1983 Legislative Apportionment of House, Senate, and Congressional Districts, In re

Decision Date09 December 1983
Citation469 A.2d 819
PartiesIn re 1983 LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT OF HOUSE, SENATE, AND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Peter Adams Anderson (orally), Anderson, Merrill, Norton & Relyea, Bangor, David M. Sanders (orally), Rowe & Sanders, Livermore Falls, for petitioners.

Harriet Lewis Robinson, pro se.

William R. Stokes (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Anthony W. Buxton (orally), Augusta, for respondents.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, ROBERTS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.

OPINION AND ORDER

This original proceeding brought directly before the Supreme Judicial Court challenges the constitutionality of the plans enacted by the 1983 Legislature for the apportionment of election districts for the Maine House of Representatives and the Maine Senate. 1 Pursuant to Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; art. IV, pt. 2, § 2, the Supreme Judicial Court is asked to declare that the legislatively enacted districting, chapter 93 of the Public Laws of 1983, 2 is unconstitutional and then to make the necessary apportionment. On the basis of the evidence presented to the court and of the legal principles here applicable, we find that chapter 93 complies with both the state and federal constitutions.

By a petition filed July 29, 1983, a group of citizens identifying itself as Citizens for Constitutional Apportionment sought to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Judicial Court to challenge the validity of the apportionment law under the state and federal constitutions. On August 19, 1983, an amended petition was filed by Citizens for Constitutional Apportionment, identifying several of its members and naming an individual citizen, Walter E. Birt, as a petitioner. The Department of the Attorney General filed an initial response on August 5, 1983, and on August 29, 1983, filed an answer to petitioners' amended petition. Two members of the House of Representatives, Darryl N. Brown and Harriet Lewis Robinson, subsequently intervened as petitioners, making further challenges to the apportionment plans enacted for the House of Representatives. The Maine Democratic State Committee and its chairman, Barry J. Hobbins, and Representative Edward C. Kelleher intervened as respondents. 3 By agreement of the parties, the matter was submitted to us on a record consisting solely of affidavits, maps, and other written materials. After receiving extensive briefs from all parties, the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting en banc on October 17, 1983, heard oral argument on issues of both fact and law.

The provisions of the constitution that currently govern the reapportionment process were adopted in 1975 4 after unsuccessful efforts by the Legislature to reapportion the Maine House of Representatives and Senate. In each instance, this court was called upon to make the apportionment. See In re Apportionment of House of Representatives, 315 A.2d 211, amended, 316 A.2d 508 (Me.1974); Opinion of the Justices, 307 A.2d 198 (Me.1973); In re Apportionment of Senate, 287 A.2d 421 (Me.1972); Opinion of the Justices, 283 A.2d 234 (Me.1971). The 1975 amendment provided for creation of a bipartisan commission to advise the Legislature on reapportionment, and also provided new substantive standards to guide the commission and the Legislature in formulating apportionment plans. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, §§ 2, 3; art. IV, pt. 2, § 2; art. IV, pt. 3, § 1-A. Under the present constitutional scheme, the Legislature that convenes in 1983 and every tenth year thereafter is required, within three days of convening, to establish a bipartisan apportionment commission in accordance with the standards set forth in Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1-A. 5 The constitution requires the commission to submit plans to the Legislature for the apportionment of the House of Representatives and the Senate within 90 days of the Legislature's convening. Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; art. IV, pt. 2, § 2. 6 The Legislature has thirty days to enact either the plan submitted by the commission or a plan of its own. If a plan is enacted, the Supreme Judicial Court has original jurisdiction "to hear any challenge" to the apportionment law "as registered by any citizen or group thereof." Id. If the Legislature fails to enact a plan within the constitutional time limit, or if a challenge to an enacted plan is sustained, this court must make the apportionment.

In accordance with these provisions, the Maine Apportionment Commission was established in December, 1982. After holding public hearings, the commission submitted reapportionment plans for the Maine House of Representatives, the Maine Senate, and the United States Congress on March 1, 1983, before the constitutional deadline. Within a week of the submission of the plans, an error was discovered in the apportionment of the districts for the Maine House of Representatives. On March 7, 1983, a revised plan was submitted to the Legislature by the chairman of the commission. Plans substantially similar to those submitted by the commission were enacted by the Legislature as P.L.1983, ch. 93, on March 30, 1983, and signed into law by the Governor on March 31.

