1997 -NMCA- 24, Alverson v. Harris

• Decision Date: 18 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 16,724,16,724
• Citation: 935 P.2d 1165,1997 NMCA 24,123 N.M. 153
• Parties: , 1997 -NMCA- 24 Melissa ALVERSON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Curtis HARRIS, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 1165

935 P.2d 1165

123 N.M. 153, 1997 -NMCA- 24

Melissa ALVERSON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Curtis HARRIS, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 16,724.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Dec. 18, 1996.

Scott E. Turner, Watrous & Reardon, Albuquerque, for Appellee.

David C. Hughes, Hughes & Carver, P.C., Albuquerque, for Appellant.

OPINION

ARMIJO, Judge.

¶1 Respondent appeals from the final order of the trial court determining child support arrears and prospective child support. On appeal, Respondent raised three issues: (1) whether the costs of providing child care while Petitioner is attending classes in pursuit of a college degree are incurred "due to employment or job search" for the purpose of calculating child support obligations under NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-11.1(G) (Repl.Pamp.1994); (2) whether the trial court failed to offset child support arrearages with $500 in payments made by Respondent to Petitioner during June and July of 1993; and (3) whether the trial court's award of attorney fees to Petitioner constituted an abuse of discretion or was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶2 This action arose under the Uniform Parentage Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 40-11-1 through -23 (Repl.Pamp.1994), to establish parentage of two children, child support, custody and arrears in child support. Petitioner is the mother of two minor children, ages two and four. Prior to trial on the issues of support and arrearages, the parties stipulated that Respondent is the father of these two children, that there should be joint legal custody with Petitioner having primary physical custody, and that Respondent should have interim visitation according to a schedule. Only the issues concerning support and arrearages were tried to the court.

¶3 Petitioner testified at trial in 1995 that she was a full-time student at the University of New Mexico (UNM), where she was working toward completing a Bachelor of University Studies degree with an anticipated graduation date of May 1996. Petitioner testified that she decided to go back to college and obtain her degree because she had sustained carpal tunnel syndrome and sciatica and therefore could not continue her previous work as a massage therapist. In her previous jobs, Petitioner earned at or just above minimum wage. Because her child-care costs were $4.00 to $5.00 per hour, she testified that, under her current circumstances (that is, during pursuit of her degree), "the amount I would have to pay a babysitter is the amount that I would be making in a job." Petitioner listed several higher-paying positions in the health promotion field for which she expected to qualify after graduating. No evidence was presented that Petitioner was not diligent in her educational pursuits or that she was using education as a pretext to avoid working or paying child support or that she was abusing her educational opportunities. To the contrary, Petitioner's actions in pursuing her degree were taken in good faith.

¶4 The trial court found that Petitioner is not able to be employed while she completes her degree and that Petitioner cannot attend college without incurring child-care costs. Based on these findings, the trial court determined that "Petitioner's child-care costs are work related and job search related" and calculated these costs to be $360 per month. The trial court included the child-care costs in calculating the arrears due for the first four months of 1995, and in determining prospective child support. However, in calculating the arrears due for June and July of 1993, the trial court declined to include an offset of $500 that Respondent allegedly paid to Petitioner during this period. Finally, Petitioner was awarded $5,956.39 in attorney fees.

DISCUSSION

I. Child-Care Costs Incurred While Petitioner Attends College

¶5 On appeal, Respondent challenges the trial court's legal conclusion that the costs of placing the parties' children in child care while Petitioner attended classes at the University of New Mexico were "incurred on behalf of these children due to employment or job search[.]" Section 40-4-11.1(G). Respondent also challenges the trial court's decision to include such child-care costs among the child support arrearages awarded to mother for the first four months of 1995.

¶6 The standard for reviewing the trial court's legal conclusions is whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing the facts in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party. Golden Cone Concepts, Inc. v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd., 113 N.M. 9, 12, 820 P.2d 1323, 1326 (1991).

