U.S. v. Gatlin

• Decision Date: 01 August 1999
• Docket Number: Docket No. 99-1447
• Citation: 216 F.3d 207
• Parties: (2nd Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. MILTON GATLIN, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 207

216 F.3d 207 (2nd Cir. 2000)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. MILTON GATLIN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 99-1447

August Term, 1999

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Argued: January 31, 2000

Decided: June 15, 2000

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Carol B. Amon, Judge), convicting defendant, following a guilty plea, of sexually abusing a minor while within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2243(a). On appeal, defendant argues, inter alia, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over his crime, which was committed on a United States military installation in the Federal Republic of Germany. We agree.

Judgment of conviction reversed and indictment dismissed.

COLLEEN P. CASSIDY, Federal Defender Division Appeals Bureau, Legal Aid Society, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.

PAUL SCHOEMAN, Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York (Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, and Peter A. Norling, Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, of counsel), for Appellee.

Before: CABRANES and POOLER, Circuit Judges, and CARMAN, Judge^*.

JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

The question presented, as a matter of first impression for this Court, is whether a civilian may be prosecuted in federal court for conduct on a United States military installation overseas. For many years, it was standard practice to try civilians who committed crimes while accompanying the military in military courts martial. See, e.g., Robert Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L. REV. 461, 482-99 (1961). However, in a series of cases beginning with Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), the Supreme Court ruled this practice unconstitutional with respect to offenses committed during peacetime. See id.; Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 80 S.Ct. 297, 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); see also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). Since Reid and its progeny, representatives of the armed forces, other executive branch officials, government commissions, members of Congress, and academic commentators, among others, have noted the existence of a "jurisdictional gap"-that is, the lack of any congressional authorization to try civilians who commit crimes while accompanying the military overseas in civilian courts of the United States. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. On more than thirty occasions, Congress itself has considered, but failed to act on, bills that would close the jurisdictional gap. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.

In this appeal, we are confronted with a legacy of the jurisdictional gap created by the Supreme Court's decisions in Reid and subsequent cases. Defendant Milton Gatlin appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Carol B. Amon, Judge), convicting him, following a guilty plea, of sexually abusing a minor while within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2243(a). On appeal, Gatlin argues, inter alia, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over his case because the offense took place on property leased by the United States military in the Federal Republic of Germany. With regret, we agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and dismiss the indictment. At the same time, because the existence of this jurisdictional gap is an issue that we believe warrants serious congressional consideration, we direct the Clerk of the Court to forward a copy of this opinion to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Forces and Judiciary Committees.

I.

The facts relevant to this appeal are essentially undisputed and can be stated briefly. In March 1993, Gatlin married Gail Taylor, a sergeant in the United States Army and the mother of two daughters, Claudia and Deaquanita, from a previous union. Between February 1994 and August 1997, Taylor was stationed at a U.S. Army base in Darmstadt, Germany. During that time, Gatlin and Taylor lived, together with Claudia and Deaquanita, in Lincoln Village, a housing complex on the base. Gatlin neither was a member of the United States armed forces nor was employed by the United States military in any capacity.

The United States military leases Lincoln Village from Germany, for no rent and an indefinite term, pursuant to an Accommodation Consignment Agreement (the "Agreement"). The Agreement specifies that Lincoln Village is for the "exclusive use" of the United States military, and provides that the "rights and obligations" of the parties over the premises are governed by, inter alia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement (the "SOFA"), see Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792 (entered into force Aug. 23, 1953). In turn, Article VII of the SOFA provides, inter alia, that the "military authorities" of a "sending State"-in this case, the United States-"shall have the right to exercise within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of that State." Id. art. VII, §1(a), 4 U.S.T. at 1798.¹

Sometime in or around August 1996, while Taylor was on duty in Bosnia, Gatlin (who was 34 years old at the time) began having sexual intercourse clandestinely with Claudia (who was 13 years old at the time) in Lincoln Village. Gatlin continued to have sexual intercourse with Claudia regularly, through at least January 1997. In September 1997, after Gatlin, Taylor, Claudia, and Deaquanita had returned to the United States, Claudia gave birth to a child. Soon thereafter, during an argument with Taylor, Claudia revealed for the first time that she and Gatlin had engaged in sexual intercourse and that Gatlin was the father of her child. A subsequent genetic test confirmed Gatlin's paternity.

Gatlin was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York with engaging in sexual acts with a minor within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2243(a).² After pleading guilty before a magistrate judge, but prior to acceptance of the guilty plea by Judge Amon, Gatlin moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction. Following oral argument on the motion, Judge Amon concluded, in a ruling from the bench, that Lincoln Village was within the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) and that the Court therefore had jurisdiction over Gatlin's crimes.³ Accordingly, she denied Gatlin's motion to dismiss the indictment and accepted his guilty plea.

On July 16, 1999, Judge Amon sentenced Gatlin principally to 51 months' imprisonment-to be followed by three years' supervised release-and ordered him to pay $1000 in restitution. This appeal followed.

II.

The particular question presented in this appeal is whether 18 U.S.C. §2243(a), which prohibits the sexual abuse of a minor while "in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," applies to conduct on a United States military installation outside the territorial United States. The answer to this question depends, in turn, on another, more significant question of first impression: whether 18 U.S.C. §7(3), which is incorporated by reference into §2243(a) and which defines the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" to include "[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof," applies extraterritorially. We conclude, contrary to the District Court, that §7(3) does not apply extraterritorially and that §2243(a) cannot, therefore, apply to Gatlin's acts. Accordingly, we reverse Gatlin's conviction and dismiss the indictment. ⁴

A.

At the outset, it is important to note that neither party disputes the authority of Congress to regulate the conduct of its citizens and nationals outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("Aramco") ("Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States."); cf. Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 435, 519 (1935) ("The competence of the State to prosecute and punish its nationals on the sole basis of their nationality is universally conceded."). Thus, the issue in this case is one of congressional intent-that is, statutory construction-not of congressional power.

In determining whether a statute applies extraterritorially, we are guided by a general "presumption that Acts of Congress do not ordinarily apply outside our borders." Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173 (1993); see Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 ("It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989) ("When it desires to do so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute."). This "canon of construction," Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted), is "rooted in a number of considerations," Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993). It ...