Thrope v. State of Ohio, C-1-96-764.

• Citation: 19 F.Supp.2d 816
• Decision Date: 28 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. C-1-96-764.,C-1-96-764.
• Parties: Joel THROPE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF OHIO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

19 F.Supp.2d 816

Joel THROPE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF OHIO, et al., Defendants.

No. C-1-96-764.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

August 28, 1998.

Richard Leo Creighton, Jr., Joseph M. Callow, Jr., Patrick F. Fischer, Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Cincinnati, OH, for Joel Thrope.

Stephen Howard Johnson, Ohio Atty. Gen., Business & Government Regulation Section, Columbus, OH, for State of Ohio, Dept. of Public Safety.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DLOTT, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 35), and the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. # 34). This case came before the Court for oral argument on July 1, 1998. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' Motion is hereby GRANTED and Defendants' Motion is hereby DENIED.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a class action lawsuit brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq. The class members include over 300,000 Ohio residents and organizations who have been required to pay a $5.00 fee to the State of Ohio in order to obtain, renew, or replace a permanent handicapped windshield placard.¹ When displayed in the windshield of a motor vehicle, the placard allows for access to special parking spaces reserved for persons with disabilities. Plaintiffs allege that the State of Ohio's program of charging a $5.00 fee for these placards is a violation of the ADA because the ADA prohibits public entities from passing on the costs of such a program to disabled persons.

The Defendants in this action are the State of Ohio ("State" or "Ohio"); the Ohio Department of Public Safety ("DPS"); Mitchell J. Brown, Director of the Department of Public Safety; the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("BMV"); and Frank R. Caltrider, Registrar of Motor Vehicles. The individuals are sued only in their official capacities, and therefore this suit is essentially against only the State. The Defendants contend that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and thus seeks dismissal of this suit. Even if jurisdiction exists, however, the Defendants contend that Ohio's program of issuing placards for a $5.00 fee does not violate the ADA.

The parties agree that no issues of material fact remain, and that this case turns on the legal questions of whether federal jurisdiction exists and whether Ohio's program of issuing handicapped parking placards violates the ADA. See Joint Stipulation Submitting Entire Case on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (doc. # 28); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").

II. ANALYSIS

The Court will first briefly summarize the relevant features of the ADA and of Ohio's program of issuing handicapped parking placards. Next the Court will address the jurisdictional issues raised by the Defendants. Finally, the Court will turn to the merits of the case.

A. The Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with Disabilities Act is a broad federal law designed to combat discrimination against disabled persons. With respect to public entities, the ADA mandates that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.² Congress directed the Department of Justice to promulgate regulations to implement the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12134. Among the regulatory requirements of the ADA is the creation of special parking places for disabled persons, in order to ensure accessibility to places of public accommodation. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.304; 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, Appendix A, ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities; Kornblau v. Dade County, 86 F.3d 193, 194 (11th Cir.1996); Petillo v. California Dep't of Motor Vehicles, Case No. CV96-5569JSL, (C.D.Cal. June 4,1997).

The ADA regulations regarding state and local government services also include general prohibitions against discrimination. Public entities are required to "make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when ... necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). One of the specific prohibitions forms the basis of the Plaintiffs' claim in this case. The regulation specifically prohibits public entities from imposing a surcharge on disabled persons to cover the costs of an ADA-mandated measure:

A public entity may not place a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of measures, such as provisions of auxiliary aids or program accessibility, that are required to provide that individual or group with the nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act.

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f). The surcharge provision prevents disabled persons from being denied access to ADA-mandated benefits or services because they do not have the funds to pay for them, and it spreads the costs of such benefits or services to all taxpayers. See McGarry v. Director, Department of Revenue, State of Missouri, 7 F.Supp.2d 1022 (W.D.Mo.1998). The question raised by the present case is whether Ohio's program of issuing handicapped parking placards for a $5.00 fee violates this federal regulation.

B. Ohio's Handicapped Parking Placard Program

Ohio's program for providing access to federally-mandated handicapped parking places is described at Ohio Revised Code § 4503.44. Under this program, there are only two ways in which persons with a walking impairment may access the reserved handicapped parking spaces in Ohio: special license plates or a parking placard. An individual who owns or leases a motor vehicle may apply to the BMV for special license plates imprinted with the international symbol of access. To obtain the special plates, one must pay only the regular license fee. There are no additional costs for obtaining handicapped registration and plates, and the Plaintiffs in this case do not challenge the legality of the license plate program.

Disabled persons may also apply for a permanent handicapped windshield placard.³ To obtain the permanent placard, qualified individuals and organizations must pay a $5.00 fee to the State of Ohio.⁴ A motor vehicle displaying the placard is entitled to park in the spaces reserved for disabled persons. Since the ADA became effective as to public entities on January 26, 1992, the State of Ohio has collected in excess of $2.5 million for permanent placards.⁵

C. Jurisdiction

In order to address the merits of the case, the Court must first determine that it has jurisdiction over the case. Defendants contend that two separate barriers exist which prevent federal jurisdiction in this matter: the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Tax Injunction Act.

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants first allege that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal jurisdiction in this case. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although the text of the Amendment appears to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Supreme Court has long "understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... which it confirms." Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 115 L.Ed.2d 686 (1991)). This presupposition is that each state is a sovereign entity in our federal system and that it is inherent in this sovereignty not to be subject to the suit of an individual without its consent.⁶ Id.

State sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, however, is not absolute: a state may consent to suit in federal court; and Congress may, under certain circumstances, abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Neither party in this case contends that the State of Ohio has consented to suit under the ADA, but the parties disagree over whether Congress effectively abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it passed the ADA.

The Supreme Court recently set forth a two-part test for determining whether Congress has properly abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). First, Congress must unequivocally express an intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, Congress must act pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Id. 517 U.S. at 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114. The first question is easily answered in the affirmative, and the parties do not dispute that Congress, in enacting the ADA, unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 ("A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter.").

The parties disagree, however, as to whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power. In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court held that only one constitutional provision, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,⁷ provides Congress the authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. 517 U.S. at...