1998 -NMCA- 27, Ortiz v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., Motor Vehicle Div.
Decision Date | 23 January 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 18127,18127 |
Citation | 124 N.M. 677,1998 NMCA 27,954 P.2d 109 |
Parties | , 1998 -NMCA- 27 Christopher A. ORTIZ, Petitioner-Appellee, v. TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
¶1 In this case of first impression, we consider whether a "revolving doors" statute prohibiting former public officers and employees from representing persons for pay before their former government agency employers is constitutional as applied to executive branch employees. On appeal, we are asked to address whether the district court erred in holding that NMSA 1978, Section 10-16-8(C) (1993), of the Governmental Conduct Act, as applied to attorneys, violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because it is an infringement by the legislature upon the judiciary's exclusive province to regulate the practice of law. We hold that the district court erred, and we reverse.
¶2 In January 1996, Christopher Ortiz (Client) retained Lewis Terr (Attorney) to represent him in a driver's license revocation proceeding before the Department of Taxation and Revenue's Motor Vehicle Division (Department). Client's case stemmed from his refusal to take a breath test after being stopped on suspicion of DWI. Attorney was previously employed by the Department as an attorney working primarily on cases involving the Implied Consent Act. Three months after leaving government service, Attorney appeared before the Department to represent Client.
¶3 At the Department hearing, the hearing officer refused to allow Attorney to represent Client because of a perceived violation of Section 10-16-8(C), which prohibits former public officers and employees from representing persons for pay before their former government agency employers for a period of one year after leaving government service. The hearing officer noted that at one time Attorney had served as her supervisor and she was concerned that Attorney was attempting to use his former position to influence the hearing. The hearing officer provided Client with the option of either proceeding pro se or continuing the case to seek another attorney. Client chose to proceed pro se, and the Department issued a decision revoking Client's driver's license for a period of one year.
¶4 On appeal to the district court to review the Department's administrative decision, Attorney argued that Section 10-16-8(C), as applied to attorneys, usurped the judiciary's prerogative to regulate the practice of law. The district court ruled that Section 10-16-8(C) of the Governmental Conduct Act was an unconstitutional intrusion by the legislature into the judicial branch's authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys. The district court therefore overturned the revocation of Client's driver's license.
¶5 A strong presumption of constitutionality surrounds a statute. See State ex rel. Udall v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 120 N.M. 786, 788, 907 P.2d 190, 192 (1995) ( ); Wells v. County of Valencia, 98 N.M. 3, 6, 644 P.2d 517, 520 (1982) ( ); Espanola Hous. Auth. v. Atencio, 90 N.M. 787, 788, 568 P.2d 1233, 1234 (1977) (); Old Abe Co. v. New Mexico Mining Comm'n, 1995-NMCA-180, 121 N.M. 83, 96, 908 P.2d 776, 789. Not only are statutes presumptively valid, but they are normally reviewed under the rational-basis test. Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 693, 763 P.2d 1153, 1158 (1988). Furthermore, a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless we are satisfied that the legislature went outside the constitution in enacting it. Id.; see also Espanola Hous. Auth., 90 N.M. at 788, 568 P.2d at 1234 ( ); City of Farmington v. Fawcett, 114 N.M. 537, 540, 843 P.2d 839, 842 (Ct.App.1992) (). This Court will also not inquire into the wisdom, policy, or justness of a legislative act. Espanola Hous. Auth., 90 N.M. at 788, 568 P.2d at 1234; see also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Revenue Div., 96 N.M. 117, 124, 628 P.2d 687, 694 (Ct.App.1981) ( ).
¶6 The question before us is whether Section 10-16-8(C) violates Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution because it impermissible infringes upon the judiciary's exclusive province to regulate the practice of law. Section 10-16-8(C) states For a period of one year after leaving government service or employment, a former public officer or employee shall not represent for pay a person before the government agency at which the former public officer or employee served or worked.
¶7 Section 10-16-8(C) prevents the "revolving door" of successive government and private employment by prohibiting former governmental employees from representing persons for pay before their former government agency employers for a period of one year after leaving government service. Attorney argues that this type of legislation, as applied to attorneys, violates the separation-of-powers clause by intruding upon the inherent power of the judiciary to regulate the conduct of attorneys. Therefore, Attorney asks us to "read out" former executive branch attorneys from the statute's application. We disagree.
¶8 Other state courts have reviewed challenges to "revolving door" legislation similar to the statute in this case and have concluded that such provisions do not violate separation of powers. See Howard v. State Comm'n on Ethics, 421 So.2d 37, 39 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) ( ); Midboe v. Commission on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 646 So.2d 351, 358-59 (La.1994) ( ); Forti v. New York State Ethics Comm'n, 75 N.Y.2d 596, 555 N.Y.S.2d 235, 243-44, 554 N.E.2d 876, 884-85 (1990) ( ); In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d 664, 675 (R.I.1993) ( ); see generally Rachel E. Boehm, Caught in the Revolving Door: A State Lawyer's Guide to Post-Employment Restrictions, 15 Rev.Litig. 525 (1996).
¶9 Additionally, these courts have applied the rational-basis standard to review the constitutionality of the challenged legislation. Forti, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 241-42, 554 N.E.2d at 882-83; In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 670. The purpose of "revolving door" legislation is to enhance public trust and confidence in our governmental agencies by prohibiting conduct which may permit or appear to permit undue influence or a conflict of interest. See In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 671. Thus, there is a rational basis for "revolving door" legislation such as that involved in this case.
¶10 Nevertheless, Attorney contends that a higher level of scrutiny should attach because Section 10-16-8(C) applies much more strongly to attorneys who primarily earn their living by representing clients for pay. Moreover, Attorney explains, this legislation prevents attorneys from practicing in the area of law in which they have gained an expertise, thus detrimentally limiting their practice. However, the "revolving door" legislation does not single out attorneys for special treatment. Rather, such legislation is aimed at all former employees, whether or not they are attorneys. See Midboe, 646 So.2d at 357 ().
¶11 While the matter is not squarely presented in this case, in that Attorney is a former executive branch employee, we note that statutes such as the one at issue here are typically addressed to executive branch employees. See Forti, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 241-42, 554 N.E.2d at 882-83, 885 ( ); Maunus v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Comm'n, 518 Pa. 592, 544 A.2d 1324, 1326-27 (1988) ( ). In fact, our own statute expressly excludes legislators and judges. See NMSA 1978, § 10-16-2(G) (1993) ( ).
¶12 Furthermore, the New York Court of Appeals in Forti rejected the contention that revolving doors legislation seriously interferes with the ability of attorneys to pursue their professional careers. Forti, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 243, 554 N.E.2d at 884. The court explained:
the new rules do not interfere with the ability of plaintiffs, all of whom are...
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