Lambert v. City of Dumas

• Citation: 187 F.3d 931
• Decision Date: 18 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-1081,No. 1,1,99-1081
• Parties: (8th Cir. 1999) Essalene Lambert, for herself and for the benefit of Marsenio Lambert, Khiry Smith, Toris Lambert, Nikkita Lambert, A'Bria Smith, Ashley Lambert, John Henry Lambert, Jr., Clifton Lambert, Raymond Lambert, Floristene Owens, Bettye Murry, Earnestine Jenkins, Diane Davis, Allie Johnson, and Linda Lambert, Heirs of the Estate of David Lambert, Deceased, Appellee, v. The City of Dumas, Arkansas; Chief Everett Cox, individually and as Chief of Dumas Police Department; Valerie Bradley, individually and as a police officer of the City of Dumas; Kevin Knight, individually and as a police officer of the City of Dumas; Randy Hilliard, individually and as a police officer of the City of Dumas; Michael Donigan, individually and as a police officer of the City of Dumas; Jane Doe; John Doe, individually and as police officers of the City of Dumas, Appellants. Submitted:
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 931

187 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 1999)

Essalene Lambert, for herself and for the benefit of Marsenio Lambert, Khiry Smith, Toris Lambert, Nikkita Lambert, A'Bria Smith, Ashley Lambert, John Henry Lambert, Jr., Clifton Lambert, Raymond Lambert, Floristene Owens, Bettye Murry, Earnestine Jenkins, Diane Davis, Allie Johnson, and Linda Lambert, Heirs of the Estate of David Lambert, Deceased, Appellee, v. The City of Dumas, Arkansas; Chief Everett Cox, individually and as Chief of Dumas Police Department; Valerie Bradley, individually and as a police officer of the City of Dumas; Kevin Knight, individually and as a police officer of the City of Dumas; Randy Hilliard, individually and as a police officer of the City of Dumas; Michael Donigan, individually and as a police officer of the City of Dumas; Jane Doe No. 1; John Doe No. 1, individually and as police officers of the City of Dumas, Appellants.

No. 99-1081

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: June 18, 1999

Filed: August 9, 1999

Appeal from the United States District Court for the EasternDistrict of Arkansas

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before BEAM and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and KYLE, District Judge.¹

KYLE, District Judge.

On May 14, 1997, David Lambert ("Lambert") died in his jail cell at the Dumas, Arkansas Police Department. Essalene Lambert and her family brought this case under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking recovery for unlawful arrest, excessive force, and wrongful death.² The City of Dumas and members of its police department appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on May 14, 1997, Dumas Police Officers Randy Hilliard, Michael Donigan, and Kevin Knight answered a call concerning an attempted burglary. Upon arriving at the address given by the caller, the officers encountered Lambert outside the home of Ruthie Jordan ("Jordan"), the alleged victim of the burglary. Although the Appellants claim that Lambert was arguing with Jordan, was unstable on his feet, and was unintelligible in his speech, the Appellee presented evidence that Lambert was engaged in friendly conversation with Jordan and was not visibly intoxicated.³

The Appellant officers placed Lambert under arrest for public intoxication.⁴ Although Lambert did not resist arrest, he was "violently shoved" and "kicked" into the patrol car by the officers. At the police station, Lambert was given a blood alcohol test, registering a blood alcohol level between .24 and .25. During the booking procedure, a fight occurred between Lambert and four officers, resulting in Lambert being sprayed with pepper spray or some other kind of chemical restraint. The officers then carried Lambert to his cell, where he was again sprayed with some type of chemical restraint. The four officers were identified as Officers Knight, Hilliard, Donigan and Ashcraft.

