Berry v. Donovan

• Decision Date: 02 June 1905
• Parties: BERRY v. DONOVAN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

188 Mass. 353

74 N.E. 603

BERRY v. DONOVAN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

June 2, 1905

COUNSEL

John J. Winn, for plaintiff.

Henry F. Hurlburt, Mellen A. Pingree, and John J. Ryan, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON, C.J.

This is an action of tort, brought to recover damages sustained by reason of the defendant's malicious interference with the plaintiff's contract of employment. The plaintiff was a shoemaker, employed by the firm of Hazen B. Goodrich & Co. at Haverhill, Mass., under a contract terminable at will. At the time of the interference complained of he had been so employed nearly four years. The defendant was the representative at Haverhill of a national organization of shoe workers, called the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, of which he was also a member. The evidence showed that he induced Goodrich & Co. to discharge the plaintiff, greatly to his damage. A few days before the plaintiff's discharge a contract was entered into between the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union and the firm of Goodrich & Co., which was signed by the defendant for the union, the second clause of which was as follows: 'In consideration of the foregoing valuable privileges, the employer agrees to hire, as shoe workers, only members of the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union in good standing, and further agrees not to retain any shoe worker in his employment after receiving notice from the union that such shoe worker is objectionable to the union either on account of being in arrears for dues, or disobedience of union rules or laws, or from any other cause.' The contract contained various other provisions in regard to the employment of members of the union by the firm, and the rights of the firm and of the union in reference to the services of these employés, and the use of the union's stamp upon goods to be manufactured. The plaintiff was not a member of this union. Soon after the execution of this contract the defendant demanded of Goodrich & Co. that the plaintiff be discharged, and the evidence tended to show that the sole ground for the demand was that the plaintiff was not a member of the union, and that he persistently declined to join it after repeated suggestions that he should do so. At the close of the evidence the defendant asked for the following instructions, which the judge declined to give: '(1) Upon all the evidence in the case the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. (2) Upon all the evidence in the case the defendant was acting as the legal representative of the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, and not in his personal capacity, and therefore the plaintiff cannot recover. (3) The contract between the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union and Hazen B. Goodrich & Co. was a valid contract, and the defendant, as the legal representative of the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, had a right to call the attention of Hazen B. Goodrich & Co., or any member of the firm, to the fact that they were violating the terms of the contract in keeping the plaintiff in their employment after the contract was signed, and insisting upon an observance of the terms of the contract, even if the defendant knew that the observance of the terms of the contract would result in the discharge of the plaintiff from their employment. (4) The contract referred to was legal contract, and a justification of the acts of the defendant, as shown by the evidence in this case.' '(6) The defendant cannot be held responsible in this action unless it appears that the defendant used threats, or some act of intimidation, or some slanderous statements, or some unlawful coercion to or against the employers of the plaintiff, to thereby cause the plaintiff's discharge; and upon all the evidence in the case there is no such evidence, and the plaintiff cannot recover.' The defendant excepted to the refusal, and to the portions of the charge which were inconsistent with the instructions requested. The jury returned a verdict of $1,500 for the plaintiff. These exceptions present the only questions which were argued before us by the defendant.

The primary right of the plaintiff to have the benefit of his contract and to remain undisturbed in the performance of it is universally recognized. The right to dispose of one's labor as he will, and to have the benefit of one's lawful contracts, is incident to the freedom of the individual, which lies at the foundation of the government in all countries that maintain the principles of civil liberty. Such a right can lawfully be interfered with only by one who is acting in the exercise of an equal or superior right which comes in conflict with the other. An intentional interference with such a right without lawful justification is malicious in law, even if it is from good motives and without express malice. Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555-562; Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492-498, 57 N.E. 1011, 51 L. R. A. 339, 79 Am. St. Rep. 330; Allen v. Flood (1898) A. C. 1-18; Mogul Steamship Company v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 598-613; Read v. Friendly Society of Operative Stone Masons (1902) 2 K. B. 88-96; Giblan v. National Amalgamated Union (1903) 2 K. B. 600-617. In the present case the judge submitted to the jury, first, the question whether the defendant interfered with the plaintiff's rights under his contract with Goodrich & Co.; and, secondly, the question whether, if he did, the interference was without justifiable cause. The jury were instructed that, unless the defendant's interference directly caused the termination of the plaintiff's employment, there could be no recovery. The substance of the defendant's contention was that if he acted under the contract between the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union and the employer in procuring the plaintiff's discharge, his interference was lawful.

This contention brings us to an examination of the contract. That part which relates to the persons to be employed contains, first, a provision that the employer will hire only members of the union. This has no application to the plaintiff's case, for it is an agreement only for the future, and the plaintiff had been hired a long time before. The next provision is that the employer will not retain in his employment a worker, after receiving notice that he is objectionable to the union, 'either on account of being in arrears for dues, or disobedience of union rules or laws, or from any other cause.' The first two possible causes for objection could not be applied to persons in the situation of the plaintiff, who were not members of the union or amenable to its laws. As to such persons the only provision applicable was that the firm would not retain a worker who was objectionable to the union from any cause, however arbitrary the objection or unreasonable the cause might be. This provision purported to authorize the union to interfere and deprive any workman of his employment for no reason whatever, in the arbitrary exercise of its power. Whatever the contracting parties may do if no one but themselves is concerned, it is evident that, as against the workman, a contract of this kind does not of itself justify interference with his employment by a third person who made the contract with his employer. Curran v. Galen, 152 N.Y. 33, 46 N.E. 297, 37 L. R. A. 802, 57 Am. St. Rep. 496. No one can legally interfere with the employment of another unless in the exercise of some right of his own, which the law respects. His will so to interfere for his own gratification is not such a right. The judge rightly left to the jury the question whether, in view of all the circumstances, the interference was or was not for a justifiable cause. If the plaintiff's habits or conduct or character had been such as to render him an unfit associate in the shop for ordinary workmen of good character, that would have been a sufficient reason for interference in behalf of his shopmates. We can conceive of other good reasons. But the evidence tended to show that the only reason for procuring his discharge was his refusal to join the union. The question, therefore, is whether the jury might find that such an interference was unlawful.

The only argument that we have heard in support of interference by labor unions in cases of this kind is that it is justifiable as a kind of competition. It is true that fair competition in business brings persons into rivalry, and often justifies action for one's self which interferes with proper action of another. Such action on both sides is the exercise by competing persons of equal conflicting rights. The principle appealed to would justify a member of the union, who was seeking employment for himself, in making an offer to serve on such terms as would result, and as he knew would result, in the discharge of the plaintiff by his employer, to make a place for the new comer. Such an offer for such a purpose, would be unobjectionable. It would be merely the exercise of a personal right, equal in importance to the plaintiff's right. But an interference by a combination of persons to obtain the discharge of a workman because he refuses to comply with their wishes, for their advantage, in some matter in which he has a right to act independently, is not competition. In such a case the action taken by the combination is not in the regular course of their business as employés, either in the service in which they are engaged or in an effort to obtain employment in other service. The result which they seek to obtain cannot come directly from anything that they do within the regular line of their business as workers competing in the labor market. It can only come from action outside of the province of workingmen, intended directly to injure another, for the purpose of compelling him to submit to their dictation. It is difficult to see how the object to be gained can...