Winegar v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.

• Decision Date: 13 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-2585,93-2585
• Parties: 90 Ed. Law Rep. 580, 9 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 527 Larry WINEGAR, Appellant, v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, sued as "Des Moines Independent School District"; Thomas Stokes; Gary Wegenke; Jerry Stillwell; Barbara Prior, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 895

20 F.3d 895

90 Ed. Law Rep. 580, 9 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 527

Larry WINEGAR, Appellant, v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, sued as "Des Moines Independent School District"; Thomas Stokes; Gary Wegenke; Jerry Stillwell Barbara Prior, Appellees.

No. 93-2585.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 12, 1994.

Decided April 5, 1994.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied June

13, 1994. ^*

Alfredo Parrish, Des Moines, IA, argued (T. Rae Hammans, on the brief), for appellant.

Thomas W. Foley, Des Moines, IA, argued (Edward W. Remsburg, on the brief), for appellees.

Before BEAM, Circuit Judge, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, and STROM, ^** District Judge.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Larry Winegar appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Des Moines Independent Community School District (School District) in his action for deprivation of procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

The evidence establishes that Winegar had been an industrial arts teacher at East High School in Des Moines for nineteen years. He had an unblemished record. On October 3, 1991, he became involved in an altercation with a student. The School District concedes that, whether intentionally, or as horseplay which got out-of-hand, the student hit Winegar in the chest, causing Winegar to fall backward and hit his head. Winegar then, by his own admission and allegedly in self-defense, kicked the student, aiming at his rear, but the student turned and the kick landed in the groin or upper thigh. Winegar then slapped the student across the face.

Winegar and several student witnesses later reported the incident to the vice principal. Winegar was instructed to submit a written statement. Later that same day, Winegar spoke with the principal, Jerry Stillwell. During that discussion, Winegar was allowed to present his version of the incident. Stillwell prepared a written report and placed Winegar on paid suspension. (Winegar remained on paid suspension until December 3, 1991.)

The School District then implemented a Level I investigation of physical abuse, pursuant to district policy. Principal Stillwell referred the matter to Shirley Leonard, a School District employee and a "designated investigator" under Iowa Department of Education regulations. As part of her investigation, Leonard reviewed Stillwell's report, Winegar's written statement, the written statements of the student involved in the altercation, and statements of the student witnesses. She also interviewed the student involved, his father, and Winegar. Based on her review, she concluded that it was likely that an incident of physical abuse had occurred and referred the matter for further investigation.

The School District then retained William Pearce, a private investigator, to conduct a Level II investigation. He reviewed the Level I investigation materials and interviewed the student involved in the altercation, the student's mother, Winegar, and Winegar's wife. Pearce concluded that Winegar had physically abused the student and that the abuse was not justified.

Principal Stillwell and two other School District administrators, Dr. Barbara Prior and Mr. Thomas Stokes, reviewed the reports and supporting documentation and met with Winegar on November 20, 1991. ¹ Winegar was again allowed to present his version of the incident. Stillwell and the School District's attorney later interviewed the student involved and several student witnesses. After several telephone conversations, Prior, Stokes, and Stillwell decided to suspend Winegar without pay for three days. They informed Winegar by letter. Winegar was actually suspended for four days from December 3 through 6, 1991. Further, as a result of the incident, he was transferred to another school "until a suitable industrial technology position becomes vacant at a school other than East High School." Appellant's Appendix at 25.

Winegar sought administrative review and was allowed to meet with Dr. Gary Wegenke, the superintendent. Wegenke upheld the committee's finding. Winegar then asked for a hearing before the school board and the School District refused.

Winegar filed this action in the district court alleging deprivation of property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. He also alleged injury to his reputation. The district court granted the School District's motion for summary judgment, finding that Winegar's four-day suspension without pay entitled him to procedural due process protection but that the opportunity to relay his version of events afforded him all the process he was due.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. United States ex rel. Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992). The question before the district court, and this court on appeal, is whether the record, when viewed in light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

A government employee is entitled to procedural due process only when he has been deprived of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. ² See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705-06, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). An employee's liberty interests are implicated where the employer levels accusations at the employee that are so damaging as to make it difficult or impossible for the employee to escape the stigma of those charges. Shands v. Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1347 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 880, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1994). The requisite stigma has generally been found when an employer has accused an employee of dishonesty, immorality, criminality, racism, and the like. See id. (and cases cited therein). We find that allegations of unjustified child abuse are sufficiently stigmatizing to a teacher's reputation, honor, and good name in the community to implicate liberty interests. ³

A person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her employment to have a property interest in it. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. The existence of a property interest must be determined with reference to state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). Typically, this interest arises from contractual or statutory limitations on the employer's ability to terminate an employee. Id. A property interest in employment can also be created by implied contract, arising out of customs, practices, and de facto policies. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699, 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). When such a property interest exists, the employee is entitled to a hearing or some related form of due process before being deprived of the interest. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Here, the parties agree that Winegar has a protected property interest in his employment by virtue of his continuing contract under Iowa Code Ann. Secs. 279.13-.19 (West 1988). ⁴

Having decided that Winegar has property and liberty interests we must thus decide what process is due Winegar. ⁵ The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Due process is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127, 110 S.Ct. 975, 984, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). To determine what process is due in any particular case, we must weigh:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903).

Applying the principles of Mathews to the present case, we first find that Winegar's interest is weighty on the scales of Mathews. Winegar has a nineteen-year history as an industrial arts teacher and a clean record in that capacity. The deprivations at issue here are significant. This case involves more than a mere suspension. ⁶ As noted above, Winegar has been deprived of liberty interests. He has also been transferred to another school. The transfer, which might not implicate due process interests if executed for ordinary business or administrative reasons, must also enter into the calculus here. ⁷ See, e.g., Wilson v. Walker, 777 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir.1985) (no protected property interest in a pilot's assignment to flight duty absent statute, regulation or other source that would establish a claim of entitlement to it). An employee can have a protected property interest in a benefit, such as a particular assignment or duty station, if he legitimately expects to continue in that assignment or duty station. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709; Perry, 408 U.S. at 601, 92 S.Ct. at 2699. Here, the School District has not suggested that Winegar would have been transferred if the incident had not occurred. He had an impeccable record at East High and legitimately expected to stay there. Under the circumstances, Winegar has demonstrated a weighty private interest in retention of his job, his assignment, and his good name that are adversely affected by the School District's official actions of suspension and punitive transfer.

Second, we must assess the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. This involves...