Hill v. Wright
| Citation | 128 Conn. 12,20 A.2d 388 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Decision Date | 08 May 1941 |
| Parties | HILL v. WRIGHT et al. |
Error from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Kenneth Wynne, Judge.
Action by Nicholas S. Hill, 3rd, against Florence A. H. Wright, executrix and trustee under the will of Nicholas S. Hill, Jr., and others for a declaratory judgment construing the will. From a judgment for defendants on plaintiff's failure to plead further after a demurrer to the complaint was sustained, plaintiff appeals.
Error, and case remanded.
Argued before MALTBIE, C. J., and AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS, JJ.
Sheldon B. Smith, of Norwalk, for appellant.
Farwell Knapp, of Bridgeport, for appellees.
The plaintiff brought this action for a declaratory judgment to determine his rights in the estate of Nicholas S. Hill, Jr. The complaint, in so far as necessary for our present decision, contained in effect the following allegations: The testator left a widow, a son, who is the plaintiff, a daughter and four grandchildren, one the son of the plaintiff and three the children of the daughter. All the grandchildren are minors, the oldest being about nineteen years of age. All of these persons are alive. In the fourth article of the will, the testator created a trust fund of $50,000, the income to be paid to his widow during her life and upon her death the principal to become a part of the trust fund established for the benefit of his grandchildren in the thirteenth article; in the twelfth article he provided that the residue of his estate should constitute a trust fund, the income of which should be paid to his widow during her life; and in the thirteenth article he provided that after her death the principal of the trust fund should be divided into equal shares per capita, and not per stirpes, for the benefit of his grandchildren, the income to be paid to his daughter to be used in equal shares for the benefit of the grandchildren as she might in her judgment deem proper, that when the youngest of his grandchildren then living reached the age of twenty-five years, the principal of the trust fund should be paid to them in equal proportion, and that in the event that any of his grandchildren had died before that time, leaving lawful issue, the share of the trust fund which would have gone to that grandchild if living, should be paid to his lawful issue. The executors and trustees have proceeded with the administration of the estate upon the basis that the trusts created by the testator were valid. The plaintiff claimed in the first count of the complaint that all the trusts, including those for the benefit of the widow, were invalid, and, in a second count, that if this were not so, the trusts for the grandchildren and their issue to come into effect upon her death were invalid. A demurrer to the complaint was filed upon the grounds that in so far as it purported to state a cause of action based upon the invalidity of the trusts for the widow, it did not appear from the allegations of the complaint that they are invalid or that their validity could not be sustained even if the remainder interests or some of them are invalid, and in so far as the complaint purported to state a cause of action based on the invalidity of the trusts to come into effect at her death, it appeared from the complaint that the action was prematurely brought; and the demurrer was also addressed to the relief sought in so far as it pertained to the validity of these provisions upon the same grounds. The trial court sustained the demurrer substantially upon the ground that the remedial objectives of the declaratory judgment act do not include such a construction of a will as that here sought, and that as regards future interests the question should not be decided until a situation arises which would bring them into effect. From a judgment for the defendants entered upon the failure of the plaintiff to plead over, the latter has appealed.
The demurrer to that portion of the complaint in which the plaintiff sought a declaration that all the trusts, including those for the widow, were invalid, was not based upon the ground that the action was prematurely brought, but the claim was that the trusts for the widow were, as matter of law, valid. The object of an action for a declaratory judgment is to secure an adjudication of rights which are uncertain or in dispute, and the complaint need only allege that there is such uncertainty or dispute and the facts necessary for the determining of the question. If rights are so clear that there is no uncertainty or dispute as to them, a demurrer upon that ground would lie. But where the complaint in such an action does not seek affirmative relief, a demurrer cannot properly be addressed to it on the ground that the facts alleged would not legally support a judgment sustaining the claim of the plaintiff, because he does not claim direct relief, but only a declaration of his rights. Such a declaration can be made only in the final judgment rendered in the action. The demurrer in this case was upon the ground that the trust provisions were valid and this could not be determined upon such a pleading. The first ground stated in it was insufficient.
We add, however, that if the trust provided in the fourth article is invalid, the fund would fall into the residue, and if the disposition of the residue was invalid the property would become intestate. Daboll v. Daboll, 101 Conn. 142, 146, 125 A. 253; Shannon v. Eno, 120 Conn. 77, 97, 179 A. 479. The plaintiff, as one of the testator's heirs, is, if that is so, presently entitled to his share of the property. He certainly would be entitled to enforce that right in some form of action, and none affords a simpler or more direct method of having the question determined than does an action for a declaratory judgment. Lloyd v. Weir, 116 Conn. 201, 204, 164 A. 386. It is true that the plaintiff's claim with reference to the trusts for the widow is not that they are in themselves invalid, but that they are so indissolubly linked with the trusts to go into effect at...
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