Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Redistricting Com'n Arizona Independent

• Decision Date: 20 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. CV-08-0161-PR.,CV-08-0161-PR.
• Citation: 220 Ariz. 587,208 P.3d 676
• Parties: ARIZONA MINORITY COALITION FOR FAIR REDISTRICTING, an unincorporated association; Ramon Valadez; State Representative Peter Rios; Carlos Avelar; Maricopa County Supervisor, Mary Rose Garrido Wilcox; Esther Lumm; Virginia Rivera; Los Abogados, an Arizona Corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION; Steven W. Lynn, in his official capacity as Chairman and a Commissioner thereof; Andrea Minkoff; in her official capacity as Vice Chairman and a Commissioner thereof; Daniel R. Elder, in his official capacity, as a Commissioner thereof; Joshua M. Hall, in his official capacity as a Commissioner thereof; James R. Huntwork, in his official capacity as a Commissioner thereof, Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

208 P.3d 676

220 Ariz. 587

ARIZONA MINORITY COALITION FOR FAIR REDISTRICTING, an unincorporated association; Ramon Valadez; State Representative Peter Rios; Carlos Avelar; Maricopa County Supervisor, Mary Rose Garrido Wilcox; Esther Lumm; Virginia Rivera; Los Abogados, an Arizona Corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION; Steven W. Lynn, in his official capacity as Chairman and a Commissioner thereof; Andrea Minkoff; in her official capacity as Vice Chairman and a Commissioner thereof; Daniel R. Elder, in his official capacity, as a Commissioner thereof; Joshua M. Hall, in his official capacity as a Commissioner thereof; James R. Huntwork, in his official capacity as a Commissioner thereof, Defendants/Appellants.

No. CV-08-0161-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.

May 20, 2009.

Perkins Coie Brown & Bain PA, by Paul F. Eckstein, Charles A. Blanchard, Rhonda L. Barnes, and Lewis and Roca LLP by Richard A. Halloran, Lawrence A. Kasten, Kimberly A. Demarchi, Phoenix, Attorneys for Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting, Ramon Valadez, Carlos Avelar, Peter Rios, Mary Rose Garrido Wilcox, Esther Lumm, Virginia Rivera, and Los Abogados.

Gammage & Burnham PLC, by Lisa T. Hauser, Cameron C. Artigue and Haralson Miller Pitt Feldman & McAnally PLC by Jose de Jesus Rivera, Peter T. Limperis, Phoenix, Attorneys for Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, Steven M. Lynn, Andrea M. Minkoff, Daniel R. Elder, Joshua M. Hall, and James R. Huntwork.

OPINION

McGREGOR, Chief Justice.

¶ 1 Arizona's Independent Redistricting Commission (the Commission) has the sole task of drawing congressional and state legislative districts. The Arizona Constitution provides procedural and substantive guidance to the Commission. This decision considers the nature of this guidance and the extent to which a court can review Commission decisions.

I.

¶ 2 In November 2000, Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, a citizen initiative that amended the Arizona Constitution by removing the power to draw congressional and state legislative districts from the state legislature and reassigning this task to the newly created Independent Redistricting Commission. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(3) and historical notes. The Commission consists of five volunteer commissioners appointed in a manner designed to assure diversity in political party affiliation and county of residence. See id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(3) to (8). The Commission on Appellate Court Appointments nominates candidates for the Commission, id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(4), and commissioners are then appointed from this pool of candidates, id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(6), (8). The Speaker of the House of Representatives appoints the first commissioner, followed, in order, by appointments by the minority leader of the House, by the President of the Senate, and by the minority leader of the Senate. Id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(6). Then, by majority vote, the four appointed commissioners select the fifth commissioner, who serves as the chair of the Commission, from the remaining candidates in the nomination pool. Id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(8). The commissioners then select one of their members to serve as the vice-chair of the Commission. Id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(9). Commissioners are appointed in "years ending in one" and serve concurrent ten-year terms. Id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(6), (23).

¶ 3 The constitution permits no more than two members of the Commission to be from the same political party and requires that the fifth commissioner not be registered with any party represented on the Commission at the time of appointment. Id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(3), (8). Candidates must demonstrate a commitment to performing the Commission's charge "in an honest, independent and impartial fashion and to upholding public confidence in the integrity of the redistricting process." Id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(3). All Commission members must be registered Arizona voters who have been "continuously registered with the same political party or registered as unaffiliated with a political party for three or more years immediately preceding appointment." Id.

