Odom v. Langston

• Decision Date: 10 November 1947
• Docket Number: 40207
• Citation: 205 S.W.2d 518,356 Mo. 1140
• Parties: A. D. Odom, Ella King, Walter L. Odom, Charles Peel, Mrs. Neva Groves, nee Neva Thompson, Ollie Fogelman, Jess L. Odom, Ruby Williams, Mrs. Linnie Owens, Roy Odom, and Joyce Odom, Appellants, v. Louise W. Langston, Trustee: St. Louis Trust Company, a Corporation, Trustee; Louise W. Langston and St. Louis Union Trust Company, a Corporation Executors of the Estate of Barsha A. Langston, Deceased; Louise W. Langston as an Individual
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

205 S.W.2d 518

356 Mo. 1140

A. D. Odom, Ella King, Walter L. Odom, Charles Peel, Mrs. Neva Groves, nee Neva Thompson, Ollie Fogelman, Jess L. Odom, Ruby Williams, Mrs. Linnie Owens, Roy Odom, and Joyce Odom, Appellants, v. Louise W. Langston, Trustee: St. Louis Trust Company, a Corporation, Trustee; Louise W. Langston and St. Louis Union Trust Company, a Corporation Executors of the Estate of Barsha A. Langston, Deceased; Louise W. Langston as an Individual

No. 40207

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 10, 1947

Appeal from Howell Circuit Court; Hon. Gordon Dorris Judge.

Affirmed.

J N. Burroughs for appellants.

