Bank of America v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 27 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | F009097 and F009098,Nos. F009088,s. F009088 |
| Citation | 246 Cal.Rptr. 521,200 Cal.App.3d 1000 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST & SAVINGS ASSOCIATION et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Stanislaus County, Respondent; Jack A. ULRICH, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, etc., Real Party in Interest. UNION BANK, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Stanislaus County, Respondent; Jack A. ULRICH, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, etc., Real Party in Interest. TRANSBAY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Stanislaus County, Respondent; Jack A. ULRICH, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, etc., Real Party in Interest. |
Petitioners seek a writ of prohibition and/or mandamus directing the Stanislaus County Superior Court sitting as a coordination trial court to vacate its order specially setting the case for trial and to dismiss the action for failure to bring it to trial within five years as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 583.360. 1 Real party in interest claims the statutory five-year period for bringing the action to trial was extended for two hundred twenty-five days by (1) an order staying depositions in another action filed in El Dorado County which was later coordinated with this case and (2) by an automatic stay of the proceedings under the California Rules of Court 2 governing the coordination of civil actions filed in different courts. (Rule 1501 et seq.)
The basic issue in this case is whether the statutory five-year rule for bringing civil actions to trial applies to coordinated actions, and, if so, whether the statutory time was tolled or otherwise extended by law so that the coordination trial judge had the authority to set the case for trial beyond the five-year period.
We conclude the statutory five-year period applies to coordinated actions. We also conclude the five-year period was not tolled or otherwise extended to give the coordination trial judge the authority to set the case for trial.
A writ of mandate should issue.
The chronology of events is as follows:
August 12, 1980 Rolland and Daisy Smith filed a petition in bankruptcy, and Jack Ulrich was appointed trustee for the bankruptcy estate.
November 13, 1981 Smiths filed an action in El Dorado County for breach of fiduciary duty against petitioners, Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association and David Kobriger (B of A), Union Bank (Union), Transbay Management Corporation (Transbay) and others.
February 11, 1982 Smiths filed a similar action in Stanislaus County.
July 1982 Stanislaus County action amended to substitute Jack A. Ulrich, trustee in bankruptcy, as plaintiff rather than Rolland and Daisy Smith.
August 12, 1983 Transbay and B of A filed a motion in the El Dorado County Superior Court to stay further proceedings in that action for 30 days to allow commencement of a coordination proceeding pursuant to rule 1520(b). The motion was made because plaintiff had noticed the depositions of certain Transbay personnel in the El Dorado case without noticing counsel in the Stanislaus case, and petitioners feared the depositions would have to be repeated in the Stanislaus County action. On August 18, 1983, the El Dorado court granted the stay as follows: (Emphasis added)
September 12, 1983 Counsel for defendant American Heritage Home Loans, Inc., filed a petition for coordination of the El Dorado and Stanislaus County actions with the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. Notice of the petition was filed with the clerks of the El Dorado and Stanislaus Superior Courts.
October 12, 1983 Stanislaus County Superior Court Judge Cantwell was assigned as coordination motion judge.
March 12, 1984 Judge Cantwell granted the coordination motion.
March 30, 1984 Stanislaus County Superior Court Judge Azevedo assigned as coordination trial judge.
June 27, 1986 Judge Azevedo granted petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings in the El Dorado action on the ground that Rolland and Daisy Smith lacked standing to sue by virtue of the bankruptcy action and entered judgment accordingly.
October 21, 1986 Real party in interest filed a second amended complaint in the Stanislaus County action. Union demurred and moved to strike.
February 1987 Real party filed a third amended complaint. Petitioners demurred.
May 14, 1987 Judge Azevedo overruled demurrers.
July 23, 1987 Real party filed at-issue memorandum.
July 30, 1987 Real party moved to specially set trial date to be heard on shortened time. Petitioners responded with a request to dismiss the action on the ground real party had failed to bring the case to trial within five years.
August 6, 1987 Judge Azevedo denied the motion to dismiss finding that the five-year period had been extended two hundred twenty-five days to September 24, 1987, because of a stay in the prosecution of the action. Trial was specially set to commence 39 days later on September 14, 1987.
The question whether section 583.310 et seq. applies to coordination proceedings arises from the language of the court rules governing coordination of civil actions commenced in different courts. (Rule 1501 et seq.) Rule 1504(a) provides, (Emphasis added.)
Several of the Judicial Council rules arguably conflict with the statutory rules governing the time within which civil actions must be brought to trial. For example, rule 1503 entitled "Requests for Extensions of Time or to Shorten Time," provides, "The time within which any act ... required to be done by a party may be ... extended by the assigned judge upon such terms as may be just...." (Emphasis added.) From this rule it may be argued that the coordination trial judge has the authority to extend the time within which a party otherwise would be required to bring a coordinated action to trial under section 583.310. In other words, under the coordination rule, the statutory five-year rule would not limit the coordination trial judge's discretion to set a coordinated action for trial beyond the five-year period if he found this to be in the interest of justice under the circumstances. However, it is evident from both the title and the context of rule 1503 that it was designed to govern time extensions for the doing of pretrial acts and not for the act of bringing a coordinated action to trial.
Real party contends the automatic stay provided by rule 1529 conflicts with the section 583.310 time for bringing a civil action to trial. Thus, under rule 1504(a), the automatic stay provisions prevail. Rule 1529(a) provides that when a petition for coordination is granted, a copy of the order shall be filed forthwith in each included action. "When an order granting coordination is filed in an included action, all further proceedings in that action are automatically stayed, except as directed by the coordination trial judge...." (Rule 1529(b), emphasis added.) This rule literally construed suggests that once a copy of the coordination order is filed in the included actions, all further proceedings in the actions, including a trial of the actions, are stayed until some affirmative action is taken by the coordination trial judge to end the stay. Until such time as the coordination trial judge actually sets the case for trial, it cannot be tried. Thus, the time for trial of coordinated actions is within the sole discretion of the coordination trial judge regardless of the statutory time limits for the trial of civil actions generally.
However, rule 1529(b) must be read in conjunction with rules 1540 and 1541. Rule 1540 provides that upon the granting of a petition for coordination and the assignment of a coordination trial judge, the latter "immediately upon his assignment, ... may exercise all the powers over each coordinated action of a judge of the court in which that action is pending." (Emphasis added.) This means the coordination trial judge would have the power to dismiss an included action on its own motion or on motion of the defendant, after notice to the parties, if the action is not brought to trial within five years. (§§ 583.310, 583.360.) Thus, the coordination rules contemplate the applicability of the statutory five-year rule to coordinated actions.
Rule 1541(a) provides that the coordination trial judge shall hold a preliminary trial conference preferably within 30 days of the assignment order and at the conference establish a timetable for motions, discovery and the submission...
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