Woodruff v. Hemingway.
| Decision Date | 06 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 18512.,18512. |
| Citation | 297 Conn. 317,2 A.3d 857 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Michael J. WOODRUFF v. Tasha HEMINGWAY. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident caused by the defendant's alleged negligence, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the court, Agati, J., granted the motion to intervene as a party plaintiff filed by the Carmen Anthony Restaurant Group; thereafter the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the action and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed.
David Compagnone, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Ronald D. Williams, Jr., Trumbull, for the appellee (defendant).
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js. *
This appeal arises from a negligence action brought by the plaintiff, Michael J. Woodruff, 1 against the sole defendant, Tasha Hemingway, resulting from an automobile accident in which the defendant, a state employee, caused the vehicle that she was driving to collide with the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. The plaintiff now appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of the defendant. 2 The trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant because, at the time of the accident, she was protected by the grant of qualified immunity to state employees found in General Statutes § 4-165. 3 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because: (1) General Statutes § 27-70, 4 when read in conjunction with General Statutes § 4-142(2), 5 permits actions against armed forces personnel; (2) General Statutes § 52-556 6 exempts the defendant from immunity; and (3) the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act; 50 U.S.C.App. § 501 et seq. (act); 7 prevented the plaintiff from litigating his claim while the defendant was engaged in active military service. We disagree, and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On December 13, 2006, the plaintiff and the defendant were involved in a motor vehicle accident when the front of the defendant's vehicle collided with the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought the action underlying this appeal, alleging that the accident had been caused by the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff named only the defendant in his complaint; he did not name or serve process on the state.
The defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss with an accompanying affidavit, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because she was immune from suit. The defendant claimed that, at the time of the accident, she was employed by the Connecticut National Guard and was performing one of her job duties, namely, returning a vehicle to the home station, and thus she was acting in her capacity as a state employee. She therefore asserted that she was entitled to the qualified immunity afforded to state employees pursuant to § 4-165. See footnote 3 of this opinion. The plaintiff responded that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction because: (1) armed forces personnel are liable for damages caused in the line of duty; (2) actions against state employees for automobile accidents are expressly authorized; (3) actions against a state employee are treated as actions against the state itself; and (4) the act barred the plaintiff from litigating his claims.
The trial court granted the motion to strike, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action because “§ 4-165 affords statutory immunity to the defendant, who, the plaintiff concede[d], was acting within the scope of her employment with the state at the time of the collision.” The trial court rejected the plaintiff's claim that armed forces personnel are liable for damages pursuant to General Statutes §§ 27-70 and 4-142(2); see footnotes 4 and 5 of this opinion; reasoning that “there is nothing within the language of these statutes negating the statutory immunity afforded to a state employee under ... § 4-165.” The trial court additionally rejected the plaintiff's claim that actions against a state employee for automobile accidents are authorized by § 52-556. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
The trial court relied on the express language of the statute, which permits actions against the state for automobile accidents caused by state employees. See General Statutes § 52-556. Because the trial court found that the state had not been made a party to the action, and there was not any authority permitting a trial court to treat an action against an employee as one against the state, it determined that the plaintiff's reliance on § 52-556 was misplaced. The trial court finally concluded that the plaintiff's reliance on the act was improper. The court, quoting Esposito v. Schille, 131 Conn. 449, 452, 40 A.2d 745 (1944), reasoned that the stay of proceedings permitted by the act while a litigant is engaged in active military service must be “construed to protect those who have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) As a result, the trial court determined that “[i]t is the interests of the defendant, not the plaintiff, that are to be protected under [the act].” This appeal followed. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that § 4-165 afforded the defendant immunity and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claim.
Our examination of the record on appeal and the briefs and arguments of the parties persuades us that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Because the trial court's memorandum of decision fully addresses the arguments raised in the present appeal, we adopt its concise and well...
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