Buchholtz v. Renard
Decision Date | 20 September 1960 |
Parties | Hannah BUCHHOLTZ, Samuel Beloff, Samuel Wulwick, Philip Wulwick, Louis G. Wulwick, Florence Wulwick, Norman Wulwick, Faye Cottesfield, Ansi Charchat, Bernard Nemhouser, Harold Weitz, Frank Filetti, Frank Moratta, Gene A. Cass, Leo Goodfriend, Charles Sheldon, Phyllis Berens, Murray Levine, Plaintiffs v. Lester G. RENARD, William W. Luman, James L. Garrity, George C. Alpauch, Henry Fullop, Nettie W. Kramer, Roycan Co., Herzog Co., Manuel D. Guzman Polanco, Geraud Bibo, Sylvia Berman, Samuel B. Ratoff, Selma H. Ratoff, Benjamin H. Lapin, Harris C. Lapin, Ada Lapin, Nancy Lapin, Sidney Orsek, Leon Entin, Frances Maloni, Gertrude Moskowitz, Ethel Jarozenski, Hilda Fink, Minnie Spawn, Clara Ladenheim, Joseph A. Lederer, Anne L. Renard, Philip Bateser, Henry G. Lubin, Stillman Elfield, David R. Weisner, C. Law McCabe, Jeanette Weisman, Marilyn Weisman, Herman L. Weisman, Edward Weisman, Robert D. Weisman, Caroline Johann, Carle Erbe, Oscar L. Hausner, Consolidated Enterprises, Ltd., A. K. Swann, The National Company, Ltd., and Universal Mineral Resources, Inc., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Martin Horwitz, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Arthur Richenthal, New York City, for defendants, Lester O. Renard, William W. Luman, Nettie W. Kramer, Herman L. Weisman and Universal Mineral Resources, Inc.
In this case the defendants move—
(1) to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 8(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., on the ground that it is not simple, concise and direct and that each claim is not set forth in a separate count; or
(2) to dismiss the first cause of action pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or
(3) pursuant to Rule 12(e) for a more definite statement as to the date when certain plaintiffs received delivery of the stock of Universal Mineral Resources, Inc.; and
(4) and (5) to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) the second and third causes of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or
(6) pursuant to Rule 12(f) to strike certain allegedly redundant, immaterial, impertinent and scandalous matters in the amended complaint.
Generally, this court does not write long and extended opinions on motions of this type. However, in this case defendants' motion is in reality six separate motions and in order to fully answer each one it is necessary to discuss them at some length.
This action is brought by various stockholders of Universal Mineral Resources, Inc., a New York corporation, against said corporation, The National Company, Ltd., a Panama corporation, three other corporate defendants and various officers, directors and stockholders thereof. The amended complaint, which contains forty-three numbered paragraphs and covers sixteen typewritten pages, alleges that defendants conspired to sell unregistered securities to the public in violation of §§ 5(a), 5(c), 12(1), 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq., and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq.
The first part of defendants' motion is denied.
Plaintiffs' first cause of action alleges a violation of §§ 5(a), 5(c) and 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.A. 77e(a) and (c), 77l).1
Defendants' motion to dismiss the first cause of action under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is based upon three claims:
(1) That the first cause of action does not identify the particular person from whom the plaintiffs purchased their respective shares of stock;
(2) There has been no offer of rescission and a tender of the stock purchased by the plaintiffs;
(3) Those plaintiffs who purchased their stock prior to February 10, 1959 are barred from recovery by the one-year statute of limitations.
Defendants' position appears to be that since the exact defendants from whom plaintiffs purchased the stock are not alleged, then plaintiffs' cause of action against defendants must be dismissed. Defendants contend that plaintiffs' remedy is against the broker who sold them the stock. I do not agree with defendants' position. Under the reasoning of the defendants the broker-agent would be liable and not the principals. It cannot be seriously contended that because defendants managed to conceal their identity from plaintiffs by using brokers and other nominees that they, the defendants, are not liable for stock they sold to plaintiffs.
Defendants further claim that there has been no tender of the securities still held by the plaintiffs as is required by § 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. Plaintiffs have stated that they have not tendered the securities because they did not know to whom to make the tender. Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 does not say when tender should be made. Stadia Oil & Uranium Company v. Wheelis, 10 Cir., 1957, 251 F.2d 269, 273. In the above case the trial court permitted tender to be made with motions for leave to file amended complaints. Thus, since tender to the defendants is impossible because the exact defendants are unknown to plaintiffs, and since there is no exact time set by the statute for tender, defendants' motion is denied.
Defendants further claim that certain of the plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this suit because of the one year statute of limitations provided for by § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.A. § 77m).2
Thus, plaintiffs have averred compliance with the statute of limitations and defendants' motion must be denied at this time.
However, defendants have asked, in part three of their motion, for a more definite statement as to the dates when various plaintiffs received delivery of the stock of defendant Universal Mineral Resources, Inc., allegedly purchased by the plaintiffs. Defendants are entitled to this and the motion for a more definite statement as to the date or dates when the plaintiffs, Beloff, Louis G. Wulwick, Florence Wulwick, Charchat, Weitz, Filetti, Buchholtz, Samuel Wulwick, Philip Wulwick, Norman Wulwick and Gottesfield, or their agents, received delivery of said stock, is granted.
Plaintiffs' second cause of action, which defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is based on § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77l (2). See footnote 1, supra. Defendants' position is that this second cause of action should be dismissed because of lack of privity, lack of tender of the stock, and because there has been no prospectus or oral communication upon which to base this claim. The claims of lack of privity and tender have been discussed above, and that discussion is applicable here. Section 2(10) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(10), defines a prospectus...
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