shift, she discovered a box of tool crib release forms glued to the top of her desk.

8. Later on the same day she discovered the box glued to her desk, Williams claims to have heard Giovannoe say, "I'm sick and tired of these fucking women." As Williams waited on people at the crib window, Giovannoe came over to the desk and threw a box on it. Williams and Giovannoe got into a verbal altercation ending with Giovannoe throwing another couple boxes, the last of which grazed Williams' [sic] hip, but did not hurt her.

9. Williams claims that she was denied overtime.

10. She complained that she was the only person who did not have a key to the office.

11. Williams stated that she was the only person denied a break.

12. She was not allowed to sit at the table at the window of the crib, but had to go in the back instead.

13. One night when Williams came to work she found a buggy (a motorized cart used to haul supplies) sitting on a wooden skid and blocking the other buggies. She had to find a co-worker to help her move it.

14. On one occasion a female hourly worker, Shalimar Kufchak, padlocked the crib's main entrance while Williams was inside.

15. On a couple of occasions materials were stacked in front of the alternate exit, blocking access in and out.

In May 1996, she filed suit against General Motors, alleging sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and under Ohio state law. She also alleged retaliation under Title VII for having filed sex and race discrimination charges with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission in 1995.

The district court granted summary judgment to General Motors on both the federal and state claims, finding that the incidents of alleged sexual harassment, while offensive, were not so severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile work environment under the standard set out in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 21, and also that Williams had failed to meet the subjective test under Harris. The court further found that Williams had failed to establish that her transfer to the midnight shift constituted an adverse employment action and, therefore, had not alleged a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See City of Mt. Clemens v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 917 F.2d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a summary judgment motion, we must construe the evidence and all inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 66 (6th Cir. 1979). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. Hostile Work Environment

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that the discrimination based on sex created a hostile or abusive work environment. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 825 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 172 (1997). Discrimination in this form occurs "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the "severe or pervasive" test -- Harris's core holding -- in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998). Moreover, these cases invalidate a portion of prior caselaw in this circuit and require that we recast the analytical framework for a hostile-work-environment claim based on a supervisor's actions. Previously, to establish such a claim, a plaintiff had to show not only that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subject to unwelcomed sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her sex; and (4) the harassment created a hostile work environment; but also that (5) the supervisor's harassing actions were foreseeable or fell within his or her scope of employment, and the employer failed to respond adequately and effectively. See Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 183-184 (6th Cir. 1992). After Faragher and Burlington Industries, however, it is no longer enough for an employer to take corrective action; employers now have an affirmative duty to prevent sexual harassment by supervisors. Once an employee has established actionable discrimination involving "no tangible employment action," Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293, an employer can escape liability only if it took reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior. Id.²

The Supreme Court has not ruled on the appropriate requirements for a hostile-work-environment claim stemming from a co-worker's actions. This court has developed a...