At approximately 4:00 p.m., Officer Valerie Bradley, the jailer, came on duty. At 4:30 p.m., while making her rounds through the jail, she told Lambert to quiet down or he would "get some more." Approximately fifteen minutes later, Officers Knight, Hilliard, Donigan and Ashcraft went back to Lambert's cell where another fight occurred, again resulting in Lambert being sprayed with chemical restraint. No other attempts were made by the officers to observe Lambert or to check on his condition. Throughout this time, Lambert demanded to be released and to talk with the Dumas chief of police. Lambert was not placed on a suicide watch or in a designated "drunk tank."

At approximately 7:00 p.m., Officer Bradley discovered Lambert's body hanging by his jail jumpsuit from his cell door. Upon finding the body, jail officers immediately called an ambulance. Lambert was pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital. The autopsy report ruled Lambert's death a suicide.

The Appellee brought the instant case under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful arrest, excessive force, and wrongful death by means of deliberate indifference and, in the alternative, by intentional means. The Appellants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, finding material facts to be in dispute on all counts. Addressing separately the Appellants' claim of qualified immunity, the court stated that "there is some evidence that defendants should have known of Lambert's suicidal tendencies, i.e., the March 28, 1994, incident at the jail when he attempted to swallow a crack pipe and crack cocaine."⁵ The court further noted that Lambert's attempt to swallow the crack pipe was most probably "caused by his desire to destroy evidence." Nevertheless, giving the Appellee the benefit of every factual inference, the court found that the Appellants were not protected by qualified immunity.

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). The court views the evidence and the inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Adkinson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 971 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir. 1992). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Enterprise Bank, 92 F.3d at 747; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial; mere allegations or denials are not enough. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2514 (1986); Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S. Ct. at 2511.

II. Qualified Immunity

We review issues of qualified immunity de novo. See Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1998). "Qualified immunity shields government officials from suit unless their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which the reasonable person would have known." Yowell v. Combs, 89 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982)). This Court has established a three-part test to determine whether a government official is protected by qualified immunity: (1) the plaintiff must assert a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; (2) that right must be clearly established; and (3) taking all facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, there must be no genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable official would have known that the alleged action violated that right. See id. The issue of whether summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is appropriate from a particular set of facts is a question of law. Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1352 (8th Cir. 1994). "But if there is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, there can be no summary judgment." Id.

III.

The Appellants Are Not Entitled to Summary Judgment Regarding the Appellee's Claim for Unlawful Arrest.

The Appellee alleges the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the right of the people to be "secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment includes the right to be free from arrest without probable cause. See Ripson v. Alles, 21 F.3d 805, 807-08 (8th Cir. 1994).

The Appellee asserts that Lambert was arrested without probable cause, solely due to his prior interactions with the Dumas police. She alleges that the Dumas police had become "antagonistic" toward Lambert due to their prior relationship with him and that the officers were predisposed to arrest Lambert. Moreover, she has presented evidence that Lambert was not visibly intoxicated and that neither his speech nor his actions provided the officers with probable cause to arrest him. Consistent with summary judgment standards, the Court assumes the Appellee's factual allegations to be true. Taking these allegations as true, the Court finds that any officer of reasonable competence would have known that no probable cause existed to arrest Lambert. ⁶ By arresting him without probable cause, the officers would have known that they were acting unlawfully.

The Appellants dispute the Appellee's factual claims, and contend that Lambert was unable to stand under his own control and that his speech was slurred and unintelligible. Such observations would have provided the officers with probable cause to arrest Lambert. This factual dispute, however, presents a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The district court, therefore, was correct in concluding that the Appellants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

IV. The Appellants Are Not Entitled to Summary Judgment with Respect to the Appellee's Claim of Excessive Force.

The Appellants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the Appellee's claim of excessive force, arguing that Lambert suffered only minor injuries as a result of the force used by them, which were not sufficiently serious to support an excessive force claim. (See Appellants' Supp. Mem. at 4-5; Appellants' Reply Mem. at 4.)

This Court has specifically rejected the "significant injury" requirement proposed by the Appellants. See Dawkins v. Graham, 50 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1995).⁷ "Assuming without deciding...