¶7 Whether the phrase "employment or job search" as used in Section 40-4-11.1(G) includes Petitioner's educational pursuits at UNM is an issue of first impression. Respondent relies on Gomez v. Gomez, 119 N.M. 755, 758, 895 P.2d 277, 280 (Ct.App.1995), to support his assertion that the child support guidelines are clear and unambiguous and should be enforced as written. However, Gomez involved a simpler and more quantifiable issue concerning the definition of "basic visitation" as a custody arrangement where one parent has visitation with a child less than 30% of the time. See id. (citing Section 40-4-11.1(D)). Because Respondent's case involves a different section of the statute where such an explicit, quantifiable definition is lacking, we conclude that Gomez is not controlling.

¶8 The phrase "employment or job search" as used in Section 40-4-11.1(G) is ambiguous because "it can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses." See State v. Elmquist, 114 N.M. 551, 552, 844 P.2d 131, 132 (Ct.App.1992). In particular, the term "job search" can be understood in both a narrow sense and a broad sense. In its narrowest sense, a job search might include only specific activities of relatively short duration such as attending an interview or disseminating a resume. However, in a broader sense, a job search could encompass the development and implementation of a step-by-step plan to achieve an individual's employment goals. Such a plan might include education and training as well as contacts with prospective employers.

¶9 We apply principles of statutory construction to resolve this ambiguity. In determining the meaning of a statute, the central question is the intent of the legislature. State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 351-354, 871 P.2d 1352, 1357-60 (1994). In determining the intent of the legislature, we look to the language of the statute and its purpose. Dona Ana Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dofflemeyer, 115 N.M. 590, 592, 855 P.2d 1054, 1056 (1993). All of the provisions of the statute, together with other statutes relating to the same subject matter, must be read together to ascertain the legislative intent. Quintana v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 100 N.M. 224, 225, 668 P.2d 1101, 1102 (1983).

¶10 Section 40-4-11.1(H) reads as follows:

The cost of providing medical and dental insurance for the children of the parties and the net reasonable child-care costs incurred on behalf of these children due to employment or job search of either parent shall be paid by each parent in proportion to his income, in addition to the basic obligation.

We note that the worksheets used for calculating child support obligations and the instructions accompanying these worksheets refer to this obligation as "work-related child care." See §§ 40-4-11.1(J), (K) (Basic Visitation, Instructions for Worksheet A, Line 6, and Shared Responsibility, Instructions for Worksheet B, Line 11).

¶11 Taken in context, we think the separate, itemized treatment of child-care costs incurred "due to employment or job search" reflects a legislative recognition of the importance of these costs and the fact that the amounts involved may vary in a manner that is independent of the income earned by the parties. In addition, the use of the disjunctive phrase "employment or job search" indicates to us a legislative intent to account for child-care expenses incurred in pursuing the prospect of employment as well as during the time a parent is actually employed. We regard the reference to "work-related child care" in the worksheets and instructions as merely an attempt to summarize the provisions of Section 40-4-11.1(G) and not as evidence of an intent to exclude child-care expenses incurred during a parent's job search. However, since the statute contains no explicit definition of a "job search," we ascertain its meaning from an analysis of the statute's purpose and that of other statutes concerning the same subject matter.

¶12 Respondent contends that to interpret Section 40-4-11.1(G) in a manner that includes Petitioner's educational pursuits as part of a "job search" would change the statute's purpose and effectively provide Petitioner with an unprecedented form of spousal support between persons who were never married--all to Petitioner's personal benefit and not to the benefit of the children. To avoid such a result, Respondent urges us to treat Petitioner's educational pursuits as a voluntary refusal to work rather than a legitimate component of a job search.

¶13 We find that Respondent's rationale demonstrates a lack of sensitivity to and understanding of the needs and expectations of a child on the eve of the twenty-first century. Under New Mexico's child support guidelines, both parents have a clear obligation to support their children and to contribute to child-care costs that directly relate to their employment or search for employment. Moreover, in the long run, the increased earning capacity associated with Petitioner's college education is likely to lead to increases in the total support the children receive, thus furthering the "state policy" of establishing "an adequate standard of support for children, subject to the ability of parents to pay." Section 40-4-11.1(B)(1).

¶14 Requiring Respondent to pay a share of the child-care costs incurred while Petitioner attends...