Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 March 1963
• Docket Number: No. A--73,A--73
• Parties: Anthony RUVOLO, a mental incompetent, who sues by Rose Ruvolo, his guardian, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY, a corporation of the State of Pennsylvania, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 490

39 N.J. 490

189 A.2d 204

Anthony RUVOLO, a mental incompetent, who sues by Rose

Ruvolo, his guardian, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY, a corporation of the State of

Pennsylvania, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A--73.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Feb. 4, 1963.

Decided March 18, 1963.

John F. Ryan, Elizabeth, for defendant-appellant (Bernard L. Davis, Elizabeth, on the brief, Ryan, Saros, Davis & Stone, Elizabeth, attorneys).

Melvin J. Koestler, Elizabeth, for plaintiff-respondent (Koestler & Koestler, Elizabeth, attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FRANCIS, J.

In this action plaintiff, guardian of the insured, sought a declaration with respect to the coverage extended by a policy of liability insurance issued by defendant American Casualty Company. The trial court entered summary judgment for plaintiff requiring defendant to undertake the defense of a certain damage suit then pending against the insured, and declaring that the policy provided coverage for the liability on which that suit was based. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division and we certified the matter before argument there.

Dr. Anthony Ruvolo purchased an insurance policy from defendant under which the company agreed to pay all sums which he 'shall become legally obligated to pay as damages' because of the death of any person resulting from (his) 'activities.' The contract also obligated the insurer to defend any damage suit brought against Ruvolo alleging such a death 'even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.' The coverage extended was limited as follows:

'* * * This policy does not apply:

(c) to * * * death * * * caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured.'

On June 6, 1960 Dr. Anthony Ruvolo shot and killed Dr. Annunziato La Face with whom he was associated in the practice of medicine. Ruvolo was arrested immediately and at the instance of the Prosecutor, was examined by two psychiatrists. Upon their certification that he was insane, he was committed on June 10, 1960 to the New Jersey State Hospital at Trenton. He is still confined there.

In July 1960 Evelyn La Face, as Administratrix Ad Prosequendum and as general Administratrix of the estate of her husband, brought suit for damages against Ruvolo alleging that he 'wrongfully shot and killed' La Face. The insurer refused to defend the action asserting that the claim was excluded from policy coverage because the death had been caused by the insured's intentional act. We were advised at the oral argument that after this appeal had been taken, the damage suit was settled between the parties, and that it was done pursuant to an agreement with the insurer that the adjustment would be without prejudice to a judicial determination of the question of policy coverage.

When the declaratory judgment proceeding was instituted, defendant filed an answer alleging that Ruvolo's homicidal act was intentional and therefore was not within the protection afforded by the insurance. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, supporting the application by affidavits of the two psychiatrists on whose certification Ruvolo had been committed, and by affidavits of two other psychiatrists who have examined and cared for him since his admission to the State Hospital.

The first two physicians, who examined Ruvolo on June 6 and 7, 1960, declared him to be 'insane,' suffering from 'Dementia Praecox (Schizophrenia), paranoid type,' and that the condition was gradual in onset, ('his paranoid ideas (had been) very strong for several months past'). The affidavits of the two attending physicians were made after 19 months of examination, observation and treatment. They agree that upon admission to the hospital on June 10, 1960, Ruvolo was suffering from paranoid delusions; also, that at and prior to June 10 and continuously thereafter, he was afficted with a mental disorder classified as 'paranoid state.' More particularly, one of them deposed that at the time of the killing on June 6, 1960, Ruvolo

'was suffering from a mental disorder which rendered him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, that his insight and judgment were defective, that he was possessed with delusions of persecution, and that he did not at that time know the nature or quality of his acts and lacked the mental capacity to control his conduct.'

The second one said:

'In my opinion, based upon my early examination (day of admission) of Anthony Ruvolo and confirmed by my frequent contact with and knowledge of the case during the past year and a half, Anthony Ruvolo was psychotic at the time of the alleged homicide on June 6, 1960 and was at that time suffering from a mental disorder which rendered him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, and that he did not at that time know the nature or quality of his acts and he lacked the mental capacity to control his conduct.'

