Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. McWilliams

• Decision Date: 14 February 1927
• Docket Number: 26027
• Citation: 146 Miss. 298,112 So. 483
• Parties: PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. MCWILLIAMS. [*]
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

112 So. 483

146 Miss. 298

PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. MCWILLIAMS. ^[*]

No. 26027

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 14, 1927

Division B

Suggestion of Error Overruled March 14, 1927.

APPEAL from circuit court of Chickasaw county, Second district HON T. E. PEGRAM, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Emma L. McWilliams against the Provident Life &amp Accident Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Stovall & Stovall and Sizer, Chambliss & Sizer, for appellant.

The sole issue in this case is whether or not Ed Davenport was sufficiently insane to render his killing the insured, McWilliams, unintentional. The burden of showing this is on the plaintiff and until plaintiff has sustained this burden defendant cannot be put to its proof. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Houston, 3 Tex.App. Civ. Cases, section 429. See, also, 1 C. J., "Accident Insurance," section 289, page 498; Hutson v. Continental Cas. Co., 107 So. 520; Nat'l Life & Accident Co. v. Hannon, 101 So. 892; 4 Cooley's Briefs on the Law of Insurance, page 3211.

There is, of course, no question but that a sufficient degree of insanity can render a person entirely irresponsible for his acts and the acts themselves mere physical motions, not guided by any mental activity at all. And there is no question but that a person so afflicted would not be responsible for crime, and his acts would be unintentional. In the attempt to define the border line between sanity and legal responsibility, there have been written countless opinions dealing with hair-splitting definitions, but when they are all sifted down to the underlaying basic principle the question is, in plain everyday language, Was the mind of the subject capable of formulating and carrying out the plan or intention of committing the crime?

The evidence in this case, taken as favorable for the plaintiff as possible, shows no more than that Ed Davenport was somewhat of a crank, inclined to be moody at times and easily excited and possessed of a rather high temper; that during the dispute before the Labor Board, with reference to his seniority over McWilliams, he conceived the idea that Conductor A. S. Miller was using his influence to hinder him and help McWilliams; that this idea of Davenport's was erroneous because in fact Miller was not helping McWilliams; but, nevertheless, laboring under this idea Davenport developed an intense hatred for Miller; and that this hatred for Miller and the bitterness of the controversy with McWilliams worked Davenport up to such a pitch that he deliberately tried to kill both of them, and succeeded in killing one and wounding the other. According to the opinion of the expert, Dr. Buchanan, these facts showed that Davenport was insane; but, nevertheless, in spite of his insanity he was capable of forming, and did form and carry out, the intent to kill McWilliams and his motive was the destruction of these people who were interfering with him in his attempt to secure a job. It is defendant's insistence that this proof is not sufficient to go to the jury in this case. Rider v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 107 N.Y.S. 974, is directly in point.

All the plaintiff here can claim to have proved is "mere insanity;" and since she has also proved that Davenport even though insane had the capacity to do an intentional act, and that he did intend to kill the insured, we earnestly insist that the court should direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.

L. P. Haley and Geo. Bean, for appellee.

The only issue in this case is whether or not Ed Davenport realizing the consequences of his act, intended to kill the insured, Carl McWilliams. Hutson v. Continental Casualty Co., 107 So. 520, covers every proposition involved in the case now before the court; is comprehensive in its details, and settles the law in this state so far as this case is concerned. The Hutson case decided that the capacity to do an intentional act is very clearly a question of fact for the jury.

A provision exempting a company from liability for death from "intentional" injury inflicted by the insured or any other person does not preclude a recovery where the insured was killed by an insane person, incapable of forming a rational intent. One of the leading cases on insanity in this state is Cunningham v. State, 56 So. 269. See, also, 14 R. C. L., page 522.

Argued orally by R. C. Stovall and Burnett Sizer, for appellant, and L. P. Haley for appellee.

OPINION

HOLDEN, P. J.

This case is here on appeal for the second time. See Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Mrs. Emma McWilliams, Miss. , 107 So. 527. Upon the former appeal the judgment of the lower court was reversed, for the reasons given in the opinion of the court. The case was tried again, which resulted in a judgment for two thousand three hundred dollars in favor of Mrs. Mc-Williams for the accidental death of her husband, who was shot and killed by one Ed Davenport.

The recovery is based upon an accident insurance policy, which provided for indemnity for accidental injuries to Carl McWilliams, husband of the appellee, and, among other things, the policy sued on contained the following clause:

"This policy does not cover injuries, fatal or nonfatal, sustained by the insured. . . . (4) If said fatal or nonfatal...