1997 -NMCA- 32, Hartman v. Texaco Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 16328,16328
• Citation: 123 N.M. 220,1997 NMCA 32,937 P.2d 979
• Parties: , 1997 -NMCA- 32 Doyle HARTMAN and Margaret Hartman, d/b/a Doyle Hartman, Oil Operator, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TEXACO INC., a Delaware Corporation, and Texaco Exploration and Production Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 979

937 P.2d 979

123 N.M. 220, 1997 -NMCA- 32

Doyle HARTMAN and Margaret Hartman, d/b/a Doyle Hartman, Oil

Operator, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TEXACO INC., a Delaware Corporation, and Texaco Exploration and Production Inc., a Delaware Corporation,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 16328.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Jan. 29, 1997.

Certiorari Denied March 7 and March 14, 1997.

Alice Tomlinson Lorenz, Marte D. Lightstone, Miller, Stratvert, Torgerson & Schlenker, P.A., Albuquerque, Deborah G. Hankinson, Allison Roseman, Thompson & Knight, P.C., Dallas, TX, John D. Sullivan, Texaco Incorporated, Denver, CO, Eric D. Lanphere, Hinkle, Cox, Eaton, Coffield & Hensley, Albuquerque, for Appellants.

J.E. Gallegos, Michael J. Condon, Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., Steven L. Tucker, Tucker Law Firm, P.C., Santa Fe, for Appellees.

OPINION

BOSSON, Judge.

¶1 Defendants Texaco Incorporated and Texaco Exploration and Production Incorporated appeal from the judgment entered against them after a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs Doyle and Margaret Hartman d/b/a Doyle Hartman Oil Operator on claims of common law trespass, statutory trespass, and intentional private nuisance. For convenience, we will refer to the Parties in the singular as Texaco and Hartman.

¶2 On appeal, Texaco argues: (1) that the trial court erred in ordering Texaco to produce certain documents during discovery; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of unrelated waterflows and of Texaco's post-accident conduct; (3) that the trial court erred in applying statutory trespass, NMSA 1978, § 30-14-1.1(D) (Repl.Pamp.1994), to this case and entering judgment for a figure that represents double damages; and (4) cumulative error. If the judgment is reversed, Hartman contends he should be allowed to try the issue of punitive damages which he raised in his pleadings and upon which discovery was predicated. See NMRA 1997, 12-201(C). In addition, two motions were filed during the pendency of this appeal that have not yet been resolved. We discuss those motions, along with our disposition of the evidentiary issues, in a separate memorandum opinion.

¶3 We hold that Section 30-14-1.1(D) does not apply to subsurface trespass, and therefore we reverse the imposition of double damages. We affirm the trial court on all other issues. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate the judgment and enter judgment in favor of Hartman in the amount determined by the jury. Because we are not remanding this matter for a new trial, we need not decide whether Hartman should be allowed to try the issue of punitive damages. Additionally, because we affirm the trial court's discovery and trial rulings, we reject Texaco's claim of cumulative error. See State v. Lopez, 105 N.M. 538, 548, 734 P.2d 778, 788 (Ct.App.1986) ("The doctrine of cumulative error has no application if no cumulative errors are committed and defendant has received a fair trial.").

BACKGROUND

¶4 Doyle Hartman is an independent oil and gas operator who drills gas wells in Lea County, New Mexico. In January 1991, Hartman was drilling the Bates No. 2 well on property referred to as the Bates lease, when the drillers hit an uncontrolled, high pressure waterflow at a depth of 2281 feet, which is in the Salado formation. ¹ After several round-the-clock days and several hundreds of thousands of dollars expended, as well as consultations with the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division and his own engineers, Hartman was forced to plug and abandon the well.

¶5 Hartman conducted an investigation into possible reasons for the blowout and came to the conclusion that the blowout was caused by injected water that had escaped from the Rhodes-Yates Unit (RYU), a waterflood operated by Texaco to recover oil from the Yates formation. ² In December 1992, Hartman met with Texaco employees and presented his theories concerning the cause of the blowout. In December 1993, Hartman filed suit against Texaco, alleging common law trespass, statutory trespass, and nuisance.

¶6 During discovery, Texaco resisted production of a number of its internal documents, contending that they were protected by the work product doctrine. Eventually, the trial court ordered most of these documents produced.

