Phineas v. United States

Decision Date22 December 1902
Docket NumberPAM-TO-PEE and O,No. 211,211
Citation187 U.S. 371,23 S.Ct. 142,47 L.Ed. 221
PartiesPHINEASthers, Appts. , v. UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

On March 19, 1890, Congress passed an act (26 Stat. at L. 24, chap. 39) giving to the court of claims jurisdiction to try all questions arising out of treaty stipulations between the United States and the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana, unembarrassed by reason of any estoppel supposed to arise from the joint resolution of Congress approved April 18, 1866, or a receipt in full given by certain Pottawatomie Indians under the provisions of that resolution. Under the authority of this act two petitions were filed in the court of claims, one on April 14, 1890, in behalf of 'the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana,' no individuals being named, by John Critcher, their attorney, his authority being, as stated, an 'agreement between said Critcher and the business committee of said Indians, dated September 29, 1887,' the other on November 5, 1890, by Phineas Pam-to-pee and 1,371 other Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana, by John B. Shipman, their attorney. On January 8, 1891, these two cases were consolidated, and on June 27, 1892 (27 Ct. Cl. 493), a judgment was rendered against the United States for $104,626. The claimants in each of the cases so con- solidated appealed to this court, which on April 17, 1893, affirmed the judgment. 148 U. S. 691, 37 L. ed. 613, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 742. On April 20, 1893, the mandate was filed in the court of claims.

While the judgment determined the amount due from the United States, it did not determine to how many or which of the various individual plaintiffs, or in what proportion, the amount thus adjudged to be due from the United States should be paid. The court of claims, in its opinion, said (p. 414):

'Congress have recognized, by the very title of the act, a claimant designated as the 'Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana,' and under that generic head is to be determined the aggregate right of such claimant, leaving the question of distribution to that department of the government which by law has incumbent on it the administration of the trust which in legal contemplation exists between the United States and the different tribes of Indians.'

By this court it was stated (p. 703, L. ed. p. 617, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 747):

'How the moneys so awarded should be distributed among the several claimants it is not easy for us to say. The findings of the court below, and the contradictory statements of the several briefs filed by the appellants, have left this part of this subject in a very confused condition.'

And, after quoting the language of the court below, we further said:

'On the other hand, it is contended, with great show of reason, by the petitioners who are represented in case No. 1,125 (16,842 in the court below), that the question of what Indians are entitled to participate in the fund is one of law, to be settled by the court, and should not be left to clerical functionaries. Our difficulty in disposing of this part of the subject is that we have neither findings nor concessions that enable us to deal with it intelligently.

'It is to be observed that the court below found as a fact (see finding 10) that the average proportion between the Indians who removed west and those who remained was as 2,812 of the former to 291 of the latter, and the court used that relative proportion of numbers as a factor in computing the amount due the petitioners.

'The petitioners, however, number 1,371 in case No. 1,125, but the number represented in No. 1,133 (16,473 in the court below) is not precisely stated. It is alleged in the brief filed in behalf of petitioners in case No. 1,125 that only 91 Indians are actually represented in case No. 1,133, and that the other 200 Indians are among those represented in case 1,125.

'But these facts are not found for us in any authoritative form. Nor, indeed, would it seem that the court below was furnished with information sufficient to enable it to define what Indians or what number of Indians entitled to distribution are represented by the respective attorneys or agents.

'Unable as we are to safely adjudicate this question as between these classes of claimants, we can do no better than acquiesce in the suggestion of the court below, that it is one to be dealt with by the authorities of the government when they come to distribute the fund.

'As these petitioners no longer have any tribal organization, and as the statutes direct a division of the annuities and other sums payable, by the head, and as such has been the practice of the government, perhaps the necessities of the situation demand that the identification of each claimant entitled to share in the distribution shall be left to the officers who are the agents of the government in paying out the fund. United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 427, 37 L. ed. 509, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650.'

On August 23, 1894, Congress passed an act (28 Stat. at L. 450, chap. 307) appropriating money for the payment of judgments of the court of claims, including therein the amount of this judgment in favor of the Pottawatomie Indians. On March 2, 1895, it passed a further act (28 Stat. at L. 894, chap. 188) directing the Secretary of the Interior to detail or employ an Indian inspector to take a census and prepare a roll of the Pottawatomie Indians of Michigan and Indiana who were entitled to share in such judgment, and appropriated the sum of $1,000 therefor. After an inspector had been appointed under this act, and while he was engaged in taking the census, counsel for the present petitioners, who was counsel for petitioners in the second of the original suits, addressed a communication to the Secretary of the Interior of date July 27, 1895, representing that such cen- sus, by reason of the basis upon which it was ordered, would omit many Indians entitled to share in the judgment. Before any further instructions could be given, and in August, 1895, the inspector filed in the Interior Department his report and census. Acting upon the suggestions made in the letter of counsel, a new inspector was, on February 5, 1896, designated to examine and report upon the claims of any parties other than those already upon the cenusu roll, and upon his report, of date March 14, 1896, making some slight additions, payment of the entire amount of the judgment was made, and made per capita, to all the individuals on the revised list. Thereafter, and on April 22, 1899, these petitioners filed their petition in the court of claims, alleging in substance that they were entitled to participate in the sum awarded against the United States, and, as they had not received their share of those moneys, they prayed a judgment therefor. Upon a hearing, the court of claims decided against them, and on May 20, 1901, entered a judgment (36 Ct. Cl. 427) dismissing their petition, from which judgment this appeal was taken.

Mr. John B. Shipman for appellants.

Messrs. William H. Button and Assistant Attorney General Pradt for appellee.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

There is an apparent hardship in the result of this litigation, but one which we are constrained to believe the plaintiffs are chiefly responsible for, and which can be relieved only by the action of Congress. Two sets of claimants appeared in the former suits, each represented by separate counsel, and, after a consolidation, the litigation proceeded only so far as to determine the fact of the liability of the government and the extent of that liability, leaving undetermined the individuals entitled to share in the amount awarded against the government, or the proper basis of distribution between those so entitled. In the first of the suits ninety-one Indians were, it is said, represented, while the petition in the second suit set forth the names of 1,371 persons whose names and residences were given, and who were alleged to be entitled to share in whatever money should be awarded against the government. The court of claims, after finding the amount that was due, in terms declared that it left 'the question of distribution to that department of the government which by law has incumbent on it the administration of the trust which in legal contemplation exists between the United States and the different tribes of Indians.' This court affirmed that decision, and in so doing, after saying that there was nothing in the record which would enable them to identify the claimants, added: 'Perhaps the necessities of the situation demand that the identification of each claimant entitled to share in the distribution shall be left to the officers who are the agents of the government in paying out the fund.' Such being the final orders in the consolidated cases, proceedings for ascertaining the individual beneficiaries were rightfully had in accordance with the directions then made. It is no argument against upholding that which was done to say that some other and more satisfactory procedure might have been ordered. Posibly it would have been better for the court to have appointed a master and proceeded according to the rules of equity in identifying the beneficiaries of the fund. However, it was not so ordered, and both the claimants and the government were instructed and concluded by the decision in respect to the method of identification.

The mandate of this court was filed in the court of claims on April 20, 1893, and on August 23, 1894, Congress passed an act appropriating money for the payment of the judgment. The fund thereby became available for distribution. No action, so far as appears, was taken in the court of claims or in the Indian Department looking to an identification of the parties entitled to this money until after March 2, 1895. Nearly two years had passed, and no effort had been made by the petitioners to establish to the satisfaction of the court...

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