Defendant submitted no answering affidavits or other proof in opposition to that presented by plaintiff. Counsel pointed out, however, that none of the psychiatrists had examined or treated Ruvolo or had actual knowledge of his mental state before the shooting; further that their statements as to his insanity on the day of the homicide were opinions based on subsequent examinations and treatment. And he argued that the motion for summary judgment should have been made on depositions of the doctors, which would have provided him with an opportunity for cross-examination as to the nature and extent of the insanity and whether it was such as deprived Ruvolo of sufficient rational reasoning capacity to conceive and intentionally execute a purpose to shoot Dr. La Face. It is also fairly inferable from the argument that he felt entitled under the circumstances of the case to employ cross-examination to probe into the credibility of the affiants, the basis for their opinion, as well as its medical soundness and legal effect with relation to the exclusionary clause of the insurance contract. Defendant urged that plenary trial was warranted because depositions had not been taken (although it is not suggested that such course is imperative on a motion for summary judgment), and because the subjects sought to be explored were not covered in the affidavits to the point where it could be said that 'palpably' there was no genuine factual issue (R.R. 4:58--3). The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiff holding that the affidavits demonstrated beyond factual conflict that Dr. Ruvolo was insane at the time of the shooting and lacked the capacity to form a rational intent to kill. A killing in such circumstances, he declared, could not be considered an intentional act and therefore was within the protection extended by defendant's policy.

Clauses excluding coverage for losses caused by intentional wrongful acts are common in various types of insurance contracts and are accepted as valid limitations. In fact, it has been held to be contrary to public policy for an insurer to agree to indemnify an insured against the civil consequences of his own wilful criminal act. Malanga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 225, 146 A.2d 105 (1958); Morgan v. Greater New York Taxpayers Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 305 N.Y. 243, 112 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ct.App.1953); 10 Couch, Insurance (2d ed. 1962), §§ 41.663--665; 1 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (1941), § 481; 29A Am.Jur., Insurance, § 1194. In applying the exclusory provision, however, whether in a life, accident, liability or fire policy, it has come to be commonly accepted that where the death or loss involved, be it of the insured or caused by the insured, is the product of an insane act, recovery is not barred. See, e.g., Hier v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 104 Mont. 471, 67 P.2d 831, 110 A.L.R. 1051 (Sup.Ct.1937); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. McWilliams, 146 Miss. 298, 112 So. 483 (Sup.Ct.1927); Markland v. Clover Leaf Casualty Co., 209 S.W. 602 (Mo.Ct.App.1919); Corley v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 105 F. 854 (6 Cir., 1900); Berger v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 88 F. 241 (C.C.Mo.1898); Van Zandt v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 55 N.Y. 169; 14 Am.Rep. 215 (Ct.App.1873); Annotation, 110 A.L.R. 1060 (1937); 1 Appleman, supra, p. 590, n. 7; Couch, supra, § 41.667; 29A Am.Jur., supra, §§ 1199, 1304.

In this context, however, the critical, or more precise, problem is the nature or extent of the mental incapacity necessary to transmute the character of the act involved from intentional to insane. Broadly stated, if the actor does not have the mental capacity to do the act intentionally, the policy coverage remains operative. The test has been expressed in this wise: If the deceased was killed by one incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or of forming a rational intent to do the act, the death would not be intentional, Corley v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, supra, (105 F. at p. 862); if the death was caused by the voluntary act of the insured, when his reasoning faculties were so far impaired that he was not able to understand the moral character, or the general nature, consequences and effect of the act he was about to commit, the killing was not 'intentional,' Berger v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra; or, if the person was suffering from such an impairment of the mind as to render him incapable of acting rationally, his homicidal act cannot be considered intentional, Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. McWilliams, supra. The rule has been put in the terms applied in determining guilt or innocence in the criminal law, i.e., whether at the time the life was taken the killer was so unbalanced as not to be able to distinguish between right and wrong in reference to the act. Markland v. Clover Leaf Casualty Co., supra; 1 Appleman, supra, §§ 482, 483.

Ninety years ago, the United States Supreme Court, after reviewing a number of authorities which stated the test in various ways, adopted this...