Petitioners base their challenge to chapter 93 both on the alleged failure of the Legislature and the commission to comply with certain procedural requirements that petitioners claim are imposed by the state constitution and on the alleged failure of the law itself to comply with the substantive criteria imposed by the state and federal constitutions. Petitioners' original and amended petitions contained three counts asserting that: (1) the apportionment law is unconstitutional under Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1-A because it enacts apportionment plans produced by a commission in which the Democratic members received substantially more funding than was provided to the Republican members; (2) the apportionment law is unconstitutional because the House apportionment plan originally filed by the commission within the constitutional deadline contained a substantial error and the corrected plan was filed by the commission after the constitutional deadline and without the benefit of a public hearing, in violation of Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; art. IV, pt. 2, § 2; art. IV, pt. 3, § 1-A; and (3) the enacted apportionment plans for the House and Senate are unconstitutional because they fail to adhere to the substantive standards imposed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and by Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 2; art. IV, pt. 2, § 2. 7

I. Standing

Before discussing the merits of each of these claims, we must address the contention raised by respondents other than the Department of the Attorney General, that petitioners lack standing to bring the instant action. We disagree. The drafters of the 1975 constitutional amendment painted with a broad brush in providing that "[t]he Supreme Judicial Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear any challenge to an apportionment law enacted by the Legislature, as registered by any citizen or group thereof." Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3, art. IV, pt. 2, § 2 (emphasis added). We read the constitutional language as sufficient, without more, to give any citizen standing to challenge an apportionment law enacted by the Legislature. The reapportionment process entails the right of every citizen to be governed by a Legislature that is duly elected by the people.

A challenge to the House or Senate reapportionment plan implicates the integrity of future elections of the entire body. In such circumstances, the constitutional draftsmen had a good reason for giving any citizen or group thereof the power to trigger judicial scrutiny of the legislative apportionment rather than limiting that power to a citizen who could show that his vote would be diluted or to a candidate who could show that his subsequent public service would be made more difficult by the alleged constitutional shortcomings of the enacted plan. The danger of frivolous challenges to reapportionment laws--which in any event are enacted only at ten-year intervals--is by no means serious enough to compel this court to put a restrictive gloss on the unrestricted words of the Maine Constitution. Rather, we give those words their plain meaning. Any citizen may go to court to challenge legislatively adopted apportionment plans. Of course, the Supreme Judicial Court will not get into the business of itself making the reapportionment until and unless it has been proved that the Legislature's plan is constitutionally defective.

II. Pre-enactment Procedural Defects

The first two counts of the petition are based not upon any substantive constitutional insufficiency in the enacted reapportionment plans, but rather upon the alleged failure of the Legislature and the reapportionment commission to comply with certain procedures that petitioners claim are mandated by the Maine Constitution. Petitioners assert that the reapportionment law is rendered invalid by unequal funding of the two political parties represented on the reapportionment commission and by failure of the commission to comply with constitutional deadlines and hearing requirements. We, however, do not reach the merits of these arguments, which are based upon alleged procedural defects in the functioning of the commission, for the reason that these "challenges" do not fall within the scope of the constitutional proceeding now before the Supreme Judicial Court. The constitutional provisions (Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; art. IV, pt. 2, § 2) require that the Supreme Judicial Court decide challenges "to an apportionment law enacted by the Legislature." This language should be read narrowly in light of the fact that the purpose for this special proceeding is for the Supreme Judicial Court to determine whether it must itself make the apportionment. "If any challenge is sustained, the Supreme Judicial Court shall make the...

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    ...policies within the limitations imposed by federal law. See In re 1983 Legislative Apportionment of House, Senate, & Congressional Districts, 469 A.2d 819, 827 (Me.1983) (hereinafter In re 1983 Legislative Apportionment ). Accordingly, the Legislature must resolve the tension that exists be......
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