(1) The former case lacked every one of the essential elements of a former adjudication, to-wit: (a) The parties were not the same; (b) the causes of action were not the same; (c) the thing involved was not the same; and, (d) the quality of the persons was not the same, and the appellants cited authorities holding that in event any one of the four essentials above mentioned was lacking then there would be no former adjudication, to-wit: Stephens v. Moore, 249 S.W. 601; O'Malley v. Musick, 177 S.W. 749; Taylor v. Welch, 168 Mo.App. 223, 153 S.W. l.c. 494; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. American Surety Co., 236 S.W 657. (2) The judge who wrote the decision in the will case wrongfully held that there was no statute that suspended the running of the five-year Statute of Limitations against the right of interested parties, to bring a suit to construe a will. Secs. 538, 540, R.S. 1939; Tapley v. McPike, 50 Mo. 589; Hughes v. Burris, 85 Mo. 660. (3) The judge who decided the trust case, failed and refused to make application of the "Declaratory Judgment Act," being sections 1126 to 1140, inclusive, of R.S. 1939, which was a special act of the state legislature for the protection of the property rights and interests of all citizens, and also failed and refused to make application of the court decisions construing said "Declaratory Judgment Act," to the case then at bar. Kingston v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 154 S.W.2d 39; Smith v. Pettis County, 136 S.W.2d 282; School District v. Smith, 11 S.W.2d 167; Hill v. Wright, 20 A.2d 388. (4) The judge in writing the decision in the trust case, wrongfully and against all rules of law, held that the petition of appellants involved the trust instrument alone for the claimed reason, that the prayer did not ask that the residuary clause of the will be declared invalid, that it sought relief against the trust instrument alone. It is the rule that relief will be granted upon the facts stated in the petition and not on the prayer. Gunnell v. Emerson, 80 Mo.App. 322; Liese v. Myer, 145 Mo. 547; Lackawana Ry. v. Long, 231 Mo. 605. (5) Before a plea of former adjudication can be invoked, there must be an adjudication on the merits and the merits were in no way involved in the will case and it is a wrongful usurpation for a judge to go outside the case he has in hand for a pretext to find against a party. State ex rel. McManus v. Muench, 217 Mo. 124; Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 254 S.W. 266; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. American Surety Co., 236 S.W. 657. (6) The judge who decided the will case ignored the following decisions. Kingston v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 154 S.W.2d 39; Proctor v. Board of Trustees, 123 S.W. 862; Hill v. Wright, 20 A.2d 388; Masterson v. Masterson, 130 S.W.2d 629. (7) The Supreme Court had no right to construe the provisions of the will and trust instrument, for the reason that such power and jurisdiction was vested in the trial court alone. Kingston v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 154 S.W.2d 39; Smith v. Pettis County, 136 S.W.2d 232; School District v. Smith, 111 S.W.2d 167; Hill v. Wright, 20 A.2d 388. (8) By reason of the claim that said Board of Trustees did not constitute a legal entity, the attempted gift was to no one, and was therefore void. There must be a beneficiary, which must be a person or legal entity. 65 C.J., pp. 233-234 and footnotes; Hajek v. Bohemian Society, 66 Mo. 568; Railroad v. Express Co., 145 Mo.App. 371. (9) A gift of personal estate to a religious corporation did not come within the inhibition of Section 8, Article II of the Missouri Constitution. Proctor v. Board of Trustees, 225 Mo. 51; M.E. Church v. Walters, 50 F.2d 417. (10) An unincorporated religious association is not a legal entity and has no capacity to hold title, legal or equitable, to property. Farm & Home Assn. v. Armstrong, 85 S.W.2d 461; Tucker v. Diocese, 264 S.W. 897; North St. Louis Christian Church v. McGowan, 2 Mo. 279. (11) The attempted gift for a "Memorial" was invalid. Board of Trustees v. May, 201 Mo. 360; Buchanan v. Kennard, 136 S.W. 415; Wentura v. Kinnerk, 5 S.W.2d 66; Schmuckers Estate v. Reed, 61 Mo. 592; Jones v. Patterson, 195 S.W. 1004; M.E. Church v. Walters, 50 F.2d l.c. 417; Bergen v. First Trust Co., 103 F. 260; Wheeler v. Smith, 50 U.S. 55. (12) The trial court erred in overruling the petition of appellants to transfer the cause and especially the injunction proceedings to the Federal Court. (13) The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the decisions of the Supreme Court in the trust case, No. 39,690, 355 Mo. 115, 195 S.W.2d 466, and in the will case, No. 39,583, 355 Mo. 109, 195 S.W.2d 463. Kansas City Pump Co. v. Jones, 126 Mo.App. 536; Engler v. Knoblaugh, 131 Mo.App. 481; Raney v. Home Ins. Co., 213 Mo.App. 1, 246 S.W. 57. (14) The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the purported judgment of the Circuit Court of Polk County over the objections of appellants. State ex rel. v. Muench, 217 Mo. 124; Davidson v. Real Estate Co., 226 Mo. 1. (15) It is settled law that fraud employed in procuring a judgment, renders it nonenforceable, and does not bar another action on the same matters. Mayberry v. McClurg, 51 Mo. 256; Moody v. Peyton, 135 Mo. 482; Davidson v. Real Estate Co., 226 Mo. 1; Wonderly v. Lafayette County, 150 Mo. 635. (16) A judgment on a demurrer does not bar another action between the same parties on the same cause of action. Wilson & Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 254 S.W. 266, 300 Mo. 1; State ex rel. McCanus v. Muench, 217 Mo. 124; Swing v. Karges, 150 Mo.App. 574. (17) A judgment sustaining a demurrer to a demurrable petition cannot be successfully pleaded in bar to a subsequent action on a complaint that is perfect. Bennett v. Southern Bank, 61 Mo.App. 297; Davis v. Robinson, 126 Mo.App. 293; Dorman v. Hall, 124 Mo.App. 5. (18) Motion to dismiss stands same as demurrer. Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo. 26. (19) To grant an injunction order restraining and enjoining the appellants from prosecuting their original action against the respondents, would be to deprive them of their property without the due processes of law, and would be to deny them the equal protection of their property rights and interests under the law, in violation of their constitutional rights under Section 1 of the Amendment 14, of the Constitution of the United States. (20) To permit the decision in the trust case to stand would deprive the appellants of their property without the due processes of the law, and would also deny to them the equal protection of their property rights and interests under the laws enacted as special statutes for protection of all citizens and thereby violate their constitutional rights under Section 1 of Amendment 14 to the Constitution of the United States. (21) To permit the decision in the will case to stand, would deprive the appellants of their property without the due processes of the law, and would deny to them the equal protection of their property rights and interests under the laws. (22) That the arbitrary, unwarranted and wrongful refusal of the Supreme Court and the judges thereof, whose duty it was to pass upon the same, to permit the appellants to file their motion for a rehearing on the decisions in the trust and the will cases, or to transfer the same to the court en banc; and in overruling the application of appellants for leave to file said motions will deprive the appellants of their property without the due processes of the law, and it will also have the effect of denying to appellants the equal protection of their property rights, under the laws, in violation of their constitutional rights, as provided in Section 1 of Amendment 14 to the Constitution of the United States. (23) The judges were disqualified. Sec. 1059, R.S. 1939; Priddy v. McKenzie, 205 Mo. 181, 103 S.W. 968; Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 329. (24) A judgment obtained through fraudulent conduct or of self interest of the judge who renders the judgment will be declared invalid and of no effect; so held in the following cases: Burkharth v. Stephens, 117 Mo.App. 425, 94 S.W. 720; State ex rel. Schade v. Russell, 110 S.W. l.c. 677; State ex rel. Morehead v. Cartwright, 99 S.W. 48; State ex rel. Kochtiteky v. Herbst, 160 Mo.App. 443, 140 S.W. 925; State ex rel. Baldwin v. Davidson, 139 Mo. 118, 40 S.W. 765; State ex rel. Heller v. Thornhill, 160 S.W. 558; State ex rel. Verble v. Haupt, 163 S.W. l.c. 534; Wonderly v. Lafayette County, 150 Mo. 635.

A. W. Landis, R. L. Hyder, Arch A. Johnson, Herman Pufahl, Elliott H. Jones and A. D. Scarritt for respondents.

(1) The issues asserted by plaintiffs in the present suit are res judicata and may not again be litigated. McIntosh v Wiggins, 191 S.W.2d 736; Norwood v. Norwood, 183 S.W.2d 118. (2) The judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of Polk County operated as an adjudication upon the merits and became a bar to another suit. Civil Code, Sec. 101, Laws 1943, p. 385; Pulley v. Ry. Co., 251 P. 1100, 122 Kan. 269. (3) The trial court had power, as a court of equity, to grant an injunction to prevent vexatious relitigation of matters which had been adjudicated. McIntosh v. Wiggins, 191 S.W.2d 637; Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130...