1997 -NMCA- 54, City of Albuquerque v. Chavez

Decision Date01 April 1997
Docket NumberNo. 17356,17356
Citation941 P.2d 509,1997 NMCA 54,123 N.M. 428
Parties, 1997 -NMCA- 54 CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Joseph CHAVEZ, Respondent-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico
OPINION

FLORES, Judge.

¶1 Joseph Chavez (Chavez), a corrections officer for the City of Albuquerque (the City), was terminated from his employment. After a hearing, the hearing officer ultimately recommended, and the Personnel Board (the Board) approved, reversal of Chavez's termination. The City appealed to the district court, which found that the hearing officer "was not impartial," and remanded for a new hearing. On interlocutory appeal, we take this opportunity to address when, as a matter of law, a hearing officer should disqualify himself or herself on an issue of bias, and by what standard a court should review that decision for error. We affirm the district court and remand for a fair hearing.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The City terminated Chavez from his position as a corrections officer at the Bernalillo County Detention Center (BCDC) for applying excessive force to a prisoner. In the early morning hours of July 13, 1994, Chavez was recorded on BCDC surveillance video running toward a prisoner from behind, striking the prisoner, and propelling the prisoner's upper body into the wall. At the time of this incident, the prisoner was on the phone with his back to Chavez, and was moving away from Chavez, apparently unaware of his approach. Several other guards became involved in the altercation that ensued. Following the struggle, the video shows Chavez carrying the prone prisoner by the handcuffs, shackled and face down, into a holding cell. In Chavez's report of the incident filed later that same night, he stated that he applied force because the prisoner "advanced toward me in an aggressive manner."

¶3 The director of BCDC terminated Chavez after an independently-contracted internal affairs investigation, and a pre-determination hearing based on Chavez's conduct, his prior record of similar conduct, and the conflict between the video record and Chavez's report of the incident.

¶4 Chavez challenged his termination. Pursuant to the City's Merit System Ordinance (MSO), see Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinances ch. 3, art. I, §§ 3-1-1 to -25 (1978 & Supp.1989), the grievance was set for a hearing before an independent personnel hearing officer (hearing officer). 1 At the beginning of the hearing and in the context of discovery motions, the City moved to disqualify the hearing officer. The City based its motion both on the fact that Chavez's trial attorney, Paul Livingston, immediately prior to a discovery proceeding in the case, served the hearing officer with a "courtesy copy" of a separate lawsuit Livingston had filed against the hearing officer, and on Livingston's continued reference to that suit "throughout that hearing, every time that there was any kind of a real dispute." The City noted that this lawsuit against the hearing officer stemmed from his role as the hearing officer in a similar case, and specifically involved the hearing officer's rulings on discovery motions. The City also noted that the hearing officer (1) expressed concern for the personal financial impact the suit would have on him; (2) asked Livingston to reconsider suing him; and (3) admitted to Livingston that "[q]uite frankly, you intimidate me. I have never been sued before." The hearing officer denied the City's motion, responding "I know I can be objective." The City renewed its motion to disqualify at least three times over the course of the hearing and each time the hearing officer responded that he believed he could be fair.

¶5 After the hearing, the hearing officer presented to the Board a summary of his findings and conclusions, and recommended that the Board reverse the City's decision to terminate and instead reinstate Chavez with a sixty-day suspension. The hearing officer made no reference to the City's repeated motions for his disqualification in his report and recommendation to the Board. Further, the stenographic record of the hearing was not fully transcribed until after the Board had approved the hearing officer's recommendation. Cf. Littlefield v. State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, Motor Vehicle Div., 114 N.M. 390, 395, 839 P.2d 134, 139 (Ct.App.1992) (board that had access to record and concurred with hearing officer's recommendation not required to have reviewed the record in order to meet due process requirements).