¶7 The trial took approximately two weeks. Hartman contended that Texaco injected water into its RYU injection wells at pressures sufficient to create vertical fractures in the Yates formation that extended through the Tansill and up to the Salado, that these high pressure injections went on for long periods of time, and that a substantial volume of the injected water was never recovered, indicating that it had escaped the formation and gone elsewhere--in Hartman's view, to the Bates lease area and into his well. Texaco, on the other hand, contended that it was physically impossible for the pressures it was using to create the vertical fractures necessary for water to escape from the Yates formation through the Tansill formation and into the Salado formation, and it was equally impossible for the water to travel 2 1/2 miles through the Salado formation to the Bates lease. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hartman on common law trespass, statutory trespass, and intentional private nuisance. During post-trial proceedings, the trial court determined that pursuant to Section 30-14-1.1(D), the portion of damages representing the appraised value of the damage to Hartman's property ($2,521,000) should be doubled. Judgment was entered accordingly, and this appeal followed.

STATUTORY DOUBLE DAMAGES DO NOT APPLY TO SUBSURFACE TRESPASS

¶8 Hartman claims he is entitled to double the appraised value of the property destroyed under Section 30-14-1.1(D) because Texaco committed a statutory trespass. Prior to trial, the district court indicated that it would instruct the jury on the statutory trespass claim, but would await post-verdict proceedings to decide whether subsection D applied. On appeal, Texaco argues that Section 30-14-1.1(D) does not apply to subsurface trespass. For the reasons discussed below, we agree.

¶9 Section 30-14-1.1 is entitled "Types of trespass; injury to realty; civil damages." It reads:

A. Any person who enters and remains on the lands of another after having been requested to leave is guilty of a misdemeanor.

B. Any person who enters upon the lands of another when such lands are posted against trespass at every roadway or apparent way of access is guilty of a misdemeanor.

C. Any person who drives a vehicle upon the lands of another except through a roadway or other apparent way of access, when such lands are fenced in any manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

D. In the event any person enters upon the lands of another without prior permission and injures, damages or destroys any part of the realty or its improvements, including buildings, structures, trees, shrubs or other natural features, he shall be liable to the owner, lessee or person in lawful possession for damages in an amount equal to double the amount of the appraised value of the damage of the property injured or destroyed.

¶10 The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to determine the intent of the legislature. Edwards v. Board of County Comm'rs, 119 N.M. 114, 117, 888 P.2d 996, 999 (Ct.App.1994). In making this determination, we look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning unless a different meaning is indicated. Id. We think the language of the statute more likely indicates that the legislature intended Section 30-14-1.1(D) to apply to trespasses on the surface of the land by persons who enter another's land, as opposed to the type of subsurface trespass by a substance that is involved in this case. In its common usage "upon" means "on; upward so as to be on." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 2517 (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1961). Additionally, Section 30-14-1.1(D), by its terms, protects things which are usually found on the surface of the land--buildings, structures, vegetation, or other natural features. While "other natural features" is certainly broad enough to include subsurface trespass, that is not the case if the phrase is read harmoniously with the more limited, specific protections in the same sentence ("buildings, structures, trees, shrubs or other natural features"). Under the rule of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, when the legislature recites specific examples followed by a general phrase, it is a fair presumption that the legislature intended the general language to be focused on the class of specific examples enumerated. In re Melissa H., 105 N.M. 678, 679, 735 P.2d 1184, 1185 (Ct.App.1987); Grafe v. Delgado, 30 N.M. 150, 152, 228 P. 601, 602 (1924).

¶11 When we construe a statute, this Court considers the statute in its entirety. Bustamante v. De Baca, 119 N.M. 739, 742, 895 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct.App.1995). Subsection A of Section 30-14-1.1 deals with persons who enter and remain on land after being asked to leave. Subsection B concerns entry by persons onto lands posted against trespass at every roadway or apparent way of access. Subsection C deals with persons driving on lands of another except on a roadway when the lands are fenced. All of these events one would normally expect to occur on the surface of the land. Subsection D essentially creates a civil remedy for the preceding subsection. Viewing the language of subsection D in context with the rest of the section, Section 30-14-1.1 generally pertains to trespass by persons on the surface of the land, and subsection D provides compensation to landowners when a person enters the land without permission and damages the land or things on, or accessible from, the surface of the land. ³

¶12 We also consider the history and background of Section 30-14-1.1. See Edwards, 119 N.M. at 117, 888 P.2d at 999. Section 30-14-1.1 was originally enacted in 1979. See 1979 N.M.Laws, ch....