1998 -NMSC- 41, State v. Munoz
| Decision Date | 17 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 24054,24054 |
| Parties | , 1998 -NMSC- 41 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Manuel MUNOZ, Defendant-Petitioner. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
¶1 Manuel Munoz (Defendant) seeks reversal of his convictions for vehicular homicide and great bodily injury by vehicle. He asserts that a jury instruction patterned on UJI 14-252 NMRA 1998 () shifted the burden of proof from the State's shoulders to his own. He also contends that UJI 14-252 fails to explain adequately to juries the law of intervening causation. We reject Defendant's burden-shifting argument, but we hold that juries should ordinarily be instructed on foreseeability when intervening causation is an issue in a criminal case. In this case, however, failure to instruct the jury on foreseeability was not reversible error because Defendant never contested the issue and because no rational jury could find that the fatal, injury-producing accident in this case was not a foreseeable result of Defendant's actions.
¶2 On the night of May 5, 1995, Defendant's north-bound vehicle collided with a west-bound vehicle at the intersection of Solano Avenue and Griggs Street in Las Cruces, New Mexico. At trial, a witness who had been traveling south on Solano that night testified that a short time before the accident Defendant's car veered into his lane at a high rate of speed. Fortunately, the witness was able to avoid a collision by swerving to the side of the road and Defendant also veered back into his own lane. The witness soon saw police and an ambulance pass by, and he followed those vehicles to the accident scene at Solano and Griggs.
¶3 There, he found that Defendant's Oldsmobile Toronado had smashed into Jason Jiron's Datsun 210, demolishing it. Evidence at trial indicated that Defendant was driving between 64 and 71 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone, that he had lost control of his vehicle as it entered the intersection, and that he did not attempt to slow down prior to impact. Jason was killed by the tremendous force of the crash, which according to one of the attending emergency medical technicians, rammed the "driver's door ... in over the transmission" and left Jason "in the lap of the passenger." Jason's passenger, Joe Shelton, III, suffered a broken shoulder, three broken ribs, a broken pelvis, and serious internal injuries, including traumatic brain injury.
¶4 Upon their arrival at the scene of the accident, several police officers noticed an odor of alcohol emanating from Defendant. One officer administered a number of standard field sobriety tests, all of which Defendant failed. When Defendant's blood was drawn approximately an hour after the accident, his blood-alcohol concentration was 0.17, more than twice the legal limit of 0.08. See NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102(C) ().
¶5 Defendant argued at trial that Jason had run the stop sign at the intersection and that Defendant therefore bore no criminal responsibility for Jason's death or his passenger's injuries. Conflicting evidence was presented by Defendant and the State as to whether Jason had run the stop sign. The issue of Defendant's guilt was submitted to the jury.
¶6 The jury was instructed on the elements of vehicular homicide in the following manner:
For you to find the defendant guilty of causing death by vehicle as charged in Count I[,] the [S]tate must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:
1. The defendant operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or in a reckless manner;
2. The defendant thereby caused the death of Jason Jiron;
3. This happened in New Mexico, on or about May 5, 1995.
See UJI 14-240 NMRA 1998 (Instruction No. 2). The jury was similarly instructed on the elements of great bodily injury by vehicle. Id. () (Instruction No. 3). On the element of causation, there were two further instructions. The first one, Instruction No. 6, instructed the jury that the State was required to prove that Defendant caused Jason's death, defining causation as follows:
For you to find the defendant guilty of causing death by vehicle, as charged in Count I, the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of the defendant caused the death of Jason Jiron.
The cause of a death is an act which, in a natural and continuous chain of events, produces the death and without which the death would not have occurred.
There may be more than one cause of death. If the acts of two or more persons contributes to cause death, each such act is a cause of death.
See UJI 14-251 NMRA 1998. The second supplemental instruction on causation, Instruction No. 7, instructed the jury on Defendant's theory of intervening causation; it read:
Negligence of the deceased, or some other person, which may have contributed to the cause of death does not relieve the defendant of responsibility for an act which also contributed to the cause of the death. However, if you find that negligence of the deceased, or some other person, was the only cause of death, then the defendant is relieved of all responsibility for the death of the deceased.
See UJI 14-252. 1
¶7 The jury found Defendant guilty of vehicular homicide and great bodily injury by vehicle. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, asserting several points of error. The Court of Appeals affirmed by memorandum opinion, and we granted Defendant's request for certiorari to consider whether Instruction No. 7 shifted the burden of proof to Defendant to prove his innocence and whether Instruction No. 7 adequately instructed the jury on the concept of intervening causation. We affirm Defendant's convictions.
¶8 "The propriety of jury instructions given or denied is a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, p 49, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996. "Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo." Id.
¶9 "In a criminal prosecution the State has the burden of proving each element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Chouinard, 96 N.M. 658, 660, 634 P.2d 680, 682 (1981). Defendant argues that Instruction No. 7 effectively lodged the burden of proof on his shoulders by obliging him to prove, as a prerequisite for acquittal, that the victim was the sole cause of the accident. In making this argument, Defendant focuses narrowly on the phrase "if you find" in the second sentence of Instruction No. 7, which reads, "However, if you find that negligence of the deceased, or some other person, was the only cause of death, then the defendant is relieved of all responsibility for the death of the deceased." (Emphasis added.) See UJI 14-252.
¶10 A California court has addressed this argument. See People v. Welborn, 242 Cal.App.2d 668, 51 Cal.Rptr. 644, 649 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1966). The court there summarized the issue succinctly: "It is contended the instruction given by inclusion of the phrase 'if you find' seemed to tell the jury that there was some obligation on the part of the defense to establish innocence." Id. The court rejected this argument, holding that the bare phrase "if you find" provided no basis for inferring that the defendant bore the burden of proof. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the trial judge had "clearly and unequivocally" instructed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proof and that the defendant was presumed innocent. Id. We reach the same conclusion here.
¶11 Here, as indicated above, Instruction No. 2 advised the jury that in order to convict Defendant of vehicular homicide, "the [S]tate must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt" each of the elements of the crime. (Emphasis added.) See UJI 14-240. Additionally, Instruction No. 5 provided that, for the jury to find Defendant guilty of vehicular homicide, "the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted intentionally when he committed the crime[ ]." (Emphasis added.) See UJI 14-141 NMRA 1998. Moreover, as set forth above, Instruction No. 6 explicitly specified for the jury that "the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of the defendant caused the death of Jason Jiron." (Emphasis added.) See UJI 14-251. Finally, Instruction No. 11 admonished the jury that "[t]he law presumes the defendant to be innocent unless and until you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt" and further reiterated that "[t]he burden is always on the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis added.) See UJI 14-5060 NMRA 1998.
¶12 " '[I]nstructions must be considered as a whole, and not singly ....' " State v. Parish, 118 N.M. 39, 41, 878 P.2d 988, 990 (1994) (quoting State v. Crosby, 26 N.M. 318, 324, 191 P. 1079, 1081 (1920)). Reading the instructions as a whole, we hold-as did the Court of Appeals--that a reasonable juror would not have been confused as to whether the State or Defendant bore the burden of proof on the issue of whether Defendant committed vehicular homicide. See id. at 42, 878 P.2d at 991 (). Instruction Nos. 2, 5, 6, and 11 were clear and unequivocal that the burden of proof rested on the State.
¶13 While acknowledging that Instruction Nos. 2, 5, 6, and 11 correctly placed the burden of proof on the State, Defendant contends that Instruction No. 7 commanded the jury "to acquit if (and only...
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