Ryan v. Bethlehem Sparrows Point Shipyard, 6624.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1953
• Docket Number: No. 6624.,6624.
• Citation: 209 F.2d 53
• Parties: RYAN v. BETHLEHEM SPARROWS POINT SHIPYARD, Inc.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

209 F.2d 53 (1953)

RYAN v. BETHLEHEM SPARROWS POINT SHIPYARD, Inc.

No. 6624.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued November 10, 1953.

Decided December 12, 1953.

Robert E. Coughlan, Jr., Baltimore, Md. (Robert G. Sheller, Baltimore, Md., Joseph J. Brophy, New York City, and Lord, Whip and Coughlan, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellant.

Norman P. Ramsey, Baltimore, Md. (Rignal W. Baldwin, and Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.

Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.

DOBIE, Circuit Judge.

Ryan brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against Bethlehem Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc., (hereinafter called Bethlehem), seeking damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by him as the result of Bethlehem's negligence. The District Judge, on motion of Bethlehem, dismissed Ryan's complaint. On appeal, we held the motion was improvidently granted and remanded the case for further proceedings, 4 Cir., 192 F.2d 636.

On remand, the motion to dismiss was again granted. This motion was argued before the District Judge on a stipulation embracing facts material to the controversy as well as upon the pleadings, interrogatories and answers thereto, requests for admissions and answers thereto and upon two written contracts. Ryan has again appealed to us.

Appellant's complaint stated:

"* * * on or about March 24, 1950, the Plaintiff was lawfully and rightfully on the premises of the Defendant and had been engaged in changing a valve on a machine in the hold of a vessel which was being constructed by the Defendant, its agents, servants and employees, at Defendant\'s shipyard, Sparrows Point, Maryland, said vessel being known as Hull No. 4478. * * * The Plaintiff further states that he had completed his work and at about 3:30 P. M., was in the act of leaving the aforesaid vessel and while carefully and prudently using the scaffolding, planking or catwalks, which had been erected or built on said vessel by the Defendant, its agents, servants and employees, the scaffolding, planking or catwalks suddenly and without warning gave way and collapsed, causing the Plaintiff to fall a distance of about twelve (12) feet and as a result thereof to sustain serious, painful and permanent injuries * * *."

Appellee's motion to dismiss contained the following allegations:

"That the plaintiff was at the time of the accident an employee of the Carrier Corporation, a sub-contractor employed by the defendant to perform certain work necessary in the construction of said vessel and as such was under the coverage of the Workmen\'s Compensation Act of Maryland, Art. 101 Flack\'s Annotated Code of Maryland. That the defendant has secured compensation to its employees and their defendants in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen\'s Compensation Act, Art. 101, Flack\'s Annotated Code of Maryland, and the remedy of the plaintiff under the Workmen\'s Compensation Act is exclusive."

Article 101, § 63, of the Maryland Code provides:

"When any person as a principal contractor, undertakes to execute any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation which he has contracted to perform and contracts with any other person as sub-contractor, for the execution by or under the sub-contractor, of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal contractor, the principal contractor shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the execution of the work any compensation under this Article which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately employed by him; and where compensation is claimed from or proceedings are taken against the principal contractor, then, in the application of this Article, reference to the principal contractor shall be substituted for reference to the employer, except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference to the earnings of the workman under the employer by whom he is immediately employed."

The same Article 101, under Section 68 (3), provides:

"An employee and his employer who are not residents of this State and whose contract of hire is entered into in another State shall be exempted from the provisions of this Article while such employee is temporarily or intermittently within his State doing work for such non-resident employer, if such employer has furnished workmen\'s compensation insurance coverage under the workmen\'s compensation or similar laws of such other State, so as to cover such employee\'s employment while in this State; provided the extra-territorial provisions of this Article are recognized in such other State and provided employers and employees who are covered in this State are likewise exempted from the application of the workmen\'s compensation or similar laws of such other State. The benefits under the Workmen\'s Compensation Act or similar laws of such other State shall be the exclusive remedy against such employer for any injury, whether resulting in death or not, received by such employee while working for such employer in this State."

Ryan insists that the contract between the Carrier Corporation, his employer, and Bethlehem was a mere agreement to sell; that, accordingly, Carrier Corporation, under that contract, was a mere seller, not a sub-contractor under Bethlehem as prime contractor. He, accordingly, urges that the Maryland Compensation Acts do not apply to him and that he is, therefore, free to bring the instant civil action against Bethlehem. With this contention we agree. The judgment below must be reversed and the case must be remanded to the District Court for the trial of Ryan's civil action against Bethlehem on its merits.

It is clear from the record that Bethlehem had contracted to build the vessel in question for ...