¶ 4 The Commission requires a quorum of three commissioners, including the chair or vice-chair, to conduct business, and the Commission can take official action only with three or more affirmative votes. Id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(12). To ensure transparency, the Commission must conduct its business "in meetings open to the public, with 48 or more hours public notice provided." Id. ¶ 5 The sole task of the Commission is to establish congressional and legislative districts. Id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14). The Arizona Constitution directs the Commission to complete its task by following a specified procedure. First, the Commission must create "districts of equal population in a grid-like pattern across the state." Id. Working from that map, the Commission must next adjust the grid "as necessary to accommodate" six listed goals:

A. Districts shall comply with the United States constitution and the United States voting rights act;

B. Congressional districts shall have equal population to the extent practicable, and state legislative districts shall have equal population to the extent practicable;

C. Districts shall be geographically compact and contiguous to the extent practicable;

D. District boundaries shall respect communities of interest to the extent practicable;

E. To the extent practicable, district lines shall use visible geographic features, city, town and county boundaries, and undivided census tracts;

F. To the extent practicable, competitive districts should be favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals.

Id. The Commission must exclude "[p]arty registration and voting history data ... from the initial phase of the mapping process[,]" but may use that data to "test maps for compliance with the above goals." Id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(15). The Commission must "advertise a draft map" of both congressional and legislative districts to the public for at least thirty days to permit public comment. Id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(16). During the comment period, "[e]ither or both bodies of the legislature may ... make recommendations to the independent redistricting commission[,]" and those recommendations "shall be considered by the independent redistricting commission." Id. The Commission then establishes final district boundaries. Id.

II.

¶ 6 In May 2001, the Commission commenced the mapping process by creating a map with "districts of equal population in a grid-like pattern across the state" and adopting that map on June 7, 2001. See id. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14).¹ The Commission then held hearings during the next three weeks to solicit public input about the initial grid map. Between July 17 and August 17, 2001, the Commission adjusted the grid map to accommodate the first five of the six constitutional goals, but did not adjust for "competitiveness," the sixth goal.

¶ 7 On August 17, 2001, the Commission adopted a draft map. The Commission advertised this draft map for the constitutionally required thirty days and held another series of public hearings to obtain additional comment. After reviewing public comments and making further modifications to the draft map, on November 9, 2001, the Commission adopted a legislative map. It certified the legislative district boundaries and delivered the certification to the Arizona Secretary of State on November 15, 2001.

¶ 8 As required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000), on January 24, 2002, the Commission submitted the legislative and congressional redistricting plans to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) for preclearance.² The DOJ did not object to the congressional plan but, on May 20, 2002, denied preclearance of the legislative plan, stating that "the proposed plan, which results in a net loss of ... districts ... in which minority voters can effectively exercise their electoral franchise, is retrogressive." See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976) (noting that the purpose of Section 5 is to "insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise").

¶ 9 In May 2002, the Commission developed an emergency interim legislative plan to address the DOJ objections. On May 29, 2002, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona authorized use of the interim plan in the 2002 legislative elections. Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 230 F.Supp.2d 998, 1000-01 (D.Ariz.2002).

¶ 10 In June 2002, the Commission adjusted the interim plan, taking into consideration all six of the constitutional goals, including competitiveness. The Commission adopted a new draft map on June 25, 2002, and advertised that map to the public for thirty days. Following the comment period and some final minor adjustments, the Commission adopted a final legislative district map on August 14, 2002.

¶ 11 On March 6, 2002, the Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting and others (the Coalition) filed this action in superior court asserting that the legislative plan did not sufficiently favor competitive districts and therefore violated Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14)(F) because it did not create competitive districts when it was possible to do so.³ The Coalition alleged that the Commission's final map created "fewer, rather than more, competitive legislative districts" and it offered an alternative plan to better accomplish all the constitutional goals.

¶ 12 After a six-week bench trial in November and December 2003, the trial court concluded that the Commission had failed to favor the creation of competitive legislative districts and that this failure was arbitrary and capricious and a violation of section 1(14)(F). In reaching its...