Beard v. Dansty

• Decision Date: 15 January 1887
• Citation: 2 S.W. 701
• Parties: BEARD <I>v.</I> DANSTY.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2 S.W. 701

BEARDv.

DANSTY.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

January 15, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Drew county.

Action of ejectment. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

McCain & Crawford, for appellant.

SMITH, J.

In this ejectment the defendant does not controvert the plaintiff's title, but seeks to recover the value of his improvements, and the taxes he has paid. He pleaded that he had entered upon the land in the year 1868 under a deed with covenants of general warranty, and which purported to convey an estate in fee-simple; that the land was then in a wild and unimproved state, and he had in good faith, believing that his title was perfect, and his right to the possession indisputable, peaceably made improvements to the value of $2,000, and had paid the annual taxes, amounting to $150. To the paragraph of his answer setting up this partial defense a general demurrer was sustained. In his deposition, taken before the trial, the defendant testified as to the nature, extent, and value of his improvements. This portion of his deposition was suppressed. At the trial the defendant offered, but was not permitted to read, his deed, for the purpose of showing that he went into possession under color of title. Against defendant's objection, the court gave this instruction: "The jury is instructed that the plaintiff is entitled to the rents and profits of the land in cultivation, as shown by the testimony, from the time that the defendant commenced cultivating it up to the present time." And the court refused to give the following instruction requested by defendant: "If the land was wild and unimproved when defendant entered, the jury should not allow the rent value of the land as increased by the improvement."

By these several rulings (exceptions to which were properly saved) the circuit court affirmed that the betterments act of March 8, 1883, (Mansf. Dig. § 2644 et seq.) did not affect the rights of the parties, and ought not to influence the result. The court may have been led to this conclusion by the fact that the plaintiff's title was of record when the defendant purchased the land from another party, or from the fact that the improvements were made, and the present action had been brought, before the passage of the act, or from the fact that the plaintiff was an infant at the time the improvements were in progress. But the constructive notice of an adverse title which the law implies from the registry of a deed is not sufficient to preclude the occupant from recovering for improvements, if he, in fact, purchased in good faith, and under the supposition that he was obtaining a good title in fee. Actual notice is the test; that is, either knowledge of an outstanding paramount title, or of some circumstance from which the court or jury may fairly infer that he had cause to suspect the invalidity of his own title. Now, the mere fact that the defect in the title would have been disclosed upon an examination of the public records does not bring such knowledge home to him;...