¶6 The City appealed to the district court, arguing that the decision to reverse Chavez's termination was arbitrary and capricious, and alternatively, that the hearing officer should have been disqualified for bias. The district court reviewed the entire record, and found that the hearing officer "was not impartial," and remanded for a new hearing before an unbiased hearing officer. The district court then certified the case for interlocutory appeal, and this Court granted Chavez's application for an interlocutory appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

¶7 This case involves two intertwined issues. The first issue relates to the standard of review this Court should apply when reviewing an administrative adjudication for possible bias. The second issue pertains to the question of what constitutes bias to warrant remand for a new hearing. The second issue is complicated by the fact that the tests New Mexico courts have developed to determine when bias in an administrative tribunal is impermissible have been constructed for the purpose of protecting the constitutional right to due process, whereas in this case the City, which has no such constitutional right, seeks protection from bias.

A. Standard of Review

¶8 We review appeals from administrative agency decisions under the same standard as the district court. See Downtown Neighborhoods Ass'n v. City of Albuquerque, 109 N.M. 186, 189, 783 P.2d 962, 965 (Ct.App.1989). Here, the MSO specifies that the Board's decisions are reviewable in the district court:

(a) Where the decision is arbitrary or capricious and is unsupported by substantial evidence; or

(b) Where the decision is in violation of applicable constitutional provisions or is otherwise illegal; or

(c) Where the decision is in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Board.

MSO § 3-1-23(D)(5)(a)-(c).

B. Deference to Administrative Board

¶9 The parties dispute the proper standard of review; specifically, they dispute how much, if any, deference this Court should give to the decision of the Board and hearing officer. Chavez argues that this Court should give deference to the decision of the Board to reverse the City and reinstate Chavez. The City argues that because the issue of bias was not presented to the Board, deference to the Board is misplaced. We agree with the City.

¶10 In this case, the decision under review is the decision of the Board to adopt the hearing officer's recommendation and reinstate Chavez. The record reveals that the Board was never put on notice of the City's allegations of bias. Although the City at numerous times raised the motion to disqualify the hearing officer, the hearing officer made no reference to this issue in his statement of the case, his findings and conclusions, or his recommendation to the Board. The MSO prohibits the Board from considering any information beyond what is submitted by the hearing officer. See MSO § 3-1-23(D)(4)(a). Although the Board had authority to require the hearing officer to submit a complete transcript, see MSO § 3-1-23(D)(3) (hearing officer shall transmit to personnel board at least a summary record of the hearing, findings of fact, and his or her recommendation); MSO § 3-1-23(D)(4)(a)(3) (board may remand matter to hearing officer for further hearing or a more detailed report ), the Board was not required to do so if it followed the hearing officer's recommendation. Compare Littlefield, 114 N.M. at 395, 839 P.2d at 139 (board that had access to record and concurred with hearing officer's recommendation not required to have reviewed the record in order to meet due process), with Board of Educ. v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 106 N.M. 129, 131, 740 P.2d 123, 125 (Ct.App.1987) (fair hearing requires that board review the hearing officer's record before adopting a decision contrary to hearing officer's recommendation because credibility of witnesses key to Board's decision). Here, because the Board had no occasion to consider bias, it makes no sense to defer to the Board when reviewing that issue. Accordingly, our review for bias is conducted without deference to the Board.

C. Was the City Denied a Fair Hearing Because of Hearing Officer Bias?

¶11 The City argues that bias on the part of the hearing officer denied the City a fair hearing. This case differs from the line of cases dealing with allegations of bias in administrative proceedings in New Mexico, because those cases have each involved an aggrieved person alleging denial of a fair hearing by an arm of the state. See, e.g., Santa Fe Exploration Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 114 N.M. 103, 835 P.2d 819 (1992) (oil drillers appealed commission's decision to impose production restrictions based in part on possible commission member bias); Lujan v. New Mexico State Police Bd., 100 N.M. 149, 667 P.2d 456 (1983) (state police employee appealed police board decision upholding his termination based on chairman's possible bias); Reid v. New Mexico Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 92 N.M. 414, 589 P.2d 198 (1979) (optometrist appealed board revocation of his license based on possible board member bias). In these cases, New Mexico courts have used as their analytical starting point the constitutional right to due process. Santa Fe Exploration Co., 114 N.M. at 109, 835...

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